Is globalization of philosophy possible?

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If you define philosophy as finding a simple principle from which all cultural virtues that have reality, truth, or important meaning for human beings can be derived, you would be asked why there cannot be a meaning for the existence of philosophy if the assumption is made that philosophy would be an impossibility as such. As for the perspective in which all cultural virtues can be grasped by putting up a gate called a phenomenological reflection in the channel called consciousness because all the cultural virtues always go through the channel, I reject the phenomenology because it has to allow the unreasonable precondition that phenomenological reflection is effective for the entire scope of consciousness. (See “Phenomenology worse than anything else,” recorded in Hisatake Kato Philosophy of Forms in 2008. Gendai Bunko of Iwanami Shoten Publishers, Chapter 18, pp. 222-234.)

The suggestion that a gate should be put up in the channel of language, not consciousness, just faces the problem that the entire content of language is not understood in advance.

Before extending the target of consideration, toward experience or experience of consciousness for example, it is also necessary to examine the approach of derivation from a single principle. There is no possibility that philosophical knowledge could assume a form of deduction based on principle. Before considering what kind of architecture should be created as philosophy, whether the philosophy is necessary or not should be considered.

Philosophy is an integration of self-recognition in each field for preventing various fields from becoming words in the Tower of Babel because of the diversification of human activities. For example, faith from Pietism and Newtonian mechanics had existed before Kant, and thus it was thought that an incompatible state had been brought about between faith and scientific fact. Kant created a perspective of integration by exploring in-depth self-recognition in the fields of the philosophy of religion and epistemology. It clarifies the grounds of the formation of each of them, not using the method of indicating the common root from which religion and science branch away.

Human beings belong to multiple intellectual and spiritual fields. All the fields, including faith, science, law, economy, and art, suppress, constrain, release, uplift, or soothe the human mind. For making autonomous determination and satisfactory selections from them, human beings must have an awareness of the heterogeneity, homogeneity, compatibility, and incompatibility of each of the intellectual and spiritual fields.

Universal Thought (1975, 1999) by Hajime Nakamura describes the possibility of listing in an integrative matrix the ideas of all ages and cultures in the whole world in the form of the relationship between a common denominator and what is specific to a particular culture.

“In the newly developed cities, freedom of ideas was permitted to some degree. At least, social pressure of rural communicates had been decreasing. Then a wide variety of thinkers appeared and philosophized freely, indulging themselves in stating their own dogmas. Sophists emerged in ancient Greece while wandering monks called Shramana emerged in India. While Sophists, or philosophers, were recognized as an opinion leader in Greece, the new way of thinking and behaviors of the wandering monks were respected and trusted the most in India.” (Hajime Nakamura, Universal Thought. Shunjusha Publishing Company, 1999, p. 10) Nakamura seems to disagree with Plato on the estimation of Sophists.

Nakamura tried to state that the thinkers of the Axial Age, which was referred to by Jaspers, had various common circumstances of the formation and features, and thus the philosophical dawn for human beings might be expressed through the
group of thinkers who had a modest commonality, not being pluralistic.

The “Cities” mentioned here probably meant a place of temporary residence for the people who left many indigenous rural communities surrounding the cities. Those people had felt it necessary to share a free, functional, and flexible lifestyle rather than the ethics and practices of the indigenous rural communities, which were their homes. And the necessity probably provided an opportunity for intellectual exchange, which would have the potential for universalization.

For supporting the coexistence of different cultures, it is indispensable to establish anti-localism as a base to pursue the possibility of a universal principle. Probably the reason that Sophists and the wandering monks called Shramana earned the endorsement was that people had sought a point for integration in the open world, not in the closed one. Plato, who is representative of anti-Sophists, pursued a new Athenian culture by relativizing the Athenian culture once to oppose the Spartan one.

In modern times, the problem of whether politics and religion should be united or separated has been a part of the conflict in international politics. God and the state are to be integrated in Islamic culture, while the Christian and Oriental nations, which were greatly affected by Confucianism in the past, keep the principle of separation of politics and religion. Many of the Islamic counties are facing whether to select modernization by separating religion and the state or maintain the unity of religion and the state.

In fields that are closer to us, however, incommensurability is seen as well. In the modern period and after that, for example, the world of continental philosophy and that of the Anglo-American one look completely different. It shouldn’t be impossible to set a common denominator; however, there seems to be an eternal gap between them. Globalization of philosophy is to clarify the grounds for the heterogeneity of foreign cultures. That is, it may be to straighten the entanglements of conflicts between them, where coexistence may be impossible because of their half-baked heterogeneity, though they should be able to coexist if they are fundamentally heterogeneous.

1. What is globalization?

In the good book describing the issues on globalization The Globalization Reader (ed. by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli Blachwell, 2004), “How to Judge Globalism” by Amartya Sen is put on record.

“What has happened in Europe, America, Japan, and East Asia has important messages for all other regions, and we cannot go very far into understanding the nature of globalization today without first acknowledging the positive fruits of global economic contracts. Indeed, we cannot reverse the economic predicament of the poor across the world by withholding from them the great advantages of contemporary technologies, the well-established efficiency of international trade and exchange, and social as well as economic merits of living in an open society. … The central issue of contention is not globalization itself, nor is it the use of the market as an institution, but the inequity in the overall balance of institutional arrangements—which produces very unequal sharing of the benefits of globalization.” (pp. 18-20)

Probably Sen believes that the inequity in economic benefits would unavoidably be produced by globalization. When the indication that globalization and liberalization would produce inequity as institutional arrangements is delved into, we come up against the roots of controversies.

The Part I Debating Globalization of The Globalization Reader includes 1. Liberty Renewed by John Micklewait and Adrian Wooldridge, 2. How to Judge Globalism by Amartya Sen, 3. From the Great Transformation to the Global Free Market by John Gray, 4. Jihad vs. McWorld by Benjamin Barber, 5. The Clash of Civilizations? by Samuel P. Huntington, and 6. Global Ethics as a Foundation for Global Society by Hans Küng. This part consists of the argument that the problems of the widening gap between rich and poor and the clash of civilizations have arisen from the free economy-centered world order after the end of the Cold War and, therefore, a world ethic is sought. I think that the argument is accurate on the whole. The ethical problems have arisen from the globalization of economic activities, and thus we are in urgent need of solving them.
2. Global Ethics by Hans Küng

I excerpt from Küng’s writing passages, which show his characteristics. “There will be no survival of democracy without a coalition of believers and non-believers in mutual respect! … And there will be no peace between the religions without a dialogue between the religions. … There will be a new world order without a new world ethic, a global or planetary ethic despite all dogmatic differences.” (pp. 44-45)

Roughly speaking, Küng’s set phrase is that “there will be no peace of the world without peace between religions.” I said to Küng at the time of the debate sponsored by the Asahi Shim bun that we shouldn’t wait for peace between religions that would never come, and he seemed to be astounded at me. He always believes that his words are overwhelmingly persuasive. Küng pursues the method of picking out common elements about the ethics belonging to different religions. He expects that this method would lead people to dialog and then peace. However, the existence of half-baked commonality causes a blood feud.

Küng is not only a Christian who opened his eyes to the truth of Kierkegaard but is also one of great friends with Bultmann, which has led him to become an advocate of ecumenicalism. When he refers to “dialogue between religions, and peace,” the meaning is actually a dialogue, or peace between Christians.

