国際シンポジウム・研究会
International Symposium/Workshop

報告書
『国際協力のニューパラダイムに向けて』
Proceedings
Towards a New Paradigm of International Cooperation

東洋大学国際共生社会研究センター
（オープン・リサーチ・センター）編・発行
Edited by Open Research Center
Center for Sustainable Development Studies
Toyo University

2005年12月
December, 2005
## Contents of Proceedings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. シンポジウム プログラム／Program of the Symposium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 塩川正十郎 Masajuro SHIOKAWA</td>
<td></td>
<td>日本の国際化と国際協力 Internationalization and International Cooperation of Japan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 長谷川祐弘 Sukehiro HASEGAWA</td>
<td></td>
<td>国造りにおいて国際社会が果たすべき役割 The Role of the International Community in New Nation Building-Case study of UN Experience in Timor-Leste</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ラモス・ホルタ José RAMOS-HORTA</td>
<td></td>
<td>東ティモールと国際協力 East Timor and International Cooperation</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 北脇秀敏 Hidetoshi KITAWAKI</td>
<td></td>
<td>今後の国際協力とニューパラダイム The Future International Cooperation and New Paradigm</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. 研究会資料／Workshop Documents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. 東洋大学国際共生社会研究センター（オープン・リサーチ・センター）概要</td>
<td></td>
<td>Outline of Center for Sustainable Development Studies, Toyo University</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. 国際シンポジウム報告

Summary Report of the International Symposium
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>時間</th>
<th>プログラム内容</th>
<th>Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13:00</td>
<td>開場</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30</td>
<td>開会挨拶</td>
<td>Opening Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>東洋大学学長</td>
<td>Tomonori MATSUYO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>東洋大学国際共生社会研究センター長</td>
<td>President, Toyo University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>松尾友紀</td>
<td>Director, Center for Sustainable Development Studies, Toyo University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:50</td>
<td>基調講演</td>
<td>Keynote Presentations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>川正一郎</td>
<td>Masatomo SHIOKAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>東洋大学総長</td>
<td>Chancellor, Toyo University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>「日本の国際化と国際協力」</td>
<td>“Internationalization and International Cooperation of Japan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>講演</td>
<td>Keynote Presentations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>長谷川隆弘</td>
<td>Sukehiro HASEGAWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>東洋大学大学院客員教授</td>
<td>Visiting professor, Toyo University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>国連事務総長秘書長代表（国連東ティモール事務所代表）</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>「国際化における国際社会が果たすべき役割」</td>
<td>“The Role of the International Community in New Nation Building: Case study of UN Experience in Timor-Leste”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:10</td>
<td>コーヒーブレイク</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30</td>
<td>ラオス・ホルタ</td>
<td>José RAMOS-HORTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>東ティモール民主共和国外務・協力上級大臣、ノーベル平和賞受賞者（1996年）</td>
<td>Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs &amp; Cooperation, The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>「東ティモールと国際協力」</td>
<td>Nobel Peace Laureate in 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>「東ティモールと国際協力」</td>
<td>“East Timor and International Cooperation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:10</td>
<td>北西裕敏</td>
<td>Hidefumi KITAWAKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>東洋大学大学院国際地域学研究科委員長，東洋大学国際共生社会研究センター研究員</td>
<td>Professor, Dean of Graduate School of Regional Development Studies, Toyo University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>「今後の国際協力とニューパラダイム」</td>
<td>Researcher, Center for Sustainable Development Studies, Toyo University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>「今後の国際協力とニューパラダイム」</td>
<td>“The Future International Cooperation and New Paradigm”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:50</td>
<td>閉会</td>
<td>Closing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:20</td>
<td>レセプション</td>
<td>Reception (at Sky Hall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>（会場：2号館16階スカイホール）</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTERNATIONALIZATION AND

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OF JAPAN

Masajuro SHIOKAWA
Chancellor, Toyo University
ご紹介頂きました、塩川です。最初に、ラモス・ホルタ博士に本学にお越しいただいたこと、心から歓迎いたします。

本日は「日本の国際化と国際協力」という難しいテーマのもとで講演をいたします。このような機会を得たのは、この井上円了ホールが完成した式典のときに、外交問題につきまして私の考えを申し上げたことがあり、その関連でご招待頂いたのではないかと考えております。本日外交問題・国際協力の問題を論じさせて頂くわけですが、予め説明しておかなければならないのは、本講演の内容は私自身の見解であり、決して、政府の見解ではない、ということです。

また、原稿も予め用意しておりませんし、同時通訳も入っているため、できるだけゆっくりと話をして、その間、通訳がしやすいようにいたしたいと思っております。

1．ODAをめぐる国際協力のあり方
さて、本シンポジウムにおいてテーマに据えた「国際協力のニューパラダイムを求めて」ですが、これは我が国にとりましても非常に時宜に適したテーマだといえます。その理由として、昨年、日本がODAの国際協力に正式に参加してからちょうど50周年を迎えました。振り返りますと、長い間の歴史を経てきたODAですが、このODAをめぐる国際協力というもののあり方を根本的に見直さなければならない時期にさしかかっています。しかも、こうした状況を受けまして、本年2月政府において新しいODA大綱というものを作定しており、従来からのODAのあり方に根本的な変革を入れ始めています。こうした国際協力を語る場合に非常に大事なことは、これからの国際協力のあり方が協力をどのように
進めるか＞だけでなく、＜世界の動向をどう見るか＞ということと非常に密接に関係するようになってきているということであります。

2．日本における ODA の歴史
今までの 50 年にわたる ODA の歴史を見た場合、その発足当初においては、＜戦争において日本が迷惑をおかけしました＞という反省に基づき、関係国への賠償の意味を含めて ODA 計画を実施したと捉えることが出来ます。そうした期間は、約 10 年続いたでしょう。その後、日本が高度成長に入り、ODA の計画の中に人類の救済、また発展途上国の経済社会の基盤作りという目的が含まれるようになり、そうした性格へと我が国の ODA の実施方針も変化していきました。このため、初期の ODA では賠償的な傾向があったため、主要として賠償交付ということでやってきましたが、中途になってからは、無償交付だけでなく、有償貸付を併用し、援助対象国の社会資本の充実にあたりました。それ以降には、＜平等に繁栄していこうとするならば人材育成というものが大事である＞との認識に基づい、発展途上国の自立、つまり教育投資に重点を置いた援助を進めるようになりました。さらに時代を経ると、人類の幸せを求めるという趣旨に基づいて、保健衛生という生活環境改善の分野にも力を入れてきています。

