Enryō Inoue’s *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* and Kitarō Nishida

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Foreword

That Enryō Inoue’s *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* ("Philosophical Talks") was the motivation for Kitarō Nishida’s philosophical aspirations is a well-known fact. In an interview that is contained in the newly published complete works of Nishida, he made the following comment.

I was not always inclined to philosophy; I was actually considering science, but then a man named Enryō Inoue handed out a small pamphlet called *Tetsugaku Issekiwa*. I read it and found it extremely interesting; it motivated me to gradually enter the field of philosophy. (NKZ24-80)

It appears that his views were also shared with his disciples. Masaaki Kōsaka reports: “When I asked the teacher what philosophical books he had read, he replied, ‘There is one by Enryō Inoue called *Tetsugaku Issekiwa*. Of course you would not know it, but reading that book left a lasting impression on me.’ Of course I do not know contents of the book what written by such a scholar of mysterious, nor do I know when it was that the teacher read it” (Kōsaka, 1947-1965:22). According to Michiko Yusa, Motomori Kimura reported something similar (Yusa, 1998:42). In September 1888, Nishida enrolled in the Department of Humanities at the Fourth Higher School. It is probable that Nishida, who lived in Kanazawa, must have read *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* immediately after it was published, which then inspired him to change his focus from sciences to humanities, as he claimed in his interview1.

It should be noted here that Kōsaka, who was born in 1900 and grew up in the Taisho era, had not read the first issue of *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* and was completely unfamiliar with its contents; whereas Nishida had read the book in-depth as a student at one of Kanazawa’s Senior High Schools. Nishida even mentioned to Kōsaka, “Of course you would not know of it.” Nevertheless, Kōsaka was aware of Enryō as “the scholar of mysterious;” indicating that Enryō was known to Kōsaka as a prominent figure in the *Yokaigaku* (the study of the supernatural). This suggests that Enryō’s activities were widely known even at a time when his philosophy was not being read.

Nishida was undoubtedly influenced by Enryō’s *Tetsugaku Issekiwa*. He once asked, “What philosophy would there be without problems in life?” (NKZ6-428). But Nishida’s question addressed the field of philosophy as a whole, not just a worldview or ethics. When Nishida was a professor at Kanazawa’s the Fourth Higher School, he wrote a letter seeking a position at the University in Tokyo, in which he repeatedly pointed out his “specialization in metaphysics and theory of knowledge or Erkenntnislehre” (NKZ19-134; NKZ19-137); it was definitely metaphysics that Enryō Inoue expounded in *Tetsugaku Issekiwa*2.

In this sense, *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* had a strong influence on Nishida’s philosophical aspirations. However, scholars have never scrutinized how much impact this work had on the contents of Nishida’s philosophy. Shinichi Funayama asserts that the “theory of phenomena as reality” inspired by Enryō was established by Tetsujirō Inoue and perfected by Kitarō Nishida3. However, although Nishida was always grateful and indebted to Tetsujirō Inoue, he was dismissive of his philosophy4.
Consequently, the pedigree of theory of phenomena as reality cannot be taken as a simple direct line from Enryō Inoue through Tetsujirō Inoue to Kitarō Nishida. It is necessary first of all to elucidate the content of Enryō Inoue’s *Tetsugaku Issekiwa*, the catalyst of “theory of phenomena as reality.”

This paper examines Enryō Inoue’s *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* against the background of issues described above (Section 1–3). It goes on to discuss the linkage between Enryō Inoue’s *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* and Kitarō Nishida’s *An Inquiry into the Good* (Section 4).

1. Examination of *Tetsugaku Issekiwa* (Volume 1)

*Tetsugaku Issekiwa* comprises three volumes and takes the form of a dialogue. All three volumes are based on discussions among Enryō’s disciples, with Enryō passing a verdict when the discussion can go no further. Let us first analyze Volume 1 in detail to understand the basic scheme of Enryō’s philosophy.