I agree with the view of “For all the dogmas, dialogue is possible between them. The dogmas which are not able to coexist because they are completely opposed to each other have a common premise.” The argument of those who criticize me is; “Plural dogmas between which dialogue is impossible can exist. There is no common premise between them. They are incommensurable.” To the criticism, I would like to add the following view; “Two dogmas between which there is no common premise are compatible because they don’t need to conflict with each other.” If you look back on the history of philosophy, you can find that two dogmas’ incompatibility between which is not verified have ever often handled as being incompatible.

Küng tries to get a common ethic.

“Would not only Woodrow Wilson, but also Hans Morgenthau, who had endured so much inhumanity in his life and at the same time was always in search of universal criteria, have been in argument with such basic demands? At all events, it is a sign of the times that today a body of proven and completely realistic statesmen has expressly adopted as a basis of a global ethic the two basic principles:

Every human being must be treated humanely!

What you wish done to yourself, do to others.

These two principles should be the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all spheres of life; for family and communities; for races, nations, and religions.” (p. 47)

Küng believes that the moral order to which nobody makes an objection would be qualified for the principle of a global ethic.

Will the principle described in words be really the principle of a global ethic? Article 1 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, which was enacted in 1949, says: “The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all public authority.” Many people would agree to establish the above as article 1 of a world constitution.

Then, what are the implications of the article? We can easily understand that it aims at prohibiting all the inhumanities done by the Nazis, such as the prohibition of aiming at the extermination of the Jews.

However, the government of West Germany or that of Germany after reunification didn’t aggressively work on the prevention of the Holocaust after WWII in particular, nor did it show, in particular, a positive attitude toward the commitment to the problems of human rights violations in the world.

As a concrete application of that, laws for the restriction of artificial abortion and the prohibition against gene manipulation of embryos, etc., were enacted. It means that the people of Germany admit the thesis arguing that, “human dignity is immanent in fetuses and embryos.”

You can be rather skeptical about the expectation that the conclusion that human dignity as a concept “is immanent in
individuals of human beings which haven’t been endowed with reason yet” corresponds to the human dignity in the traditional thought of Europe.

Though what the substantial implications are when a constitution is established directly depends on the intuition (a sense of language) of the people who establish its principles, efforts are being made to define the “substantial implications” of the law through jurisprudence, such as constitutional law and criminal law, as well as precedents. In a modern state, a social group supporting the laws of a nation has at its center a bureaucratic institution (administration), a national assembly (legislation), a judicial branch, and scholars, including jurists, around which various media and intelligence organs, including journalism, perform activities. And the people who elect Diet members in the form of voting exist.

The advanced countries remain fettered in the risk of forming a superficial national consensus at the mercy of politics and journalism. The countries that are pursuing democratization now are following in the same wake. And, the prospect of reaching an agreement between nations and achieving global justice is almost bogged down though we don’t have to give up hope.

"The road to universalization” like Hans Küng goes into a morass from which it is impossible to escape. It looks promising at the starting point; however, a morass comes into view if it is advanced.

3. Hans-Georg Gadamer who has to be negative about global philosophy

For Gadamer, there is no truth in the subject, which doesn’t belong to any culture. If global philosophy should exist, it could exist in a culture that might be developed in the future, but there is no place for its existence at present.

"Philosophers, considering their missions, must make an effort at finding a common foundation on which all of us, as the creatures of one era, should rest. Philosophers shouldn’t work for the purpose of suggesting a world view that is to be presented to audience as an established and indispensable form of mind. The eternal form of philosophers is that of Socrates; that is, the form of a human being that abstracts the truth for all of us as an ignorant man. I don’t think philosophers who have no standpoint of their own in the reality of life [like Descartes who are skeptical] must state something. Socrates is fully aware, as one who speculates in a philosophical manner, that we don’t have full awareness of our standpoint as well as reality, or we still don’t know our own position." (Über die Ursprünglichkeit der Philosophie in Hans-Georg Gadamer Kleine Schriften I (1967) translated into Japanese by Hiroshi Saito, et al. Miraisha, p. 7.)

Does Gadamer really think that “a common foundation on which all of us, as the creatures of one era, should rest” should be found? Though he referred to a common foundation in order to begin stating the missions of philosophy, what he really thinks is that “staying on a specific position or prejudices is the truth for us”, isn’t it?

He urges the rehabilitation of prejudices. “What appears to be a limiting prejudice from the viewpoint of the absolute self-construction of reason in fact belongs to historical reality itself. If we want to do justice to man’s finite, historical mode of being, it is necessary to fundamentally rehabilitate the concept of prejudice and acknowledge the fact that there are legitimate prejudices. Thus we can formulate the fundamental epistemological question for a truly historical hermeneutics as follows: what is the ground of the legitimacy of prejudices?” (Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode), Translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall Continuum 1975 and 1989, p.278)

The Cartesian way is as follows: remove all prejudices → start with an absolutely definite principle → find a truth. However, ego as existence cannot exist if prejudice is removed because prejudice is part of historical reality itself.

Gadamer supports the Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle in the form of rehabilitation of prejudices. “The circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. But this commonality is constantly being formed in our relation to tradition. Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves. Thus the circle of understanding is not a “methodological” circle, but describes an element of the ontological understanding of understanding.” (Hans-Georg
These sentences indicate the core of Gadamer’s philosophy. As for text interpretation, a skeptical view is usually taken as follows:

It is impossible to remove subjective prejudices in interpreting the text. Therefore, it is impossible to know truth from text interpretation, or the text and prejudices are inseparably related to each other; therefore, it is impossible to know the truth of the text interpretation from which prejudices are removed.

When Gadamer says that “the circle is not formal in nature,” it will be admitted that unknown elements would be disclosed in the process of come-and-go between text and prejudices. If the circle of text and prejudices is formal, it would result in an analytical relation, i.e. if text and prejudices are right, interpretation of the text is right.

As Gadamer says that “the cyclical understanding is a relation between the movement of tradition and that of interpreters brought to each other,” substitute “the spirit of Christianity,” “the Bible,” and “the believers” for “tradition,” “text,” and “interpreters,” respectively. The scene in which the “spirit of Christianity” makes approaches to believers via the Bible, and believers face the spirit of Christianity itself via the Bible can be imagined. “The cyclical understanding” means the methodology of Protestantism, i.e. “Only the Bible draws us near to the God.” Of course, it is possible to replace “the Bible” with “Plato.”

The sentence that the believers “are producing the commonality itself by understanding, participating in the creation of tradition, and keeping on providing the creation by themselves” means that Christian culture is continuing.

Kierkegaard’s phrase “overleap the two-thousand-year discontinuity” says that the interpretation according to which the two-thousand-year rupture between Jesus and him can be leap is possible. Gadamer says that Kierkegaard’s discontinuity can be seen as the hermeneutic circle from another viewpoint. “What was formulated by Kierkegaard in the form of paradox for many theological reasons, in fact, applies to all our relations between tradition and past.” (Hans-Georg Gadamer Kleine Schriften I (1967) translated into Japanese by Hiroshi Saito, et al. Miraisha, p. 76.)

Gadamer thinks that the spirituality that reaches the present from the past called tradition and leads to the future exists and the interpretation is possible by the bonds of existence. Spirituality, of course, is connected to the inheritance of the text of the Bible. It’s probably safe to say that the continuity of the dialogue between the Bible and the interpreters forms tradition.

