【著作紹介】Distributive Politics in Malaysia: Maintaining Authoritarian Party Dominance

Distributive Politics in Malaysia著者鷲田 任邦 (法学部法律学科 准教授) 
出版社: Routledge
出版年:2018年 10月発行 
ISBN: 9781138634510

The election on 9 May 2018 ended six decades of rule by the ruling coalition in Malaysia (Barisan Nasional or BN, formerly the Alliance). Despite this result, the BN’s longevity and resilience to competition is remarkable. This book explores the mechanisms behind the emergence, endurance, fight for survival and decline of the party’s dominance.

Using a systematic analysis of key resources (budgets, posts, and seats), Washida challenges the conventional argument that a punitive threat to exclude opposition supporters from distributive benefits sustained the loyalty of the masses as well as the elites. He also calls into question whether the mere existence of party organization in and of itself enables leaders to credibly commit to power-sharing. Instead he posits a theory of mobilization agency, in which a party leader needs to design an effective incentive mechanism. In addition, he explains how the BN had manufactured legislative dominance by tactical gerrymandering and malapportionment.

The insights drawn from the Malaysian case can help deepen our understanding of the rise and fall of authoritarian parties and distributive politics in general.









List of illustrations/abbreviations

1. The puzzling resilience of authoritarian party dominance
Introduction / A puzzle and the shortcomings of conventional view / Plan of the book

2. A theory of elite-level mobilization agency
Introduction / Division in the studies of distributive politics / A theory of elite-level mobilization agency

3. Historical origins of the mobilization agency
Introduction / Centrifugal force in the early years / An electoral setback in 1959 as the first drive / An electoral setback in 1969 as the second drive / Conclusion

4. Revisiting center-local relations: Collusion rather than collision
Introduction / Centralized federalism / Focus of existing studies: conflicts and coercive dominance / Focus of this study: collusive agency / Conclusion

5. Providing credible cost compensation: Development budget allocation
Introduction / Interstate allocation: impartial but conditional cost compensation / Political budget cycles: enhancing credibility / Conclusion

6. Designing an incentive mechanism: Ministerial portfolio allocation
Introduction / Interstate allocation: efficiency-based mobilization incentives / Individual allocation: conditional saliency of incentives / Intra/interparty allocation: adjudicating electoral and coalitional politics / Conclusion

7. Manufacturing legislative dominance: Gerrymandering and malapportionment
Introduction / Theoretical discussion and extension / GIS-based analysis / Unintended consequences of gerrymandering / Conclusion

8. Withstanding the decline: A dilemma in spatial positioning
Introduction / Background of declining dominance / Theoretical discussion and extension / A crosscutting dimension, a survival strategy, and its limitations / Conclusion

9. Conclusion
Summary and discussion / Implications for comparative studies



1. 序論:覇権政党体制の筆頭例をめぐる謎(なぜBNは長期間支配できたのか?)
2. 理論:集票エージェントとしての与党議員(インセンティブ契約として資源配分政治をとらえる)
3. 歴史:マレーシアの資源配分政治の歴史的起源(初期の選挙での苦戦が育んだBN優位の基盤)
4. 制度と政策過程:連邦政府・州政府間関係の再考(野党州との対立よりも与党州での協調に着目する意義)
5. 分析①:開発予算配分(与党州への集票コスト保証と野党州の疎外、政治的財政循環)
6. 分析②:閣僚ポスト配分(与党議員から集票努力を引き出すインセンティブ、与党連合内の調整)
7. 分析③:区割りと一票の格差の操作(限られた得票を議席上の優位に変換する方法)
8. 分析④:衰退・敗北の背景(新しいイシュー次元の出現、BNの対応とその限界)
9. 結論:まとめと今後の比較研究に向けた示唆


[著者] 鷲田 任邦(ワシダ ヒデクニ)



Researchmapページ(鷲田 任邦 准教授)
東洋大学研究者情報データベース(鷲田 任邦 准教授)