In Volume 1, titled “Discussion on the Relationship between the world of material and world of mind,” the main topic is a debate between monism and pluralism (in Enryō’s words, the viewpoint of indiscrimination vs. discrimination). This debate is between two characters—Ryōsui and Enzan—advocating mentalist monism and pluralism, respectively. Shinichi Funayama stated that Volume 1 is a “dialogue between materialist Enzan and mentalist Ryōsui” (Funayama, 1959-1999:109), and consequently he often misinterprets Enzan as a materialist; however, Enzan cannot be called a materialist, because his outlook on pluralism incorporates a physical-mind dualism with clear distinctions between mind and matter. The debate is clearly between a perspective with clear distinctions between mind and matter and that of mentalistic monism; therefore, the relationship between the world of material and world of mind is of essence.

The dialogue begins with a statement by Enzan that finite existence can have no knowledge of a world of infinite time and space. Ryōsui, the advocate of mentalist monism, begins by asserting that everything can be known because everything exists within the mind. He replied that “time and space are an image described by human minds; the whole world exists in the mind and the entirety of creation is a representation of it” (IES1-36).

As a basis for asserting that everything exists within the mind, Ryōsui points out that all things are composed around the five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. These senses cannot hold true without the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, or body; therefore, all things are nothing more than phenomena of the five senses (IES1-36). Even the idea that something exists outside the mind at this moment is a conjecture by the mind itself that “something exists outside”; even the idea that something is unknown emanates from the result of a thinking process that “something is unknown.” Consequently, it can be said that “there is nothing outside of the mind” (IES1-38).

However, Enzan refutes Ryōsui’s claim. Even if this thinking process exists, both Enzan and Ryōsui have their own minds. If one of them were to die, the mind of the other would not vanish and some substance would be left behind. In other words, if all things are subsumed into a mind, why does discrimination occur? Ryōsui was unable to answer this question (IES1-39).

Similarly, when Enzan expands his idea of pluralism, in which discrimination exists in everything, Ryōsui immediately refutes him. Ryōsui asks whether there is discrimination between mind and matter, and Enzan responds in the affirmative. In response, on the basis of the fact that matter is unaware of the distinction between mind and matter, Ryōsui puts forward the counterargument that discrimination between mind and matter is an action of the mind (IES1-40).

Ryōsui furthers the counterargument by saying that at the beginning of the universe, when there was nothing but inorganic substances, if everything was destroyed and the universe “had nothing,” discrimination would not be possible. This is monism from an evolutionary standpoint, which states that organic substances created from inorganic matter and the beings born with minds will soon return to nothingness. The discrimination is produced by the indiscrimination, and will before long return to the indiscrimination (IES1-41ff). Enzan was unable to respond to this counterargument.

Thus, Ryōsui reaches the conclusion that “even if he knows of the existence of the indiscriminate mind, he cannot
understand the fact that there is discrimination between mind and matter within that mind,” while Enzan reaches the conclusion that “even if he knows of the discrimination between mind and matter, he cannot know of the indiscrimination to which discrimination turns” (IES1-43). If one assumes there is no discrimination, one cannot explain the distinction that exists between oneself and others; if one assumes there is discrimination, one cannot explain that there once was or will be indiscrimination. Thereupon Enzan and Ryōsui sought the instruction of Enryō.

On Enryō’s great path discrimination and indiscrimination are one. While Ryōsui tends toward indiscrimination and Enzan toward discrimination, Enryō explains to them the coexistence of discrimination and indiscrimination: If one looks through the surface, one can know the existence of the reverse side. If one looks through the reverse side, one can know the existence of the surface. Furthermore, the surface and reverse side are not separate entities, but rather two sides of a single entity (IES1-43). From the standpoint of matter, one can see the existence of the non-corporeal mind; whereas from the standpoint of the mind, one can see the existence of matter as something that is separate from the mind. However, from Enzan’s discrimination standpoint, one cannot see that indiscrimination is actually nothing more than two sides of one entity. Conversely, from Ryōsui’s standpoint, which favors an indiscriminate whole, the two-sided discrimination that exists within that whole is unknown.

Enryō’s great path, which thus incorporates discrimination as a whole, has a dynamism that transposes from the discriminate to indiscriminate and vice versa. Enzan questions why so few individuals presently know about the principle of indiscrimination; Enryō answers that it is because discrimination rises to the surface. Further, to Enzan’s repeated question of why there was no discrimination in ancient times, Enryō replies that although there appeared to be no discrimination in ancient times, the fact was that indiscrimination was only on the surface, while discrimination existed within. However, discrimination at length rose to the surface. However, when the world ends, indiscrimination will again rise to the surface (IES1-44f). Enryō expresses such progress from an indiscriminate stage to a discriminate one and the eventual movement of a discriminate stage to an indiscriminate one as follows:

The whole entity incorporates indiscrimination on one side, and discrimination on the other. The transition is made through the power of the whole entity. At times the discriminate side is shown, while at others the indiscriminate side is shown. It is not known when that change will begin or when it will end (IES1-45).