このように見てまいりますと、ODA の中期計画のなかで占めたのは、社会発展計画の中の基盤作りが中心でした。ところが、50 年の歴史の後半には、計画の中心に、経済の共生という考え方も入ってきています。具体的には、発展途上国が実質的に経済成長を遂げるために、主として工業経済の支援をするようになりました。また同時に、技術提供という形で支援の努力を続けてきました。

これらの国際協力や援助において、日本で中心的な役割を果たしたのは、国際協力機構（JICA）であり、JICA とともに海外経済協力基金（OECF）という、経済企画庁が中心となり進めた 4 省の共同事業も、国際協力のうち大规模な計画では重要な役割を果たしてきました。さらに、後期になると国際協力銀行（JBIC）に引き継がれ、現在は上記の 2 つの機関（国際協力機構と国際協力銀行）が中心となって国際協力を進めているという体制が出来上がっています。

3．国際情勢の変化
それでは、新たに決定した ODA 見直しの大綱は今年の 2 月に閣議決定しましたが、新しい ODA 大綱を考える場合、国際情勢の変化を併せて考えていかなければなりません。そこで、現在の国際情勢の変化というものを、自分なりに整理してみたいと思います。この話はあくまでも私自身の判断に基づくものです。

私は、戦後 60 年の世界安全保障体制、国際秩序がこの 10 年に大きく変わったということをまず指摘したいと思います。それは、単に東西冷戦が終わったということではありません。これも大きな変化でありますが、それがひとつの引き金となって、今までの世界体
制、世界秩序体制というものが大きう変わりつつきたという意味です。一番大きい変わり方は何かというと、今までの国連中心、国連において世界の協議を通じて、それによるところの安全保障の実行をしていうという考え方が通用しなくなった。私の見解からすると、国連の無力化ということがあまりにも明確に出ているており、その結果、これからの世界秩序のあり方、そして、日本の国際協力のあり方というものに対する考え方を変えていく必要性が出てきたと考えております。それでは、どのように変化しているでしょうか。国連はたくさんするけれども、あるいは話し合いの場は提供するけれども、何の実行力もない、また、何の決定権・決定力もない更に何も含意できないということが明確になっていくということが出来ます。

これらの変化は、世界それぞれの、いわば地域分割化のような傾向を生み出していると考えることが出来る。その一例は、EFTA（ヨーロッパ自由貿易連合）での各国協議の問題でしょうし、また、南米と北米が一つになった経済圏の構想であります。もっとはっきりしたものは、ヨーロッパにおけるEUの結成であり、28カ国がひとつのブロック化してしまうというようなことも起こってまいりました。また、アジアにおきましても、アジア共同体意識と言うこともだんだんと芽生えてきており、一種の地域活動が起こってきたと見ることも出来ます。さらに、非常に矛盾したことに、終戦後、グローバリゼーションという現象も進展しています。グローバリゼーションと地域経済構想は、お互いに相反するものでありながら、そうした二つの底流がわれわれの目の前に迫ってきています。

同時に、国連中心でやってきた、いわばアメリカの理想主義的な考え方が実際にには世界に通用しないという問題も顕在化しています。すなわち、国連という場においては各国が議決に関する権利を等しく一票ずつ有しており、貧富の格差、軍事力の格差、外交能力の格差など、様々な面において非常に格差がある国々が一堂に会すため、異なった利害が交錯し、容易に同意が得られません。このような実態が国連の構造的な欠陥となって国連の形骸化が深まっています。

そこで顕在化してきたのは、いわば強力な国を中心とした指導力という、あるいはもっと極端な表現でいうと、アメリカの覇権主義的な行動というものが多い目に目立つようになった状況です。冷戦終了後を見ました場合に、世界で唯一の指導的な立場に立って国際問題に発言できる国はアメリカしか存在しないためであります。アメリカの主導する世界秩序を造ろうとする覇権活動、これがあまりにも最近露骨に出てきており、これを我々は常に慎重に考慮しなければなりません。

こうした状況の下で、国際社会においてロシアと、中国の台頭も顕著です。この10年の間にロシアの変化というものは、ご承知のように旧ソビエトとは全く違った方向にいきました。民主化も非常に進んだようであるが、プーチン大統領になりましてから、アメリカの覇権主義に対抗するひとつの傾向も見えて取ることが出来ます。その傾向は、プーチン大統領によって進められている、いわば、ロシア地域の統括的行動といいましょうか、誤解して頂きたくはないが、かつてのソビエト連邦の諸地域との間を結びつけて、もう一度、
統一行動でやっていこうという共同意識が強くになってきているという事であります。しかし、一度ソビエト連邦が崩壊したら、ウズベキスタンやウクライナ、あるいは、チェチェンなどの周辺国が崩壊になってきているという現状もあります。周辺国自身が、資源と民族性、宗教性を強く意識するようになり、それぞれの独立性が非常に強くなってきています。このため、ロシアの統括という問題は、現時点においては、我々にとって非常に疑問視しているところです。

いったんは民主化したロシアが再び、統一化へ向かうという傾向にとどまらず、アメリカ中心の覇権主義とロシアを中心とした統一したブロック化、そして、EU諸国での統一市場の形成、さらに、アジアブロックなど世界の秩序において対立の軸が見られるようになってきています。このように見てみると、国連の統一が弱体化することで、世界各国の中の分割が始まっていると考えることが出来ます。