“In fact the important thing is to recognize temporal distance as a positive and productive condition enabling understanding. It is not a yawning abyss but is filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which everything handed down presents itself to us.” (Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode), Translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall Continuum 1975 and 1989, p.297)

I am tempted to question Gadamer’s argument that continuity is the same as Kierkegaard’s discontinuity. As you know, Kierkegaard’s writing “Approach to introduce Christianity to church,” in which he criticizes the church bitterly, shows his opposition to the tradition of the church by interpreting the interpretation of the Bible by the church through the sense of “simultaneity with Jesus.”

As to Kierkegaard, I think the connection between text and interpreters may be completely different from the “continuity” described by Gadamer. I daresay that the “simultaneity of text” is viable without the temporal connection of tradition. Such “simultaneity of text”—when I read A Collection of a Myriad Leaves, I feel the simultaneity with the people of the time—should not only lead from the past to the present but is fundamental to the understanding of different cultures. When I read Dostoevsky’s works, I not only leap the temporal barrier but cultural and geographical ones.

Gadamer’s traditionalism is only able to link Jesus and the present. It is just the self-reflection of the Western culturati who believed the continuity of Western culture and raised their cultural level based on it, but it is not a general methodology of interpretation. It would be impossible to build “a common foundation on which all of us should rest” from that.
4. Hermeneutics of the Analects of Confucius and De la grammatologie by Jacques Derrida

Nobukuni Koyasu says the history of the Analects of Confucius whose notes were written soon after the birth of the text and its interpretation was developed simultaneously as follows: “it is impossible for much more distant posterity to read the text of the Analects of Confucius promptly, and on their own terms, that is, only with their own eyes. I don’t mean to say it is because they are Japanese. It is the same with China. The Analects of Confucius is a text born two thousand years ago. This period of time causes a large linguistic and philosophical gap between the present and posterity. Notes are for bridging the gap to let us close to the Analects of Confucius.” (Nobukuni Koyasu, Analects of Confucius read by intellectual historians. Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2010, p. 4.)

In the case of the interpretation of the Analects of Confucius, there is not so much time difference between the birth of the text and the birth of the notes. The notes say that they have a function of filling the “linguistic and philosophical gap.” However, when Zhu Xi’s new notes were written compared to the old ones, Kogaku (the study of classics) and Kobunjigaku (the study of ancient rhetoric school) are said to have been born. “Neo-Confucianism came to be adopted widely in the Edo period, however, Kogaku (or Kogigaku : the study of ancient principles), which criticized Neo-Confucianism, was advocated by Jinsai Ito (1627–1705) in the middle of the Edo period. In addition, Sorai Ogyu (1666–1728), who criticized both Jinsai and Shu Xi, developed a new study of classics called Kobunjigaku. (Ibid p. 5.)

Then a question arises about how Jinsai Ito and Sorai Ogyu could fill the linguistic and philosophical gap. As it is said that filling the gap became possible through the restorative understanding of archaic terms, now I will show you examples of the restoration of archaic terms by Nobukuni Koyasu.

For example, you know the following sentence: Confucius said, “有教無類” The general interpretation of the sentence is that “the difference between people arises by education (“教”), but there is no inborn difference.” However, Koyasu says that the word “教” is not used to refer to “education.”

The word “類” refers to “good and evil of types,” that is, those who are classified by good and evil in the world. Confucius teaches us that learning can achieve the good in each person beyond the worldly classification like a good person and a bad one. Learning is to expand our own potential to achieve human good. As every person has the potential, Jinsai takes “the human nature as fundamentally good.” (Ibid p. 10.)

This case is an interesting example because the forecast that the use of the word “教” was not seen so much in the Analects of Confucius and, therefore, it didn’t probably mean “education” coincided with Jinsai’s interpretation.

In interpreting old literature, it is required to refer to other usage examples for each word. Easily reasoning by analogy with present usage may lead to the wrong interpretation.

In Speculation about the Analects of Lau-tse by Takio Sawada (Kyukoshoin 2005), the study by an authority Yoshio Takeuchi is mentioned as an example of wrong reasoning through an analogy. “In Study on Lau-tse by Yoshio Takeuchi, despite using many related materials, he determined that it was unreasonable in terms of logical thinking of the present and thus there were pages out of order due to an error in binding, making an extensive revision. The result of the revision appears in his complete works. However, the finding of Mawangdui Silk Text revealed that the revision was completely wrong.” (Ibid p. 3.)

The study on Lao-tzu by Sawada is based on extreme objectivism in which any subjective impression is excluded, but his translation in modern Japanese is very attractive. Actually, Minako Oba won the Tanizaki Prize for her work titled寂兮寥兮 (With No Shape), which was picked up from Sawada’s writing Spirit of Chuang-tse (Yuhikaku Shinsho series, Yuhikaku Publishing, 1983). Now I will show the quotation of the translation of the new text of Lao-tzu by Sawada.

“The source of the authority of law arises from the way (道). Law is to clarify rights and wrongs by applying criteria for determining merits and demerits, i.e. propriety. Therefore, persons who grasped the way (道) would not break a law rashly if it is once produced and would not abolish it rashly if it is once established...The way (道) is intangible with no substance, and its core is an unfathomable source of all things. Harm in going through life is greediness, that is, not knowing
satisfaction.” (Quoted from the annotation of the *Four Classics of Hungdi* by Takio Sawada. Chisen Shokan, 2006, p. 5.)

Jacques Derrida pointed out in *Of Grammatology* (De la grammatologie, referring to the translation by Kazuhiro Adachi. Gendaishichosha 1967) that the consciousness of textual language, when it is topicalized, was completely different from that of vision. In interpreting the text of kanji characters, it is particularly important. In the text of kanji characters, one ideogram represents one unit of meaning, not a combination of phonograms representing one unit of meaning like Western languages. Characters change throughout the times, but the continuity of being the same character is strictly maintained.

I will remove two whitewashes from Derrida’s philosophy. One is deconstruction, which is an untrue argument that Derrida’s philosophy involves a historical position that denies, destroys and reconstructs the past philosophies. Another one is difference, which is also an untrue argument that the fundamentally intentional structure of consciousness is established with “difference” in it. When we ignore the two whitewashes, we can see the Talmudist as they really are. Those who advocate Talmud all day long are prototypical people for Derrida.

Tetsuya Takahashi explains as follows: “Derrida says that generally signs including language signs, so as to function as such, must have minimum *iterability* (*itérabilité*). However, if *iterability* is an indispensable condition for signs as functioning as such, we can say as follows: the function of signs does not come to an end within a one-time-only nature of an event, but can be, or must be still maintained after the whole context which specified their meanings when they were uttered for the first time has been lost. At any time, signs which are separated from the original context where they are placed and then are transposed to another context can, or have to be able to function as ones with new meanings in there.” (Edited by Megumi Sakabe and Hisakake Kato, *Collection of Propositions*, Chikuma Gakugei Bunko series. Chikumashobo p. 381.)

For us who are familiar with the ideograms of kanji, there is no need to imagine the characters and words of Hebrew for understanding “iterability” by intuition.

Now, please think about the main thesis of Derrida—“there is nothing outside the text.” First, according to the Talmudic interpretation, the whole universe is completely shrouded in the world of Talmudic text, and the world outside the textual set doesn’t exist.