The great path advocated by Enryō is not based on an indiscriminate standpoint (monism) or a discriminate one (pluralism), but rather it unites the two (one yet many). It possesses a dynamism that is constantly active from the one to the many and from the many to the one. Enryō states, “It is always turning through the power of the whole; it does not stop for a second. It is one great living being” (IES1-47). Enryō’s great path is the dynamism itself that moves as one great being.

2. Examination of Tetsugaku Issekiwa (Volume 2)

Volume 2, titled “Discussion on the Substance of Divinity,” discusses a debate between atheism and theism. Atheism here is divided into materialistic atheism and mentalistic atheism, and theism is divided into whether divinity is separate from mind and matter. It is presented as a discussion among four of Enryō’s disciples.

Entō advocates that everything is derived from matter and its energy, and he is unable to answer the question, “Was matter the element that formed matter?” (IES1-56). If element was matter, then an element must have existed before matter to form the element from which matter was composed. If that element was not matter, how could matter have been formed by something that was not matter? He is also unable to answer how we could know the energy within matter (IES1-56f).

Ryōsei advocates that everything exists within the mind, and is unable to answer the counterargument that “even if changes in matter occur in thought, thought itself is powerless to change matter by simply witnessing change.” If changes in matter are caused by energy within a material, it cannot be said that everything exists within the mind (IES1-59f).
Theism appears here as a contrast to atheism. The “gods” are mentioned as having produced the worlds of mind and matter, and are capable of making changes in the two worlds. There are two viewpoints on the relationship between the gods and mind and matter. The first perspective is that of Ennan, who believes that the gods must exist as their creator because mind and matter exist and that the gods are separate from mind and matter. However, this perspective, by which the gods are assumed to exist outside of the universe, cannot answer the question about a reality outside of time and space. The question also arises of how the gods created mind and matter. If the gods brought materials from somewhere to create the world, what were these materials like and where did they come from? It is difficult to believe that something came out of nothing (IES1-62).

Therefore, Ennan responds by saying “perhaps the gods used part of themselves to create the universe” (IES1-62). However, if the gods used themselves to create everything, mind and matter cannot be said to be separate from the gods.

By contrast, Ryōhoku holds the viewpoint that parts of the gods are within and outside the universe. The parts that are within the universe can be known, while the parts outside the universe are unknown. However, he is unable to answer why there would be unknowable gods instead of knowable gods (IES1-63f). Ryōhoku stated, “I have known for the first time now that the substance of the gods, the entirety of which comprises mind and matter, cannot exist separate from this world” (IES1-64).

At this point, the opinions of the four disciples are suddenly in agreement. First, Entō, the materialistic atheist, says that his own theory agrees with Ryōhoku’s theory that mind and matter comprise the entirety of the gods. Moreover, although Entō says that there is no mind without matter, this does not mean that there is no discrimination at all. The movement of the “one great living being” produces various discriminations, giving rise to various dispositions as well. Entō calls the dynamism of the “one great living being,” which enables this discrimination, the “substance of indiscrimination,” but he asserts that if it were called “the gods,” it would be identical to Ryōhoku’s theory (IES1-64).

Ryōsei, who advocates mentalistic atheism, also claims to agree with the theories of Ryōhoku and Entō. Even if everything exists within the mind, it does not mean that discrimination does not exist; the indiscriminate impartial mind exists, as do the discriminate mind and matter. If these were called “the gods” or “the substance of indiscrimination,” then his theory would match those of Ryōhoku’s and Entō’s (IES1-64).

Furthermore, Ennan also claims to have a theory that coincides with this. If the gods, as an impartial mind, are distinct from the discriminate mind and matter, then the gods can be considered as being outside of the discriminate mind and matter. He asserts that this does not contradict his own theory that the gods exist outside of mind and matter (IES1-64f).