さらに、中国国内においても変化が生じています。そのきっかけは天安門事件であり、それ以降、共産党の中央委員会と軍部との中国の統制に関する考え方の相違が見られるようになっています。特に最近では、軍部の力の発揮の仕方、中国の経済発展の仕方に考え方に相違があることが明らかになり、これが外交の面でもあらわれています。中国の統一という立場において、我々は、さらに一層に関心を持って見なければならないでしょう。一番の問題は、中国の共産党が掲げる市場経済主義による社会主義であり、これに最大の矛盾があります。この考えからいって、独裁の統一政治体制をとるという立場の軍部と、市場経済の実行をしなければならないという政府との間に考え方の相違があります。最近の極端な経済発展というのをよく見た場合、この動向の将来は、中国共産党と中国人民解放軍（現在、複合軍）との関係がどのように、政治や外交に反映するかということを見定める必要があり、そのうえで日本は対応を考えていかなければならないと思います。また、現在の日中関係を考える中で、一番の問題は、商業、つまり経済の面では各国とも共通の会話が出来るのですが、政治的、外交的な会話というのは一向に進展しないという点です。近年非常に難しい問題が起こってきており、それは石油の問題です。石油の問題は、日本の経済、並びに国際協力の問題とも関連させ、将来性をよく見定め、検討しなくてはなりません。

私は、原油価格は相当高止まりが続いていくだろうと推測します。どの程度の期間、高止まりの状態が続くかは分かりませんが、世界の軍事的な協調体制がとられ、あるいは、テロの問題などがある程度下火になり、世界全体に平和なムードが濃くなってくれれば、石油の問題も片付いていくと思っています。しかし、現在の国際環境を考えた場合、安心した状況ではないと判断します。理由の一つとしては、核拡散体制が崩壊状態にあるということです。ご承知のように、NPT（核拡散防止条約）が、世界的な軍事的な安定を図ろうという条約として、非常に有効なものであったのですが、この条約が事実上破綻状態に陥っています。先日世界会議が行われましたが、核拡散防止条約の改正問題については、なんらの合意も得られず、会議が終わってしまいました。このような状況下、各国が自国のい
わば国益にそっと核政策をとるということになってしまいました。このように国際的な規制の枠組みが確立する一方、核兵器が開発されてから、60数年を経て、この原子爆弾の技術は飛躍的に向上しています。従来のような原爆とは違い、小型で非常に簡便で、経費が安く作れる。そうなると、核の保有という問題が従来の大国のみに関連するのではなく、小国をも含む問題となり、これらの国々が保有する普通の兵器による可能性が出てきている、という非常に危険な状況が生じています。この核問題に対して、世界的に完全な合意を得て、ある程度抑制し、統制しなければ、将来、世界における安全保障において全面的な安定、安心を得ることは出来ないといえます。

4．世界経済における日本のあり方

以上のように、国連中心でやってきたこの60年の歴史が世界の安全保障の根本的変革の時期に来ている一方、それとは裏腹に経済のブロック化も進んでいます。そうすると、これからの世界経済における日本のあり方というのはいかにあるべきか、に関する議論は日本の国益にとっても最大の問題であると同様に世界経済について大きい影響を及ぼします。私は、これからの日本の経済は次のように変化するだろうと考えます。今までは、貿易により付加価値を追求しており、それによって日本の繁栄を保ってきたが、それだけでは、日本の経済の繁栄の基礎は先細りになっていくでしょう。幸いにして、昨年あたりから、日本の国際収支の実態が非常に変わってきています。国際収支の黒字に寄与する分野の一つは、貿易の付加価値の収入であるが、もう一つは知的収入及び資産収入も頑著に効果を表すようになっています。現在では、日本は、今まで知的部門におきましては、特許料、ノウハウ料、登録使用料などは日本から海外への一方的な支出が常であり、受け取りより支払いの額が大幅に上回っていました。しかし、最近は逆に、これらの項目では、外国からの受け取りのほうが多くなってきています。さらに、資本投下による配当金の還元の額も増加しています。このため、国際収支に占める知的収入と資産収入を合わせた額のウエートは非常に大きくなってきています。そのように考えると、日本の経済の将来のあり方は、これから貿易による付加価値の追求よりむしろ、知的収入、あるいは資本収入に重点を置く必要があると考えられます。そうなければ、従来の国際協力のあり方も国際的に相互協調して繁栄する、そのような国際協力に重点を置く手法に移行せざるを得ないのではないでしょうか。

5．今後の日本の国際協力のあり方

このように見ていくと、これからの国際的な考え方では、どうしても国家単位でものを考えるようになってくるという傾向が強くなるでしょう。日本はいつまでも「国連、国連」と連呼するだけでは、国際協力はできません。最近外務省を中心に国際情勢が変化しているのにも拘らず、未だに国連の常任理事国を目指すとされている、この国策そのものが、疑問があるとはっきり申し上げる。10年前の話であれば、まだもし、今、国際情勢が国連
中心からブロック中心に変わりつつあり、しかもブロックから国単位に変わろうというときに、国連常任理事国を目指す方針に疑問を呈さざるを得ない。現在は、移り変わりの激しい国際情勢にあります。EU25 カ国の憲法をフランス、オランダという両国が否認しましたが、これは大きな変化の現れでしょう。今まで申しように、国連から、地域の中心に移って EU25 カ国まとまってきました。ヨーロッパひとつの大きなブロックの力になろうと思ったところが、憲法という問題を見たときに、くいつくともない、俺たちは独立国家である＞という意識が強くなり、EU の結末にも異変があり自己主張が強くなってきたと見ることが出来ます。このため、10 年前のマーストリヒト条約による、統一国防軍という発想、ひいては統一国家的な構想が崩れていっている、あるいは崩れつつあるのです。

5. 今後の ODA
こうした国際情勢の変化からみて、国中心のいわば、国際協調、協力可能な国、相互理解可能な国、あるいは合意できる国同士の付き合いへと変化してきています。そうした場合、日本はどのような国と意思を通じて、それらの国や地域へ国際貢献というものを重点的にやるかを深く考える必要があります。つまり、今までの賃金の話から出ました、ODA、そして、同時に理想主義に走った人類の共同の平和、共同の繁栄、そして、最近では、ODA を使った日本の経済とのつながりなどの段階を経てきました国際協力も、今後はそのようなものから変化し、日本の安全保障と経済協力を合わせたものについて合意できる国との協調というものを心得て国際協力をしなくてはなりません。かつての理想主義的な ODA は今後通用しないと思います。