Secondly, when shifting from Talmudism to Classicism, all things have already been described in some text. Without the characters of the text, our mind never functions.

Thirdly, what people believe to be “outside the text” is an object to which a certain text, such as that of the Talmud or Plato doesn’t refer. For example, “a cell phone” is not written in the text. However, its object is already indicated with words in the text in some form. The sentence “There is nothing new under the sun” means that all things have been already indicated and all canons have already been provided.

Fourthly, all intentional consciousness is guided by language. When I see “red light,” it is guided, oriented, and differentiated by the word “red” and the word “light.” For example, from what I know, the meaning of the word “red” is in the context of the text including the word “red”, not the “outside the text”.

There is no discontinuity in the text between the past and present. There is no need to define its historical characteristics in a normal sense. If Confucius wrote the *Analects of Confucius*, I am in the same time as Confucius in terms of reading the *Analects of Confucius*. The time (or I can say “timelessness”) is not formed by my consciousness intentionally but by the text itself. Of course, the support tools for reading are used at full blast.

There is no discontinuity in the text between the East and the West. When I read *Politeia*, I am in the place of the text (I can say “placelessness”), and thus there is no spatial gap between the text and me. That is because the spatiality that is produced by the text functions, and therefore there is no need of special connection for explanations, to fill the temporal or cultural gap between the text and me (for example, “tradition” referred to by Gadamer). The text itself produces the conditions for universalization or globalization.
5. The role of the history of philosophy coming to an end

What is the Western culture by which Japanese people were attracted? It was a culture that was advanced by getting over the past, that is, not a culture for which old things were shed, left behind, and abandoned, but one for which old things were integrated into new things to grow out of the limit caused by the oldness, wasn’t it?

“The East is sinking deep into the abyss of eternal stagnation.” “Even if a new thing colors a culture superficially, it always sinks into a thorough morass. Even if a new thing emerges again, it looks new because we have lost the old one, and actually the old one has emerged in a different form.”

We can say that the philosophy of the history of philosophy was started by Hegel. The first concept in there is the ultimate correspondence between philosophy and the history of philosophy: that is, the concept that the theme pursued in the form of philosophical speculation and the chronological and diachronic description of the history of philosophy mean essentially the pursuit of the same theme and objective. If I put emphasis further, it means the correspondence between historicity and logicality. It is the idea that historical progress is to be developed and displayed in chronological order by separating the logical moments, and that those moments are integrated into the ultimate truth to become an absolute element of wisdom.

The progress of each stage in the history of philosophy is the progress for getting over skepticism. The ideas opposed to each other don’t mean negation vanishing into zero after simply denying a thesis, but are kept as each moment of a higher order by being sublated for integration of a higher level after the thesis is denied by the antithesis. The phrase “the history of philosophy is not an art gallery of fools” means that the progress of the history of philosophy is the process of negation, exaltation, and preservation.

It is thought that the thesis arguing that each of all the philosophers coloring the history of philosophy has his or her own specific fascination and eternal truth doesn’t contradict the argument that all of those philosophers constitute the integrated perspective.

The concept of the history of philosophy by Hegel was indicated in the description of the history of Western philosophy including Hegel. The history of philosophy after Hegel, especially that indicated by Ernst Kuno Berthold Fischer (the first edition) illustrated the idea that philosophy would be completed when it climbs up to Hegel as the summit.

“The idea that the history of philosophy has been completed in Hegel as it reached the summit has to be accepted at par value as a paradoxical appearance. Similarly, it is not wrong to say that the whole history of philosophy is nothing but footnotes to Plato, and it may be allowed to say that all streams of philosophy flow into Kant and the philosophy after his is nothing but the transformation of his ideas. Philosophy is such a thing. And as I dare to say so, I must be ready to say that the whole history of philosophy up to now is nothing but an introduction to my philosophy.” (Makoto Yamamoto, The Possibility of Metaphysics. University of Tokyo Press, 1977, p. 43.)

The above description clearly indicates that the relationship between philosophy and its history is, on the premise that the concept of Hegel is effective as it is, would lead to such a result in itself.

In the relation between doctrines and doxography, more than one doctrine is generally selected, and if it is possible to make a determination about them, the correct one is regarded as “truth” and the others are regarded as “untruths.” And, a doxography is produced for selecting doctrines. In the logic of skepticism, however, any doctrine is not regarded as “truth” because a doctrine opposed to it is always contraposited. Hegel considered such a condition as what the process of the history of philosophy should solve. He considered the history of philosophy not as a process of achieving an ideal discussion model and selecting “truth” from more than one doctrine but as a process of integrating the opposition between the doctrines itself.

A doxography is essentially the enumeration of options for selecting a true doctrine.

The history of philosophy by Hegel is a process of integrating all the options.

“How to Produce the History of Philosophy” by Shigeru Kanzaki (The History of the Western Philosophy I, Sensho Metier series, Kodansha Ltd.) is a precious achievement in which the circumstances of the formation of doxographical works were examined. Kanzaki’s thesis may be intended to found the concept of the history of philosophy positively. However, I would
like to recognize anew it as pointing out that Plato was the first to make a mistake about the creation of the history of philosophy by Western philosophy beyond doxography and the history of effects (development of descriptive patterns within the scope of doxography).

Kanzaki indicates that Aristotle has primary consideration for doxography. I will retrench a little the quotation by Kanzaki:

(A) Propositions should be selected in a number of ways corresponding to the number of distinctions drawn in regard to the proposition: thus one may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most men or by the philosophers…

(B) It is useful also to make them by selecting not only those opinions that actually are accepted, but also those that are like these…

(C) We should select also from the written handbooks of argument, and should draw up sketch-lists of them upon each several kind of subject, putting them down under separate headings, e.g. “On Good” or “On Life” – and that On Good should deal with every form of good, beginning with the category of essence. In the margin, too, one should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers, e.g. Empedocles said that the elements of bodies were four…

[Aristotle Topica. Book I, Chapter 14, 105a34-b18]

The attitude shown in all Aristotle’s writings is that he recognized doxography as a necessary step for preparation but didn’t intend them for the history of philosophy at all. However, Plato as Aristotle’s teacher might have an opinion that doxographical works were useless. That is because he was aware that there would be no method of settling the arguments opposed to each other

Philosophers must battle against Sophists forever. Before politicians become philosophers, misfortune for the nation wouldn’t end. The description of the history of philosophy like Hegel says that the history of the battle between philosophers and Sophists is the history of Western philosophy.

Seen from the viewpoint of the history of effects, however, both the description of the history of philosophy like Hegel and that of deconstruction like Heidegger are great masses of mistakes. In both of the descriptions, Descartes is regarded as a definitive milestone for modern subjectivism, however, when we trace his effect empirically, we cannot help but trace it by separating the effect of the scientist Descartes’s views on nature from the effect of the philosophers of cogito. The philosophers of cogito produced the second philosopher of cogito Fichte and the third philosopher of cogito Husserl. It looks like a big event, but it is just an event in the world of textbook description of the history of philosophy, and thus the meaning of “modern times” does not directly correspond to the meaning of the “philosophy of cogito.” The effect of Descartes, including the establishment of modern ego, is enhanced as extraordinarily as it is impossible for the history of effects to verify.

In the Hegelian type of descriptions of the history of philosophy, the lies, which are not verified in terms of the history of effect, are stated as follows:

Before Descartes, the concept of ego didn’t exist in Western culture.