Ryōhoku also asserts that his initial theory that parts of the gods exist outside of mind and matter and another parts of gods exist within mind and matter was not mistaken. If there is a division between the impartial mind and the discriminate mind and matter, then the gods exist outside of mind and matter; if the impartial mind is the essence of discriminate mind and matter, then the gods exist within mind and matter (IES1-65).

On the basis of this agreement in opinion, the four disciples sought the opinion of Enryō. However, Enryō does not confirm the veracity of any one opinion, but instead warns that “absolute truth can only be found by combining all four theories” (IES1-65). The four disciples are not to favor any one theory, but to find the middle road, the “path of Enryō.” In corporeal terms, the “path of Enryō” is materialism; in ethereal terms, it is mentalism; in spiritual terms, it is theism. The “path of Enryō” has a body that is “neither arising nor ceasing,” “neither increasing nor decreasing,” “neither beginning nor ending,” and “boundless and unlimited” (the body of Enryō); from the power of that body emanates “innumerable” changes (the power of Enryō); within it are shown all areas of discrimination, which together return to the principle of indiscrimination (the great change of Enryō). Thus, the fact that Enryō's path is considered to be endowed with the power to transpose by itself and to return to indiscrimination while creating discrimination, is of particular importance to the discussion in this paper (IES1-67).

3. Examination of Tetsugaku Issekiwa (Volume 3)

Volume 3, titled “Discussion on the Nature of Truth,” deals with the subject of how truth should be considered. Enten
argues for empirical truth; Ryōchi argues for mentalistic truth; Ryōin argues that truth is the consistency between the internal and external; Enyō argues that truth is founded on “the gods.”

Enten takes a standpoint that truth comprises simple and axiomatic rules that develop into more complex rules. The simple and axiomatic rules can be experienced by anyone whose intellect develops. However, the counterargument exists that if truth is based on experience, it cannot be eternally constant. A further counterargument exists that drawing a boundary between simple and complex rules requires criteria for truth to determine that the simple rules are indeed simple rules. Enten was unable to answer these counterarguments (IES1-71ff.).

Ryōchi asserts that the basis of truth is “thought.” However, thought can also be mistaken; therefore, there are three principles of thought-truth: the law of identity, the law of contradiction, and the law of excluded middle. However, he was unable to answer the counterargument that these principles could not stand without the experience of uniformity or a contradiction between things (IES1-76).

Ryōin takes a standpoint that truth exists where external experience and internal thought coincide. This standpoint advocates that there is an inductive method of gaining truth through external experiences and a deductive method of viewing the state of external elements through internal truth, and that truth exists where the two are in agreement. However, he was unable to accurately answer Enten’s counterargument that internal thought-truth is derived from external experiences, and Ryōchi’s counterargument that all external truth is also known through internal thought (IES1-79).

Last, Enyō asserts that because neither the external (matter) nor the internal (mind) can be a standard of truth, the basis of truth must be the gods, who exist outside of mind and matter. However, the truth of mind and matter cannot be determined simply by existing outside of mind and matter; therefore, certain rules of the gods must exist within mind and matter. If that is the case, the basis of truth is within the world of mind and matter. This poses the question of why the gods, who explicitly cannot be known, must exist outside of mind and matter (IES1-80).

With the argument thus coming to an impasse, the disciples decide to ask for Enryō’s advice (IES1-81ff.). Enryō explains that the four disciples have not reached “logical impartiality,” and advocates the truth through the great path of Enryō. There is no separation between the phenomenal world and its substance (the non-phenomenal: the substance of mind, substance of matter, and substance of divinity); phenomenal or non-phenomenal, mind or matter, all are one entity. On the great path of Enryō, all is truth. However, the great path has a department of indiscrimination and a department of discrimination; at the department of discrimination, there is a distinction between truth and untruth. This requires a standard for truth, but one that is relative to the situation. This is why each of the four disciples has his own position on relative truth. However, “as one moves forward and reaches the standard within the standards, one sees the existence of something not easily given to change. One sees the principle of impartiality within the department of discrimination; that which changes takes this as a relative standard; that which does not change takes this as an absolute standard; one advances from the relative to the absolute. This is called the evolution of the standard” (IES1-83). By drawing out the relative standpoint to its fullest extent, one eventually reaches the standard of absolute truth and returns to the great path of Enryō. It is noteworthy that a standpoint of discrimination evolves into one that is absolute, as indicated through the “evolution of the standard.” This indicates that there is no separation between the relative and absolute standpoints and that the absolute is considered to be the dynamism that progresses from relative to absolute.