現在まで ODA には、1991 年から 2000 年の 10 年間で 12 兆円の国際協力をしてきました。このうちの約 15%が無償で 85%は有償であり、この有償が最近返還されない国が増えています。返済資金を新規に貸付けて返済をさせるという矛盾も発生しています。地域で話すのは申し訳ないのであるが、アフリカ地域、東南地域、南米等などが該当します。日本はこれだけの ODA の実績を積み上げてきましたが、これからの ODA をどう変えれば良いのでしょうか。先ほどちょっと話しましたように、日本と共に栄えて、そして、日本の安全保障に関係のあるところに重点を置くことになっていくと考えられます。さらに、具体的にどういったかに国際協力していけばいいかという話ですが、今では、例えて言うと、学校や病院を建ててほしい、道路や橋を直してほしい、のような単発的なプロジェクトに対する援助が中心でした。こうした援助を相手国が本当に喜んでいるのかというと、必ずしもそうではありません。なぜなら、こうした援助の多くはその政府の一部のポスが要求したものであって、国民としてのレベルの要求ではないからです。ODA が国民レベルでの援助になっていない事例として、7 年前における 2008 年開催オリンピックの誘致活動を挙げることが出来ます。日本は大阪に招致すべく立候補したが、その結果、オリンピック運営委員会の会議では日本はたった 6 票しか賛成票を得ることができませんでした。ところが、中国には 37 か国が賛成しました。日本は ODA の実績が大きい国であ
5.2 援助対象国の国民に密着した国際援助

日本のこれまでの援助は単一的なプロジェクトや、相手国政府のそのときのときの要求に応じて実施されてきました。しかし、その国の民主的なあり方は日本と全く違い、国によっては適切な対象とはいえないと考えた国に対するODA援助は不適切であるといえます。したがって、これからのODAは、真にその国民の繁栄に結びつく地域開発と貢献となるようなものとしなければなりません。単発的なプロジェクトではなく、国民に密着したものを行わなければなりません。それでは、具体的にどの例があるのですか？2つ申し上げたいと思います。

まず、メコン川の総合開発であり、これは6カ国が共通して望んでいる開発であります。これを実施することによって、6カ国国民が大きな利益を受けると期待されています。どのように開発かというと、メコン川は中国の青海省を水源として、雲南省を流れ、ミャンマーに入り、ミャンマーからタイ、ラオス、カンボジア、ベトナムを経て南シナ海に注ぐ水流量非常に多く、しかも落差が非常にある川です。青海省から源を発して落差大体千メートル近くの落差があります。これが、全く開発されていない自然のままに放置されています。一部では、タイの周辺のように水運をしているところもありますが、ほとんど開発されておらず、放置されています。ところが、この川を利用し、水を有効利用すると農業が飛躍的に発展するということです。また川の開発では、灌漑用水の考え方を導入すると同時に、発電の開発にもつながります。これも電力を作ることができます。そこで推定される電力の発電は、落差が4千メートルあるので、うまく開発すると、３千万キロワットくらいの電力ができるのではないかと予想されます。日本の黒部川では、7つもの発電所があり、そこで350万キロワット発電していることを聞くと、メコン川での開発もできるのではないかと考えられます。また、発電所の豊かな水を利用して農業ができることによって文化が生まれ、同時に、軽工業が栄えます。そこで、日本の中小企業等の技術を導入すると軽工業の発達や発展に日本が貢献し、現地における雇用対策につながるでしょう。農業指導も同時に貢献できます。以上のように、ODA資金を地域の総合開発に投資することが新しいあり方の一つであります。

二つ目は、地域開発だけでなく、知的な国際協力は何かというものであります。それは、世界各国に、国際研究機関というものがあるのですが、そのうち日本政府が、支援してできた研究所が10いくつあります。私は、イリ（IRRI）というお米の研究を行っている
研究所に参上しました。この設立には日本とアメリカが関わっており、両者が中心となりフィリピンに建設しました。しかし、この研究所は運営費を十分に確保できていない状態であります。1960年に設立以来、日本は研究費の予算を支出しておりません。日本の学者が訪れると、個人の研究費という形で若干は支出ていますが、国策としてはほとんど援助していません。ほかの研究所も同様の状況です。こうした研究機関の研究資金はどこがまかなっているかと申しますと、アメリカの財団や大学が直接援助しています。このような研究所は、日本が研究資金を出すことにより初めて、日本の財政的援助に基づいて設立した研究所として広く認知されるため、こういった施設にお金を使うことが重要であります。今までのような援助ではなく、日本にとって身近であり、それが人類のために地域の繁栄のために直接結びついてくる、そういう分野に貢献するということを考えるべきです。したがって、これからの国際貢献では、もちろんODAが重要であるとは思いますが、ODAだけが国際貢献になっている現状を改めて、外交を利用し、日本の産業や学術、文化、芸術というものを総合的な力を持ってその国と付き合っていくことが必要です。また、世界各国中に公平平等に慈善を行えるわけではありません。私は、国際情勢の変化に伴った国際協力をしていくということを申し上げまして、話を終わらせて頂きます。ありがとうございました。
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IN NEW NATION BUILDING

— CASE STUDY OF UN EXPERIENCE IN TIMOR-LESTE —

Sukehiro HASEGAWA
Visiting professor, Toyo University
Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL),
Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme in Timor-Leste
- A Keynote Presentation -

The Role of the International Community in New Nation Building
Case Study of UN Experience in Timor-Leste

Sukehiro HASEGAWA
Visiting professor, Toyo University
Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL),
Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme in Timor-Leste

Executive Summary
The nature of the UN involvement in peacekeeping and peace-building in recent years has been rapidly changing towards multifunctional operations with mandates ranging from immediate stabilisation and protection of civilians to supporting humanitarian assistance, organising elections, assisting the development of new political structures, engaging in security sector reform, disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former combatants and laying the foundations for a lasting peace. The UN has increasingly used an integrated approach involving other international and regional organisations, development partners, host governments and civil society. In order to be successful, the mandate, functions and form of such an integrated mission must be determined by a clear strategy, should embody benchmarked targets to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to the recovery and development phase, and guarantee a long-term international commitment as prerequisite for sustainable peace.