Kant sublated the conflict between British empiricism and continental rationalism.

The history of German idealism is completed by Hegel through the chain of sublation, i.e., Kant sublated by Fichte, Fichte sublated by Schelling, and Schelling sublated by Hegel.

The new type of lies about the history of philosophy invented by Heidegger is still allowed.

“Since Plato, the history of Western philosophy is continuing the tradition of forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit).”

“The philosophy of Hegel is the summit of the modern egoism.”

There are not a few lies about the history of philosophy invented by Marxism.

“Hegel’s dialectics is the most completed form of the Western reason, but it contains the mistake of idealism. Marxism is what establishes materialistic dialectics by reversing Hegel’s idealistic dialectics.”

“Marxism achieves the greatest truth of thought by integrating British economics, French socialism and German classic philosophy.”
As the textbook descriptions of the history of philosophy are combined with the intellectual history of Europe itself, the image of the West where the past has always been overcome and progress has been made in a good sense is created, and as the Hegelian description of the history of philosophy, i.e. history = Aufheben is directly combined with Western culture, the veneration of modernists for the West and the denial of modernism by post-modernists are born. The intellectual history in the West itself that is consecutive is actually a virtual image created by the writers of the history of philosophy.

There are some cases where it is featured that more than one philosopher over a long period of time recognized the common premise; however, if the stream of the history of philosophy is described as if it were a living spirit, we should say that it is a fiction described by writers. It is wrong that finding the stream of the history of philosophy is regarded as the purpose of the philosophical studies.

Replace the history of philosophy with the history of effects (Wirkungsgeschichte). Replace the history of effects with doxography. And verify that the doxography that lists the doctrines of all ages and countries in parallel is the philosophy of the age of globalization.

6. The theory of impossibility of naturalistic universalization by Tetsuro Watsuji

The word naturalism often means the argument that what exists materially has an important effect on what is spiritual. In terms of literary theories, the “literature of naturalism” may refer to works in which the description of sexual desire is contained. In the theories of paintings, there is not a name for the school of naturalism, however, as it is said that the motto of Barbizon School was “Return to nature,” there is no problem with calling the school naturalism. As subjects indicate how to depict nature, such as a landscape and a still life, the term “naturalism” is not expressly used. But considering “about Courbet why the word naturalism is not used while the word realism is used,” the difference between naturalism and realism may be viable in terms of the attitude assumed intentionally by the painter toward the work.

When the word “naturalism” is used as a philosophical term, deviation can be seen. Only professional teachers of philosophy can find the definition of the incorrectness of deriving “ought” (Sollen) from “being” (Sein)” from the phrase “naturalistic fallacy.” When “naturalism” is defined, for the purpose of explaining the cultural difference, as an attitude of placing an importance on the factors of nature, the most famous “naturalistic writing” in the Japanese culture is probably Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study by Tetsuro Watsuji.

“I began thinking about climate when I read Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) written by Heidegger in Berlin early in the summer of 1927. The attempt to grasp as temporality the structure of the existence of human beings was very interesting to me. But when temporality was used as a subjective structure of existence like that, I had a question of why spatiality is not used as the same fundamental structure of existence as temporality. Of course, spatiality is not unseen in Heidegger. As focus is on a specific space for the existence of human beings, German romantic living nature seems to be newly revived. However, it almost lost its silhouette under the strong illumination of temporality. I found there the limitations of Heidegger’s work. Temporality, which isn’t in line with spatiality, is not truly temporality yet. The reason why Heidegger remained there is that his Dasein was only for an individual. (Tetsuro Watsuji, Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study. Iwanami Bunko series. Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 1979, p. 3.)

With regard to the part of the above “I began thinking about climate when I read Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) written by Heidegger,” considering that the motif of “climate” would have actually occurred to his mind naturally before going over to Berlin, the part is not a sentence stating the realistic process but a rhetorical expression worked out aiming at the effect of producing the attitude of opposing Heidegger’s Being and Time (Sein und Zeit).

Heidegger’s temporality is conceived to be the concept against the spatiality “climate,” but it is, in fact, indicating the situation in which what Watsuji had thought as temporality was nothing but historicity in a broad sense. That makes little difference with saying that not only history but geography is necessary for understanding human beings.

In view of the fact that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theory of space doesn’t correspond to Watsuji’s theory of climate at all,
“space” by Ponty is one in the stage of perception while “space” by Watsuji is a metaphor meaning a natural environment for life, but then does it correspond to Heidegger’s concept of “time”? I would like to express opposition to it.

Heidegger’s concept of “time” would not correspond to “history” in the sense of the whole culture comprising matters that affect the past to the present causally in parallel with the natural lapse of time. I think that behind Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), Heidegger had the intention of releasing the temporarily of eschatology from hermeneutics to try to transpose it into the temporality of being in itself.

“Time” and “Space” metaphorically stated by Watsuji are history and geography, respectively.

“Various cultural streams should be seen from the viewpoint of the difference between the peoples fostering them first of all, and the difference is inseparably related to the geographical difference. As they are originally the same development of human existence, they must have the contemporaneous stages of development. However, assuming that each of their unique natures are formed on such a common essence and it gives the moment of the only step of history, the geographical things that lie at the basis of the uniqueness have no choice but to be what has eternal significance like each of the times. Thus, we faced the problem of climatic structure in human beings. This is natural as long as human beings are originally in the temporal and spatial structures, not only in the temporal one. Temporality and spatiality achieve their significance by being in line with each other, not being established independently.” (Tetsuro Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsurō’s Rinrigaku: Ethics in Japan Vol. II. Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 1949, p. 126, 1965, p. 92.)

The sentence in the above “the geographical things that lie at the basis of the uniqueness have no choice but to be what has eternal significance like each of the times” can be read as combining the sentence “geographical things are eternal” with the sentence “each of the times is eternal,” but the sentence “geographical things are eternal” refers to the eternity in terms of nature, meaning that Japan is eternally in the monsoon area. As for the sentence “each of the times is eternal,” what is kept in mind, that is, whether it refers to a cultural heritage, i.e. “culture of each time has left something that has eternal value,” the whole and part of time, i.e. “each moment is an eternal atom” or the “eternal present” meaning “a moment is eternity,” is not clear.

Geography is positioned as the grounds for natural eternity. Here the ontological basis for nationalism is formed.

“General human beings do not actually exist. What was traditionally said as being universally human by the European was very noticeably European. And that is reasonable. The significance of world history lies in the realization of human ways in a wide variety of climatic and historic patterns. Just like universality that can be universal only in specialty, human beings can be universal only through special existence. Thus, only where each of the historical peoples makes an effort at forming the integrity of its specialty, the international relationship in a true sense becomes possible. Trying to be international beyond being national is nothing but an abstract illusion.” (Tetsuro Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsurō’s Rinrigaku: Ethics in Japan Vol. I. Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 1937, p. 33, 1965, p. 30.)

Compared with 1937 when we can say that a set of individual nations maintaining self-sufficiency in both material and mental terms was an international society, the realism of an international society is increasing. In Japan, the food self-sufficiency rate has been around 40% on a calorie basis since 2000, and the self-sufficiency ratio in the energy supply of Japan has been around less than 20% since 1980.

In Japan, first on the precondition that international import and export are successfully maintained, national activities for production, distribution and consumption are performed. Japan cannot survive with the attitude of “national first.” Not only Japan which has especially high material dependence on other countries but all the other countries have high external dependence in various senses. That is the time of globalism.