4. Links between Enryō Inoue’s Tetsugaku Issekiwa and Kitarō Nishida’s An Inquiry into the Good

As outlined above, Enryō Inoue’s Tetsugaku Issekiwa depicts the great path of Enryō as the dynamism that moves from the indiscriminate to the discriminate and vice versa, and from the relative to the absolute. Characteristically, it aims for impartiality rather than favoring a particular standpoint. The aiming for impartiality is also expressed as “the great path of Enryō.” In regard to associating the great path with his own name—great path of Enryō—in the preface to the Volume 2, Enryō stated that, “I had no choice but to use my own name, as I could not reuse the terms used by ancient Buddhism” (IES1-48).
Had he used the term *tathāta*, for example, it would have been taken as favoring the Buddhist doctrine, and would have run the risk of being partial. Throughout *Tetsugaku Issekiwa*, Enryō persistently aims for metaphysics as pure philosophy, having no wish that it be considered as a bias toward Buddhism.

In contrast to Enryō’s *Tetsugaku Issekiwa*, what philosophy did Nishida aim to promote? In this paper we do not examine Nishida’s philosophy in detail; however, the bare essentials of it can be seen in his first philosophical work, *An Inquiry into the Good*.

Nishida’s *An Inquiry into the Good* speaks of pure experience. His famous words are found at the beginning of *An Inquiry into the Good*: “The moment of seeing a color or hearing a sound, for example, is prior not only to the thought that the color or sound is the activity of an external object or that one is sensing it, but also to the judgment of what the color or sound might be” (NKZ1-9). The state of no distinction between subjective and objective is called pure experience. However, this does not simply mean instantaneous perception of an instant. Pure experience is something that moves. “We can shift our attention to a state of no distinction between subjective and objective without the slightest thought. For example, like climbing a cliff with all of one’s might, or a musician playing a well-practiced piece, this continual perception can all be called a perceptual train (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 252)” (NKZ1-11). When the musician plays the violin, the musician is not necessarily aware that he is a musician or is playing a violin. The musician is immersed in playing the song; likewise, the violin is not aware that it is an object. There is no distinction between the “subject” playing the violin and the “object” being played; thus, the state or performance progresses and the structure or song takes shape. Nishida states that “even those who seem to have instantaneous perception cannot always stay this way; for example, one believes that one sees the entirety of an object at a glance, but it is not until one examines the object in further detail that one can know the entirety of it, as the attention naturally shifts with the movement of the eye” (NKZ1-12f.), indicating that even instantaneous perception is a system in itself. Even if he believes that we perceive the entirety of an object in an instant, the perception made within the eye’s movement of the object and the action therein already forms a continuous system.

Thus, pure experience is an action that comprises a continuous system. Moreover, there are two states of being within this action: contradiction and unity. Nishida stated the following.

> In the establishment of reality, it is necessary to have unity at the root, as previously mentioned, as well as reciprocal antagonism, or rather contradiction. Like Heraclitus’s assertion that contention is the father of all things, reality is established by contradiction. Something red contrasts with something that is not red; the working is established in contrast to the one for whom the work is done. When this contradiction disappears, reality also disappears. Contradiction and unity are essentially nothing more than two sides of the same coin; there is contradiction because there is unity, and there is unity because there is contradiction (NKZ1-68f.).

This means that just as the color red results from its relationship with a color that is not red, i.e., where unity occurs, a contradiction will also be included. Furthermore, this also means that the occurrence of red in a contradictory relationship with other colors occurs within the system of colors as a unit. The establishment of unity as a whole incorporates much contradiction; conversely, much contradiction establishes unity as a whole. Nishida therefore makes the following statement:

> A reality that is truly one yet many must be constantly moving of itself. A state of stillness is a state of independence, free of conflict with others; that is, a state of one that eliminates the many. However, reality cannot be established in this state. If a state of oneness were established through unity, another state of conflict would have to be established immediately. Moreover, if the unity of one were established, disunity would immediately be established to break it up. As I have mentioned, true reality is established through endless conflict (NKZ1-70).