Taking the UN peacekeeping and peace-building experience in Timor-Leste as a case study, I illustrate in my paper that the role of the international community in new nation building is to help fulfilling six requirements for the establishment of a viable nationhood. The international community is first to assist in creating an environment for maintenance of peace and security, secondly to establish a national government capable of delivering essential public services, and thirdly to lay the foundation for democratic governance. Fourthly, it is necessary to establish transparency and accountability in public administration, and fifthly to achieve poverty reduction and foster economic growth. Furthermore, if nation building is carried out in a post-conflict country, the international community has a role to play in bringing about justice, truth and reconciliation among former foes and antagonists. I identify and examine these six requirements based on my own experience in the post-conflict and developing countries, in which I have served during the last 35 years of service with the United Nations, most recently in Timor-Leste.

The intervention by the international community through INTERFET stopped wide-spread violence and destruction, during which the lives of nearly one thousand and five hundred Timorese had been lost and almost all private property and public infrastructure facilities had been destroyed. UNTAET, under the leadership of the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, succeeded in carrying out peacekeeping functions while at the same time commencing the formation of the Timorese national police, PNTL. The United Nations police, UNPOL, coached and mentored PNTL national police officers while they shared police office premises throughout the country until UNPOL handed over the executive policing responsibility to PNTL in 20 May 2004. While the number of UN police officers was reduced from more than 1,000 in 2002 to 157 in May 2004 and 60 in May 2005, they became more involved in capacity building of PNTL officers.
Since May 2002, the UN has been increasingly supporting the capacity building of the four sovereign State institutions - Government, National Parliament, Office of the Presidency and Judiciary Branch. Key lessons learned include, at the very outset, the need to draw up and implement a comprehensive institutional capacity building plan. Furthermore, institution building has to be carried out in an integrated manner, addressing the development of technical and managerial skills, administrative processes and procedures, as well as management principles and institutional cultures. UNOTIL is now tasked to ensure the transition to a sustainable development assistance framework by May 2006, focusing on capacity development of critical State institutions, support to PNTL and the Border Police Unit, and training on the observance of democratic governance and human rights.

The foundations for democratic governance include the accountability of the Government and other state institutions to foster the acceptance of the rule of law, respect for human rights, the social reintegration of marginalized and vulnerable groups, and transparency and accountability of the public administration, particularly with regard to the management of natural resources. Timor-Leste recently established a Petroleum Fund and policy procedures in order to manage effectively and transparently the revenues from the Timor Sea oil and natural gas exploitation, which are expected to amount to approximately US$ 25-30 billion, depending on the fluctuations of the oil price and other uncertainties, during its anticipated lifespan of 25-30 years.

The role of the international community in Timor-Leste in bringing about justice and reconciliation has been significant and the complementary approach has significantly enhanced sustainable peace-building. The serious crimes process was carried out efficiently and professionally, bringing to trial 87 defendants, mainly Timorese militia, of which 84 were convicted mostly of crimes against humanity. However, major systemic limitation left 339 indicted persons, believed to be outside the country, without trial and a further 800 murder cases and others have not yet been indicted. As a parallel process, Timor-Leste constituted a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), which proved highly successful in mobilizing community participation in truth-telling and facilitating localized community reconciliation agreements. In March 2005 Indonesia and Timor-Leste agreed to establish a Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) with a view to revealing the truth vis-à-vis the events prior to and immediately after the popular consultation in 1999, and to further promoting reconciliation and friendship between the two countries. The UN Commission of Expert, tasked to review the judicial processes of the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor in Jakarta and the Serious Crimes Unit and Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Dili, put forward key recommendations on sound and feasible measures to bring to justice those accountable for crimes against humanity and on ways in which the CTF can assist in this endeavour.

Timor-Leste continues to face major challenges in the process of nation-building. It is one of the poorest countries in the Southeast Asian and Pacific region with a rapid population growth of an estimated annual rate of 4.3 percent and a life expectancy at birth of 58.4 years. Health standards, compromised by a lack of food, respiratory, diarrhoeal and endemic diseases, and educational level are very low. 41 percent of the population is living below the national poverty line. The Government is, therefore, pursuing a poverty reduction strategy to: (1) increase the productivity of the poor; (2) ensure adequate social services at affordable prices; (3) provide security; and (4) promote empowerment and local ownership, in view of achieving the national development goals, in accordance with the overarching Millennium Development Goals.

It has been widely recognized that the UN has conducted one of its most comprehensive and successful peacekeeping and peace-building operations in Timor-Leste, partially achieved through the integrated approach towards effective mandate implementation, and partially by the acceptance of the UN's role by the Timorese leadership and people, as well as Indonesia's acceptance of Timor-Leste as an independent nation.
INTRODUCTION

It is my great pleasure and distinct honour to participate in this international symposium on *Towards a New Paradigm of International Cooperation*. First of all, I wish to thank the Centre for Sustainable Development Studies of Toyo University for having organized such a thought-provoking symposium and invited authoritative and knowledgeable persons. I would also like to extend my appreciation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for cosponsoring this important international symposium. The fact that this symposium takes place in the Inoue Memorial Centre reflects the historic significance attached to this event.