7. Modern naturalism

As arguments of spiritualistic globalism, the theory of common ethics like Hans Küng, the theory of human security including the guarantee of the minimum standard of living, and others are presented. The state of the arguments is seen in
Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry by Michael Ignatieff (translated into Japanese by Yasuyuki Soeya and Koichi Kanada. Fukosha 2006), Restructuring of Human Rights edited by Tatsuo Inoue (Horitsu Bunka Sha, 2010) and others. If you read Child Trafficking (2008), Child Soldiers (2008), and Child Labor (2008) published by Amnesty International (Liblio Publishers), you can understand that taking practical countermeasures are more urgently necessary than solving the challenge of how to form the basis of the concept of basic human rights in terms of philosophy. However, when you read Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds by Toshiki Mogami (Iwanami Shinsho series, Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2001), you will find the dark in the deep recesses of the challenge.

As an argument of spiritualistic non-globalism, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington (translated into Japanese by Chikara Suzuki. Shueisha Inc. 1998), which argues that religious conflict causes military confrontation is presented. He takes the standpoint of realism, which sees international relations as power relationships, but in terms of philosophy, the clash of civilizations is based on spiritualism. The basis of civilization is religion. Religions are incommensurable with each other, not including a common premise. Each of their religions forms its independent universe. Among people who believe different religions, a utilitarian society may be superficially and practically formed based on a common interest, however, it is impossible to form a community where its members place the authenticity of their existence.


As an argument for naturalistic non-globalism, nationalism generally takes the standpoint of non-globalism, and we should turn our eyes to the trend of nationalism over resources. Though there is no worldwide philosopher who represents nationalism over resources, it can be regarded as the power that is moving the actual international society from behind. The writings handling this issue include Problems with Resources by Masatsugu Taniguchi (Toyo Keizai Inc., 2011) and Crisis in Resources by Hisatake Kato (Maruzen Company, Limited 2008).

Between naturalism and spiritualism as social recognition, debate with various kinds of political distortion arose many times in the Cold War era in the form of controversy over materialism. “Political distortion” means that materialists criticize the ideologist camp as a kind of “being used as a tool by capitalism” while they themselves tried to establish the “practice of materialism” in the mood of moralism. Among the anti-Marxists, there were many arguments that distorted or ignored the right aspects of materialism by intention. Today is the age when naturalism is penetrating quietly after being released from such political controversies.

8. Clash of Civilizations

As long as the conflict between religions is the main cause of wars and religion is a basic factor of specifying civilization, is it impossible for human beings to stop wars? Does each religion have to compromise for coexistence so that different religions can exist together in the same society? Isn’t the principle of tolerance established unless the authenticity or the spiritual purity of religion is sacrificed?

The beginning of “jihad” is described by Huntington as follows: “the Afghan War began with the interference of the U.S.S.R. The U.S., which was intensely offended by this, organized an Afghan rebel army against the U.S.S.R. troops and provided financial help as well as weapons to them, when the war become one within the framework of the Cold War. The U.S.S.R. defeat in this war meant the first successful resistance to a foreign power according to the Islamic behavioral norm, not <the standard of nationalism or socialism>. The war was fought as jihad, which drastically gave them a high degree of
confidence as Islam. The impact of this war on the Islamic world was no less than the impact on the Oriental world when Japan
won over Russia in 1905. (Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, translated into

By the opening of jihad and the Iranian Revolution led by Khomeini, the prospect of world history had to change. When
the Islamic world moved ahead with modernization like Turkey, and Iran began to follow the same path, Khomeini interrupted
it. Khomeini’s spiritual revolution in Iran is a spiritual movement against the crisis over the identity of Islamic culture for
restoring the fundamental spirit of Islam. The historical expectation that the world would move toward modernization, market-
oriented economic reform, globalization, and become pro-West through U.S. military operations to become homogenized was
adhered to, however, U.S. policy is now on the rocks in Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban.

In view of the structural outline of the theory of Christian tolerance, probably it doesn’t seem that the current state of the
Islamic world, where various forms of jihad are breaking out, corresponds to what religion primarily should be.

Christian tolerance is as follows:

1. Religion is the inner truth, and external constraint, such as military power, law enforcement, and secular influence, doesn’t
correspond to the true nature of religion.

2. Within the same externally forced system or nation, religious bodies such as multiple churches can coexist. They have
secular rules in common and don’t interfere with each other by using secular power.

3. As long as the secular power doesn’t force opposition to religious truth, secular rule is allowed. Those who oppose an
induced abortion for religious reasons endorse the legal liberalization of it.

This theory of tolerance is on the premise of the dualism of the sacred and the profane. However, there is no dualism of
the sacred and the profane in Islam. “Islam is keenly opposed to Christianity based on the dualism of the sacred and the
profane, which clearly separate churches from the profane nation. That magnificent medieval institution of the Church of
Christianity was founded on Jesus’s words, “My kingdom is not of this world” and “render therefore unto Caesar the things
which are Caesar’s and unto God the things are God’s.” Islam regards the entire existence as the religious world. In view of
Islam, the world is described as one into which “what is holy” has penetrated or has to penetrate completely. All aspects of
human life are connected to religion basically and primarily. The religion always exists in almost every place where human
beings actually live in terms of individuals, families, societies, races, and nations. The religious life defined by Islam is to
achieve the will of God, which is consistently expressed in the Koran through all aspects of human beings.” (Toshihiko Izutsu,

It seems impossible for the dualism of the sacred and the profane to coexist with the monism of the sacred and the profane
in terms of principle, sentiment, and actual life. With regard to the law, for example, according to the modern democracy of the
West (legal positivism), the ultimate source of law is in the agreement among the same generation. For Islamic
fundamentalism, on the other hand, the ultimate source of law is in the scriptures.

Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst. by Dieter Senghaas (translated into Japanese by
Mitsuo Miyata, et al. Iwanami Shoten, Publishers) is considered to be the most excellent writings criticizing The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington, in which six factors of modernization are described.
The outlines of them are as follows:

(1) A monopoly of rightful national force is institutionalized, and the citizens are demilitarized. (2) The rule of law
legitimates a monopoly of force and establishes the rules for settling disputes. (3) Individuals come to be expected to play
various roles. A wide range of roles is provided. (4) The desire for democratic participation is arisen. Participation in the
communication of ideas by discourse and politics by discussion become inevitable. (5) Rules for regulating public debate and
discord aiming at distributional justice and fairness. (6) The said factors are unified, which has an effect on every field of life.
The conclusion derived from the above is that modernization of Islamic society is impossible and thus its heterogeneity
compared with Christian culture or Western culture will last a long time.

“In terms of the doctrine, it is impossible to bridge Islam and the pluralism of value; however, it is possible in terms of
history. On the other hand, Islam, when it is grasped on the basis of essentialism, seems to be monolithic. On the other hand, however, the history of Islam has been, since its beginning, colored by conflicts, that is, by disputes among many schools of theology and law, or in fact, by various kinds of sectarian schism and serious and militant hostile relations caused by them.” (Ibid p. 69.)

That modernization of Islam is “impossible in terms of the doctrine but possible in terms of history” means that “it is possible in the form of sacrificing the purity of the doctrine. If the fundamentalists gain influence, the path of “being impossible according to the doctrine” will be taken.