For Kitarō Nishida, pure experience is being endowed with a moving dynamism that incorporates both contradiction and
unity. Being in a state of unity is having already been in a state of contradiction and advancing toward further unity through that contradiction. Thus, it always moves from unity to greater unity while incorporating contradiction. Contradiction and unity do not exist independently; they form a single dynamism. As mentioned, it is constantly moving of itself; it continues to move by means of its own power.

From the above discussion, there is clearly some similarity between Kitarō Nishida’s “pure experience” and Enryō’s “great path of Enryō.” Both Enryō’s Tetsugaku Issekiwa and Kitarō Nishida’s An Inquiry into the Good, address the issues such as discrimination and indiscrimination, the one and the many, contradiction and unity, and the one dynamism wherein there is no separation between the two. They do not treat discrimination and indiscrimination, or contradiction and unity, as separate entities, both are viewed together as two sides of a single movement. In terms of his view on the dynamism of movement in which the one and the many become one, Kitarō Nishida’s An Inquiry into the Good could be said to be an extension of Enryō Inoue’s Tetsugaku Issekiwa.

In addition, of importance is the fact that neither Enryō’s “great path” nor Nishida’s “pure experience” is a term with Buddhist origins. Although both Enryō and Nishida had Buddhist influences, they both tried to construct metaphysics and pure philosophy that are distinct from Buddhism.

Since Kitarō Nishida himself makes no mention of Enryō Inoue or Tetsujirō Inoue in his philosophical works, it is difficult to consider a direct influential connection. However, Nishida can at least be accounted for a part of Meiji philosophy inspired by Enryō.

Conclusion

This paper has presented an overview of Enryō Inoue’s Tetsugaku Issekiwa and examined its links with Kitarō Nishida’s An Inquiry into the Good. Just as Enryō considered dynamism between discrimination on the one hand, and indiscrimination to be the “great path of Enryō” in Tetsugaku Issekiwa on the other, Nishida considered pure experience to be the dynamism of contradiction and unity in An Inquiry into the Good. In the sense of treating reality as being two-sided and moving the entity made up of the one and the many, Nishida’s philosophy is said to be a continuation of Enryō Inoue’s philosophy.

Nishida writes, “I do not know what influenced me, but from very early on I thought that reality as it is had to be the truth, that the so-called material world is nothing more than what we perceive it to be. I still remember being lost in my thoughts walking the streets of Kanazawa as if I was dreaming when I was still at Senior High School” (NKZ1-4). This concept of reality being “the reality as it is” was not motionless and unchanging when it emerged complete as “pure experience.” It moved with contradictions within it and formed a single system. We do not know whether Nishida thought “reality has to be the truth as it is” when he read Tetsugaku Issekiwa in Senior High School. It seems more likely that it was because he thought this way that he felt so deeply the impact of Tetsugaku Issekiwa. Nevertheless, An Inquiry into the Good and Tetsugaku Issekiwa can be thought of as a successive flow of a single philosophy that perceives reality as a moving dynamism with two sides: the one and the many.

However, there is a need to analyze whether this continuity can be considered as part of the pedigree of “theory of phenomena as reality,” mentioned by Shinichi Funayama. Enryō himself does not use the term “theory of phenomena as reality.” Moreover, a comparison of it with Tetsujirō Inoue’s philosophy, an advocate of both Enryō’s philosophy and “theory of phenomena as reality,” as well as an examination of Enryō’s philosophy in its entirety is required. Of more importance is the comparison of Kitarō Nishida’s and Tetsujirō Inoue’s philosophy.

While Kitarō Nishida’s and Enryō Inoue’s philosophy share common aspects, there are also clear differences. Further study is required to ascertain whether these differences are conclusive, or whether they indicate completion or a subjugation of Enryō’s philosophy10.

Since we limit this paper to concepts of immediate liaison, these shall be discussed in detail at a later opportunity.
In this personal journal, Nishida always refers to Tetsujirō Inoue by the reverential title of "teacher." Nishida's daughter Shizuko also stated,

Other citations in the document body and the footnotes are given as: (Name of author, year of publication: page number). The works in question are cited in the reference list below. Where a reference has been made to a compilation or a revised edition, the date of its first publication is given in parentheses, beside the name of the work in the reference list, with the new date indicated by an arrow → in the main text references. In these instances, the page number indicates that of the revised work given in the reference list.