The organizers of this symposium have asked me to share my views on the role of the international community in new nation building. Today, I will do so based on my actual working experiences in nation building assistance in various countries in which I have worked. These countries include in Nepal (1978-80), Indonesia (1980-84), Western Samoa (1984-87), Cambodia (1993), Somalia (1994), Rwanda (1995-96) and most notably in Timor-Leste (2002-05). It has indeed been a privilege for me to live in these countries and work closely with the leaders and the peoples of these countries. My latest experience in Timor-Leste, the country commonly known as East Timor, has provided me with an opportunity to interact with the most senior leaders of the country including not only Foreign Minister José Ramos-Horta, who is with us today, but also Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and President Carlos Xanana Gusmão in my capacities as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations operational system's operational activities for development and the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme during the period of last three years. As many of you know, since Timor-Leste gained international recognition of its political independence on 20 May 2002, it has embarked upon its self-reliant efforts for new nation building with the support of first the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and now the United Nation Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), joined by other UN agencies, funds and programmes such as UNDP and the international financing institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and the Asian Development Bank.

The role of the international community in new nation building is to help fulfilling six requirements for the establishment of a viable nationhood. The international community is first to assist in creating an environment for maintenance of peace and security for the people of the country, secondly to establish a national government capable of delivering essential public services, and thirdly to lay the foundation for democratic governance. Fourthly, it is also necessary to establish transparency and accountability in public administration and fifthly to achieve poverty reduction and economic growth. Furthermore, if nation building is carried out in a post-conflict country, the international community has a role to play in bringing about justice, truth and reconciliation among former foes and antagonists. I identify and examine these five conditions and the sixth issue of justice, truth and reconciliation based on my own
experience in the countries, in which I have served during the last 35 years of service with the United Nations, most currently in the post-conflict country Timor-Leste.

Only in recent years has the international community become increasingly aware of the need to remain involved in post-conflict countries after the initial period of stabilisation and the instigation of the democratic process, marked by events such as popular referendums and elections. As the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has pointed out, about half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years as they are in effect abandoned by the international community. It is with this understanding that they have recommended and the Secretary-General has reiterated in his report, In larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, that the United Nations should be engaged in peace-building with a view to helping countries to successfully complete the transition from war to peace and to fulfil the imperatives for nation-building until a country has reached a phase when it can move forward with only development assistance. Secondly, the Security Council decided to authorize with its resolution 1599 adopted on 28 April 2005 the continued presence of a UN political mission designed to undertake state institution building activities. This signifies the Security Council’s full acceptance of the proposal of the High Level Panel that there is a need to undertake peace-building activities after the completion of a peacekeeping operation and before the phase of sustainable development begins. A major focus of the new mandate will be institutional capacity building within the state institutions responsible for maintaining security, law and order, justice and civil administration. As Professor Collier and his team emphasized in their report to the World Bank entitled Breaking the Conflict Trap – Civil War and Development Policy, the international community has a legitimate role to play as an advocate for the victims of civil wars that have intensified the global poverty problem, recognising that “Conflict weakens the economy and leaves a legacy of atrocities. Once a country has had a conflict it is in far greater danger of further conflict: commonly, the chief legacy of a civil war is another war – a conflict trap. [...] the core development challenge is to design international interventions that are effective in stabilizing the society during the first post-conflict decade.”

Now allow me to identify and discuss six key conditions for post-conflict peace and nation-building. In Resolution 1573 adopted a year ago, the Security Council urged the “UN development and humanitarian agencies and multilateral financial institutions to start immediately planning for a smooth transition, in Timor-Leste, from a peacekeeping operation to a sustainable development assistance framework.” A similar call was made by the Security Council in resolution 1599 that a rapid transition be realised in international support from a special political mission to a sustainable development assistance framework, signifying the urgency with which the Security Council hoped to establish the sustainability of international engagement in nation building efforts in Timor-Leste. My own experience with nation-building assistance in the field leads me to believe that the new nation building process is a long one that requires the growth of healthy institutional capacity and culture that is based on respect for freedoms and human rights. For this to happen, the role of the international community in helping new nation building efforts consists of following six tasks, namely:
(1) Building an independent and professional law enforcement agency that is committed to protecting basic human rights of all people;
(2) Strengthening the capacity of state institutions, particularly the Government, to deliver essential public services such as education and health services to the people;
(3) Establishing the foundation for democratic governance, particularly ensuring that four sovereign state institutions respect separation of powers, rule of law, and human rights for all particularly marginalised and vulnerable groups;
(4) Ensuring that the Government and other state institutions strive to achieve poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth that enable attainment of the Millennium Development Goals;
(5) Securing the transparency and accountability of sovereign state and other public institutions; and,
(6) Contributing to realization of justice, truth and reconciliation.

I will explain in detail how the international community can assist a newly independent country like Timor-Leste in each of these six endeavours. I will conclude my presentation by identifying contributing factors for successful peace and nation building missions and pointing out the concept of human security as a relevant framework for moving away from the concept of national security in order to assist effectively a newly independent country to achieve human security and development of the people of a new nation.

A. INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

Pursuant to the mandates contained in the Security Council resolutions mentioned above, one of the priority tasks in Timor-Leste was to establish a law enforcement agency - a national police service - and then to train it in such a manner that it fully respected the rule of law and the human rights of common people who had been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment during the 24 years of Indonesian occupation. In East Timor, UNTAET first recruited several hundred policemen including about three hundred former POLRI police officers and established the National Police service of Timor-Leste (PNTL) in August 2001 which has since grown in size to currently 3,300 officers with the addition of specialized units. During the past five years, with the support of UN Civilian Police, the PNTL has made significant progress in organizing itself and strengthening the professional calibre of its officers. The progress was remarkable in comparison with what had been attempted in Somalia and Rwanda, where I assisted in establishing national police forces in 1993 and 1995-96. In Somalia, there was virtually no facilities and resources to accommodate and train national police officers. Although UNOSOM II developed a scheme for establishing a national police force, it did not materialise as the Security Council decided to withdraw the peacekeeping mission in 1995. In Rwanda, in 1995 the Government built a training centre which could barely house trainees with the assistance of the international community. However, the extent of support given by the international community was extremely limited to voluntary contributions provided by the
United Kingdom and the United States. The UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMIR, was involved only nominally before it was disbanded in 1996.