Various religions opposed to each other now don’t appear to have a common principle. However, every religion has developed its own unique tradition and experts of its own, and therefore such tradition fixes exclusive relations. Whether the original text itself is exclusive or not is another question.

The state of being impossible to interpret scriptures behind the current clash of civilizations inherits the circumstances where each religion was established as a religious organization. The radical feature of religion is constitutionalized by the government of the religious organization and to break it is hermeneutic destruction.

In Universal Thought by Hajime Nakamura (1975, 1999), many cases where it is not so difficult to know the common factors among religions by examining their origins are indicated.

9. Approach of Civilization

With regard to the naturalism in the field of social science, An Essay on the Principle of Population by Malthus (1798) was an epoch-making writing. “In all our feeble attempts, however, to find out the Almighty to perfection, it seems absolutely necessary that we should reason from nature up to nature’s God and not presume to reason from God to nature.” (Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population translated into Japanese by Yoshio Nagai. Chuko Bunko series, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1973, p. 200).

It is impossible to know God directly. A book written by God, that is, nature should be read. There is no opposition between theology and physics, nor is there opposition between belief and knowledge, or between spiritualism and naturalism.

“I think I may fairly make two postulata. First, That food is necessary to the existence of man. Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state.

Assuming then my postulates are granted, I say, that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the Earth to produce subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second.” (ibid p. 22 and p. 23)

There are few answers to the question of why population increases in a geometrical ratio, and why food increases in an arithmetical ratio in his writing. Malthus’s answer is that they are facts. Today, the writers of the reports for the Club of Rome take over Malthus’s theory. There are three relevant reports: “The world population is not only increasing at an exponential rate but in terms of a growth rate.” (Meadows, et al. The Limits to Growth; A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind. Translation supervised by Saburo Okita. Diamond Inc., 1972, both in original and translation, p. 21.)

“In the year 1650 the human population numbered around half a billion. It was growing at about 0.3 percent per year, and the doubling time had been projected to be nearly 250 years. By 1900, the population had reached 1.6 billion and was growing at 0.5 percent per year, a doubling time of about 140 years. In 1970, the population totaled 3.6 billion and the rate of growth was 2.1 percent per year. Thus, not only has the population been growing exponentially, but the rate of growth has also been growing. We might say that the population growth has been “super”-exponential.” (Meadows, et al. Beyond the Limits. Translation supervised by Yoichi Kaya. Diamond Inc., 1992, both in original and translation, p. 21.)

“The global average number of children born per woman went down from 5 in the 1950s to 2.7 in the 1990s. In Europe at
the turn of the twenty-first century, completed family size averaged 1.4 children per couple, considerably less than the number of required to replace the population. The European population is projected to decline slowly, from 728 million in 1998 to 715 million in 2025. This fertility downturn does not mean that total world population growth has ceased or ceased being exponential. It simply means that the doubling time has lengthened (from 36 years at 2 percent per year to 60 years at 1.2 percent per year) and may lengthen still further. The net number of people added to the planet was in fact higher in 2000 than it was in 1965, though the growth rate was lower.” (Meadows, et al. *Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update*. Translation supervised by Junko Edahiro. Diamond Inc., original in 2004 and translation in 2005, p. 36.)

I think that the writers of the reports for “The Club of Rome” too much stick to the Malthusian model. The change which the Malthusian model cannot explain is occurring.

The explanatory model presented by Emmanuel Todd (mainly in *Le rendez-vous des civilisations and Allah n’y est pour rien!* ) is roughly as follows:

1. (Naturalistic universality) Human beings take the same or similar attitudes under a certain condition, almost independently of their believing religions.
2. The higher the literacy rate, the lower the birth rate (the number of lifetime fertility per woman).
3. The higher the literacy rate, the greater the gap with the parents’ generation widen to bring about “the transition crisis.”
4. In Islamic society, the rate of intermarriage—the rate of choosing a spouse within relatives is high. The position of women is protected by intermarriage.
5. The difference in a family system causes the difference in disposition, mentality, and ideology.

Todd says, in view of the data on the literacy rate and the birth rate, the recognition that the current Muslims have become fundamentalist, which causes the “clash of civilization” with the Christian culture, modernization, democracy, and culture supporting a market-oriented economy, is wrong and “the convergence of civilization” is very likely to occur.

What makes Todd a big name is that he presented eight patterns—the exogamous community family, the endogamous community family, the authoritarian family (the lineal family), the asymmetrical community family, the egalitarian nuclear family, the absolute nuclear family, the anomic family and African systems—and the mentalities or ideologies corresponding to them in order to explain that the difference in a family system causes the difference in disposition, mentality, and ideology.

In the exogamous community family, all the married sons cohabit with their parents to form a big family, but the sons’ wives are chosen outside the family.

In the endogamous community family, all the married sons cohabit with their parents to form a big family, but the sons’ wives are chosen from the relatives (the families of their father’s brothers). This is typical in Islamic circles. There are some cases of geographical or occupational intermarriage.

In the authoritarian family (the lineal family), seen in prewar Japan and Germany and the Tutsi in Rwanda, it is allowed that an unbroken patrimony is transferred to the eldest son, and any other children leave the family.

In the asymmetrical community family, intermarriage in the maternal line is permitted while that in the paternal line is prohibited. (Dravidian in Kerala, India)

In the egalitarian nuclear family, married children leave their family and have their own families independently. In the Paris Basin, the legacy is distributed equally.

In the absolute nuclear family, the married children leave their family and have their own families independently. In the Paris Basin, the legacy is distributed equally.

In the absolute nuclear family, the married children leave their family and have their own families independently, but it is permitted that discretionary power for inheritance is given to the parents. (England)

The anomic family doesn’t have an established nature of marriage. (Southeast Asia, American Indian, part of Madagascar) African systems refer to popular polygamy seen in so-called Black Africa. The tie of a married couple is week and uncertain. It would be better to take notice of the clarity of explaining the actual state for each case rather than the effectiveness of the general explanatory patterns used by Todd. It is easily understandable from the explanation of Todd that the Malthusianism of demographics adopted by the reports for the Club of Rome is different from the actual movement. And it is also possible with the correlation between a literacy rate and social change to presume that the movement toward spontaneous semi-
modernization in the Islamic circle can occur.

“Cultural progress destabilizes inhabitants. It is necessary to imagine concretely the society where a literacy rate exceeds 50%. It is a world where fathers cannot read and write while their sons can do so. Generalized education will soon destabilize the authority in the family. Diffusion of controlling the birth followed by the rise in the education level will shake the traditional relationship between men and women, and husbands’ authority over wives. The loss of those two kinds of authority causes perplexity in the whole society, which, as a rule, leads to the transitional collapse of political authority.” (Emmanuel Todd, A Convergence of Civilizations: The Transformation of Muslim Societies Around the World, translated into Japanese by Harumi Ishizaki. Fujiwara-shoten, 2008, p. 59.)

The countries whose birthrate declined between 1985 and 1990 were Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar.