Suspension points within a citation (…) indicate ellipsis. Any author's note added to a citation is indicated within parentheses and clearly specified.

Notes

1. The first edition of Tetsugaku Issekiwa (Volume 1) was published in July 1887; the first edition of Volume 3 was published in April 1888.
2. Enryō stated that, “I decided to write several volumes of Tetsugaku Issekiwa with the desire to demonstrate these metaphysical questions and explanations to those who know nothing at all of philosophy” (IES1-34).
3. Shinichi Funayama stated, “Nishida’s logic is a development and completion of theory of phenomena as reality of Enryō Inoue, Tetsujirō Inoue, Yūjirō Miyake, and Manshi Kiyosawa” (Funayama, 1959-1999:60), and “Meiji philosophy made a departure from Nishi Amane; its idealism was established by Tetsujirō Inoue and perfected by Kitarō Nishida” (Funayama, 1959-1999:75). Regarding Enryō Inoue, Funayama stated, “… his [Enryō Inoue] theory of phenomena as reality was the earliest it to appear in the Meiji Period, yet it was the most representative and the simplest” (Funayama, 1959-1999:108).
4. In his personal journal, Nishida always refers to Tetsujirō Inoue by the reverential title of “teacher.” Nishida’s daughter Shizuko also stated, “I remember hearing the word ‘teacher’ from my father’s mouth and wondering whether he meant Prof. Hōjō, Dr. Koeber, or Tetsujirō Inoue” (Shizuko Nishida, 1948:91). However, in a 1908 letter to Yūji Tanabe, he stated, “I do not have much admiration for Inoue’s work. I had spoken ill of teacher Inoue and been rude to him” (NKZ19-135). Again, in a 1922 letter to Tokuryū Yamauchi, he remarked, “I am jealous that Mr. Inoue bought the complete works of Bolzano. I cannot help but feel that it is a little like throwing pearls before swine” (NKZ20-40).
5. A commentary on selections from Enryō Inoue also had mentioned that “the two disciples make their arguments from the standpoint of materialism and mentalism” (IES1-428).
6. Akihira Ogura also pointed out that Enzan advocates a corporeal-mind dualism (Ogura, 2009:70).
7. Katsuhiro Inoue asserts that Enryō’s theory of phenomena as reality took shape under the influence of Tanzan Hara’s lectures on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (Inoue, 2011:159). Indeed, certain elements could be considered as having Buddhist origins, such as the figurative speech of water and waves. However, it must be noted that the work aimed at impartiality and did not focus exclusively on the Buddhist standpoint. “We hear that Tanzan Hara is a university philosophy teacher and Buddhism scholar. It shall be that Buddhism is philosophy” (IES1-33)—Katsuhiro Inoue also uses the statement from the preface of Volume 1 to support the claim that Enryō’s Tetsugaku Issekiwa was based on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna. However, this statement is given to exemplify that there are people who think of philosophy as “psychology, Confucianism, and Buddhism.” Enryō’s response and attempt to demonstrate pure philosophy is Tetsugaku Issekiwa.
8. For a detailed exposition of Kitarō Nishida’s An Inquiry into the Good, see (Shirai, 2011:121ff.).
9. Satomi Takahashi criticizes the viewing of unity and contradiction as a single state of pure experience by deeming it as “diluting and adulterating pure experience without knowing or understanding it. He believed that he was advocating this, but in fact he was repudiating it” (Takahashi, 1912-1973:162). He disapproved of the assertion that pure experience as a state of unity without informed judgment can also incorporate disunity. For Nishida’s response to this, see Response to a Criticism of My Work: An Inquiry into the Good by Satomi Takahashi, B.A. (NKZ1-299ff.).
10. Yoshihiko Nitta compares Tetsujirō Inoue’s to Enryō Inoue’s philosophy and assesses that Enryō is a step ahead in terms of perceiving reality as dynamism (Nitta, 1988:80). Nitta states, “In pursuing the later developments of theory of phenomena as reality in modern Japan, we see that it was left undeveloped in Enryō’s philosophy; however, this was finally and thoroughly developed in Kitarō Nishida’s idea of ‘self-determination’” (Nitta, 1988:99).
References