In East Timor, as noted above, the United Nations was actively involved in formation of the Timorese national police, PNTL, and provided technical and material support to its development. Adequate resources were provided for rehabilitating a major training centre complex equipped with classrooms and training facilities. The United Nations police, UNPOL, coached and mentored PNTL national police officers while they shared police office premises throughout the country until UNPOL handed over the executive policing responsibility to PNTL in 20 May 2004. While the number of UN police officers was reduced from more than 1,000 in 2002 to 157 in May 2004 and 60 in May 2005, they became more involved in capacity building of PNTL officers. The UNPOL training advisers, as they were now called, made concerted efforts to fill the gaps in capacity building of the PNTL but also in developing its managerial capabilities. In 2003, Australia and the United Kingdom joined in assisting the development of national capacity for planning, management and administration of the PNTL as an independent agency. The Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP) funded by these two countries are concentrating their assistance on crime prevention and community safety, training in investigations and operations, development of the Police Training College, and PNTL organizational finance and human resources management.

UNOTIL's mandate under United Nations resolution 1599 clearly indicates the need to further support the development of the PNTL. UNPOL has devised a comprehensive strategy to attain the mandated tasks through project-based approaches to ensure sustainability of the developmental efforts and institutional development and capacity building side by side. Furthermore, a Joint Concept of Operations has been developed, based on close cooperation and well-coordinated efforts of police and military training advisers for the development of UPF (Unidade de Patrulla de Fronteira formally known as BPU).

However, several challenges remained that PNTL needed to address in order to find necessary improvements.

- Firstly, the professional expertise of PNTL officers was completely lacking, necessitating enhanced training, particularly in such specialized areas as crowd control, investigation and intelligence gathering. In the area of crowd control, PNTL Rapid Intervention Unit officers revealed their lack of professional skills and disregard of human rights when they dispersed with force a group of peaceful former combatants who demonstrated in front of the Government on 19 and 20 July 2004. Since then, significant progress was made and demonstrated by the orderly conduct of police officers in dealing with the demonstrations organized by the Church in April 2005. The PNTL, however, has encountered difficulties in improving its investigative and intelligence gathering capacity, which left most of the crimes committed in Timor-Leste without proper investigation.
- Secondly, the administration of the PNTL as a law enforcement agency lacked professionalism particularly in the areas of budget and finance, personnel management, procurement, logistics and communication. It was unable to demonstrate accountability of its expenditures or to formulate budget proposals when requested by the Ministry of Finance. This is an area in which the Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP) funded by Australia and the United Kingdom is focusing its efforts.

- Thirdly, the PNTL continues to require assistance in changing the attitude and behaviour of its police officers as incidents of police misconduct, including violations of human rights, have been regularly reported. Some of the PNTL police officers tend to believe that their primary responsibility is to obey their commanders and superiors without due regard to the principle of democratic governance and human rights as during the 24-year period of Indonesian occupation.

- Fourthly, some of the police officers of the Border Patrol Unit, who are engaged in border management activities, are suspected of corrupt practices. UNOTIL police trainers and military training advisers are carrying out training activities to reduce such incidence of corruptions.

For the foreseeable future, the international community is expected to play an active role in assisting the law enforcement agency in improving its institutional capacity in the following areas:

- Professional skill development: There is a need to develop the policing skills and capabilities. UNMISET and UNOTIL police trainers have been carrying out the Skill Development Programme (SDP) in (1) report writing, (2) use of force and rules of engagement and (3) administrative and operation management. The TLPDP is conducting a Training of Trainer (ToT) course for 50 trainers covering 26 general subjects. Indonesia has invited 100 police officers who are currently going through training in Jakarta and elsewhere.

- Human rights training: UNMISET and UNOTIL Human Rights Unit have been conducting several training courses on human rights. These training efforts need to be continued until all PNTL police officers are fully committed to the observance of human rights of all people.

- Specialized units: The Specialized Units of the PNTL are strongly supported by the international community for the important role they play in maintaining law and order. They include the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR), the Rapid Response Unit (UPR), the Border Patrol Unit (UPF), the Marine Unit, the Immigration Unit, and the National Security Coordination (NSC/CSP).
• Forensics: The PNTL has so far proved unable to determine actual causes of death given its extremely limited capacity in forensics. This shortfall urgently calls for international assistance to provide advanced knowledge and skills training in this area.

• Explosive ordinance disposal (EOD): More than 2,000 cases of explosives have been handled in a period from 2003 to 2005. A Japanese NGO has offered its services to deal with EOD and to provide training course for PNTL officers to enhance skills development in this field.

B. GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF DELIVERING ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES

For the independent state of Timor-Leste, the Security Council recognized the importance of the newly-established state institutions, particularly the government, being able to deliver basic public services to improve the livelihoods of the people. The Security Council, through its resolutions 1272, 1410 and 1599, made this one of the three basic mandates of the subsequent peacekeeping missions, UNTAET, UNMISET and UNOTIL, calling respectively for the establishment of "an effective administration" and then "to provide assistance that is crucial for the stability of East Timor and the viability of its emergent public administration."

With regards to the civilian administration, following the departure of international civilian administrators with the completion of UNTAET in May 2002, the Security Council decided to maintain 100 ‘stability’ advisers funded through assessed contributions. Along with 200 ‘development’ advisers, to be provided through bilateral and multilateral voluntary contributions, these advisers were to carry out essential line functions and to coach their Timorese counterparts in acquiring the technical skills necessary for the proper functioning of the newly-created state systems and institutions.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNMISET jointly supported the capacity development of the public administration; however, not all 300 advisers were recruited due to a number of factors, including paucity of resources and language requirements. Two years later, the number of international advisers was reduced to 58 ‘Most Critical’ adviser positions for UNMISET and 118 ‘Critical’ Adviser positions for UNDP. These positions were identified in an assessment jointly conducted by the Timorese state institutions, UNMISET and UNDP. In May 2005, in accordance with the institutional development of Timorese public administration, the Security Council approved further retention of 45 most critical advisers as part of the peacebuilding assistance provided by UNOTIL.