Todd explains the process in which a declining birthrate changes the social structure as follows: “When a married couple has four children, the probability of having a male child, which is a requirement for applying the patrilineal principle, is 94%. In the case of three children, the probability is 88%. In the case of two children, the probability is 75%. If the birthrate falls below three children per woman, a quarter of all the married couples cannot but accept the risk of having no male patrilineal principle. This is no better than saying that the society gives up maintaining the “endogamous” patrilineal principle. This problem is not an insurmountable for “exogamous” patrilineal society. In China and North India, this problem is solved by infanticide of female babies. As infanticide of female babies is not committed almost entirely in the Arabian circle, this problem is more difficult.” (Emmanuel Todd, A Convergence of Civilizations: The Transformation of Muslim Societies Around the World, translated into Japanese by Harumi Ishizaki. Fujiwara-shoten, 2008, p. 133.)

With regard to a literacy rate and birthrate, Todd’s A Convergence of Civilizations (ibid p. 30.) says that in Japan the male literacy rate exceeded 50% in 1850, the female rate exceeded 50% in 1900, and the birthrate began to decline in 1920.

There is usually a very high correlation between a literacy rate and the spread of the importance of hygienic practice; however, it may be allowed to say that a literacy rate didn’t have a direct effect on the birthrate in Japan. It is after the WWII that the concept of birth control spread in Japan. Today, it is likely that there will be a high correlation between the literacy rate and the birth control in Japan.

Considering that a literacy rate is connected directly with a computer literacy rate in our time, individuals can access to every kind of knowledge and information by themselves. The conflicts in Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Jordan triggered by the event in Tunisia in December 2010 were activated by the high computer literacy rate.

10. Removal of all kinds of “Locality” from philosophy

Philosophy should be framed by subject.

In view of spiritualistic methods, the clash of civilization may continue while the convergence of civilizations may occur in the future as well in view of naturalistic methods. For studying which is right, it is necessary to find the common denominator; however, there is no footing or place to compare between spiritualistic methods of interpretation and naturalistic methods of observation or survey.

The actual circumstances of the higher a literacy rate, the lower the birthrate may be the changes which may change a whole attitude on life, such as a lost attitude of having sex by instinct and increase in educational expenses, etc. rather than the diffusion of knowledge of contraception, rise in position of women in their families, prevention of high rates of birth and infant mortality and uncontrolled birth of children. Though presenting the figures of a literacy rate and a birthrate is according to the methods of observation or survey, the substance of understanding the correlation covers all fields and dimensions.

In the case of the accident in a nuclear power plant, nuclear engineering, a probabilistic safety assessment method, a no-fault liability system, change from the law of large numbers in probability theory to chaos theory, and literacy of other fields (a literacy rate) such as seismology, the science of disaster prevention, a hazard map and the concept of safety and security

Some people misunderstand the requirement of philosophers as the ethical attitude such as, “we should be more austere because the reason for needing nuclear power is the tendency to excess consumption.” Others misunderstand the mission of philosophers as preaching that we should be humbler, with criticizing our excess pride in the technologies for safety control, or conceit toward them.

It is right that philosophy should indicate how the subject that is involved in and responsible for the problem should be, by seeing it from a comprehensive perspective. But it may be sometimes preachy.

We are living with managing technologies, systems and social relations that involve a great number of fields of expertise. The whole picture cannot be seen from any angle. In terms of natural science, the accident is the case of a meltdown of the nuclear reactor caused by loss of forced circulation of coolant. In terms of social science, it is the case of liability without fault. In terms of human science, it is the case of anxiety for the risk whose probability is not steady.

Philosophy must clarify the attributes of the reality in all studies, religions, and arts. Past philosophy, as a whole, also tried to grasp the entire cultural practice of human beings, and Aristotle and Descartes certainly knew the width and depth of studies well enough to philosophize. However, when professional philosophers got a social status as a university professor, they pursued philosophy as a study even if they are almost beginners in individual fields. Therefore philosophy contains a lot of waste.

“Waste” is the word used by Shozo Omori, referring to the papers that are just presented but not read repeatedly.

Studies are advanced with discharging waste. If the waste is properly discharged, the study is worth existing. Philosophy is going ahead without discharging the waste. For discharging the waste, it is necessary to establish the criteria for peer review clearly. Unless the rule of not presenting a paper once it is judged as “waste,” even though it is a report for Grant in Aid for Scientific Research, a bulletin of a university, or a coterie magazine, is followed by everyone, waste will continue to increase.

The criterion for peer review I adopt is that basic arguments of all ages and countries have been referred to about the same theme. In *On Disasters* by Hisatake Kato (Sekaishisosha Co., Ltd., 2011), I wanted to cover basic philosophical arguments of all ages and countries for the concept “contingency”. “But with relation to the concept “probability,” at the same time, I realized my limitations on the work of referring to all the arguments on mathematics and physics up to the present chaos theory. As a literary work expressing contingency, *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* by Thornton Niven Wilder (1928) and *In Cold Blood* by Truman Capote (1965) handle almost the same motif, but I gave up including all the “expressions of contingency in literature”. Also I gave up the attempt at “destiny” and “drawing” in the fields of religion and literature.

In order to meet the criterion to judge whether “all the basic arguments of the Western philosophy have been already referred to on the same theme.,” it is indispensable to use *Das Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie* by Joachim Ritter (1903-1974). However, depending on the subject, its contents may be insufficient.

For an encyclopedia covering the philosophy and religion of the East and the West, *Encyclopedia of Comparative Philosophy supervised* by Hajime Nakamura and edited by Hideo Mineshima (Tokyo Shoseki Co., Ltd., 2000) is useful, but it is insufficient in volume, which is one fiftieth of *Das Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie* by Joachim Ritter.

Encyclopedias and dictionaries are being enriched in Britain and the United States as well. Taking account of how information should be in the future including Google, efforts are being made at pursuing optimization as an encyclopedia or a handbook. *Handbuch des Staatrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* by Isensee & Kirchhof in nine volumes that has been recently completed (2003–2011) is a data pool good enough to use as criteria absolutely required to be referred to for peer review in the constitutional debate and legal philosophy.

In my dream, information of philosophy of all ages and countries is integrated, in which words that describe the wisdom of all ages and countries for the subjects, such as *truth, love, justice, beauty, and life* are assembled. The words are adopted not only from philosophy, religion, and thought in the narrow sense but from natural science, social sciences, and literature. In the extended version, the data put in record increase every year. In the cut-down version, the data put in record decrease every year. The highest honor for philosophers is to survive in the cut-down version. When the cut-down version of philosophy of all
ages and countries is handed down from generation to generation as a true classic which everyone in the world should learn in the future, the quality of dialogue and consensus building among people of the would be improved.

**Related papers and writings by Hisatake Kato**

- “Intention to Set Up the Plan of Collected Papers of Survey” in *Collected Papers of Survey of Ethics I*, Department of Ethics, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University, August 15, 2000, pp. 1-4.
- “An Idea Fusion between Humanities and Sciences and Universities” in *Science*, October 2001 issue, issued on October 1, pp. 1297-1302.
- “Interdiscipline of Ethics” in *Horizon of Boundary*, published by Tohoku University Press, Sendai, March 15, 2003, pp. 9-23. (Revised version of the article in the bulletin of Tottori University of Environmental Studies)
- “Significance and Prospect of German Philosophy” in *Significance and Prospect of German Philosophy*, edited by Kant-Gesellscha, Risosha Co. Ltd, September 5, 2006, 199 pages in total, carried in pp. 53-70.
- “Hegelianism and Skepticism” carried in *Principle of Human Being No. 13*, issued by Graduate School of Human and Environmental Studies, Kyoto University on March 31, 2007, pp. 43-56