These ‘Most Critical’ advisers have been providing advisory and training services to the various ministries as well as other state institutions such as the National Parliament and the Office of the President in various technical roles, from drafting resolutions to reviewing legislation prior to its approval by the sovereign institutions. More specifically, the advisers are
currently involved in the following sectors:

- **Legal advisory services** to Ministries and other state institutions such as the National Parliament and the Office of the President. This work involves drafting, revision, submission of legal frameworks and other legislation for Ministries and other State institutions such as the judiciary branch; assistance to Parliamentary commissions in the drafting of resolutions; work at the level of the Council of Ministers where legislation is reviewed prior to approval by the Council of Ministers and/or submitted to Parliament for approval; as well as working to help establish the basic legal/institutional framework for new bodies such as the Council of State and the Superior Council for Defence and Security. Currently 11 advisers are assigned to legislation development.

- **The Justice sector** includes judges, court administrators, prosecutors and public defenders, and an adviser for the prison service. Apart from performing line functions, the judges, prosecutors and public defenders are also all involved in the formal training of Timorese court actors through the Judicial Training Centre Programme in Dili, which is preparing local judicial officials to eventually take over these functions. Currently 18 advisers are working in this field.

- **Financial management and audit service** are being provided in the Ministry of Planning and Finance and line ministries, as well as Inspector General’s Office. Advisors in this area bring together to ensure the smooth functioning of the Timor-Leste State financial system. Especially those who are engaged in audit service in the Inspector General’s Office and internal audit unit of Ministry of Planning and Finance attempt to enhance transparency and accountability in financial transactions. There are currently 8 advisers linked to activities of this nature.

- **Policy development** is being supported in a range of Ministries and other state institutions. The Secretariat of State for Defence is assisted in defence policy development and Prime Minister’s Office is supported in development of foreign investment and export promotion. 8 advisers currently work in these areas.

In the course of UNMISET, the majority of capacity development efforts (including the ‘Most Critical’ positions) were focused on individual capacity development and the need to perform line functions, to ensure the stability of state institutions. As Timor-Leste transitioned into the next phase of capacity development, a more institutional approach became necessary, focusing on cross-ministerial and cross-sectoral trainings that aim to impart skills and knowledge to Timorese counterparts, establish systems and processes, and implicate attitudes and behavioural change.

UNOTIL has been mandated to support the development of critical state institutions through the provision of 45 civilian advisers. The key focus of UNOTIL, as it assumes its mandate, is to find “responsible hands” that can eventually take over those advisory positions that will
require continued international support and, therefore, ensure a smooth transition from UNOTIL to sustainable development assistance.

I, therefore, organized, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1599, the first Consultative Group meeting in June this year with the focus on a smooth and rapid transition from UNOTIL to the sustainable development assistance framework in institutional capacity development. We invited representatives from key state institutions, the diplomatic corps and NGOs, as well as civilian advisers both from UNOTIL and UNDP. The intention was to provide all stakeholders with the opportunity to consider and discuss necessary steps to meet remaining requirements for international assistance beyond May 2006. The Group discussed the role of civilian advisers in three main sectors: (a) Financial Management, (b) Rule of Law and Justice, and (c) Democratic Governance. Senior leaders of State Institutions presented their respective prospects on how to meet their requirements for continued capacity building after the departure of UNOTIL in May 2006. It was clear from the presentations that the requirement for civilian advisers for respective sectors varied. Civilian adviser positions identified by the Government during a recent needs assessment conducted in March 2005 numbered more than 400 advisory positions across State institutions. In turn, ambassadors and development partners presented and discussed their bilateral contributions to institutional capacity support programmes. They reaffirmed their commitment to assist the Timorese civil servants and proposed ways in which they could assist in the process of achieving a smooth and rapid transition. In doing so, they urged the Government to indicate clearly the relative priority of advisory needs, reduce the number of ‘Most Critical’ positions and emphasize the longer-term perspectives with a view to moving towards sustainable development. Development partners also emphasized the importance of assistance provided by neighbouring countries, such as Indonesia, Australia and Malaysia, which could serve as an anchor for continued and even broader assistance on regional level. Finally, development partners suggested a diversification of funding sources, including Government oil revenues, and cost-sharing arrangements between respective stakeholders.

Before turning to the next issue concerning democratic governance, I wish to highlight some key lessons learned relevant to sound state institution building. It is advisable, at the very outset, to draw up and implement a comprehensive institutional capacity building plan for all state institutions. Institution building has to be carried out in an integrated manner, addressing the development of technical and managerial skills, administrative processes and procedures, as well as management principles and institutional cultures (3-pillar approach). As the Prime Minister says often (and I correct him), he considers that the international advisers are provided ‘for free’ and can be retained as long as they are paid for by the international community. This perception makes it imperative that each and every international adviser should be required to prepare and implement a comprehensive training plan for its counterparts, including a concrete exit strategy. Furthermore, Government’s participation in cost-sharing arrangements could be a potential way to ensure prioritization of required support and more careful appreciation of international assistance.
C. LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The third imperative, in my view, is the challenge faced by Timorese society to establish the foundations for democratic governance. These foundations are the principles of democracy that include accountability of the Government and other state institutions to the people through acceptance of the rule of law, respect for human rights, the social reintegration of marginalized and vulnerable groups, transparency and accountability of public administration, particularly with regard to the management of natural resources. Let me explain how these principles have been adopted and reflected in the management of public affairs in Timor-Leste. I will also indicate how UNMIS, and now UNMIT, UNDP and other international and bilateral organizations have been assisting state institutions in establishing legal and policy frameworks based on these principles.

1. Separation of Power and Stable Parliamentary Democracy

As noted earlier, one of the key success criteria for UNTAET was the conduct of entirely peaceful elections for Constituent Assembly. East Timorese were understandably concerned that the multi-party democratic elections would precipitate violence because of the memory of the bitter civil war of 1974-75. It was also an important step in the transition of East Timor to an independent and democratic country. Not only was there, for the first time, a representative body democratically elected by the people of East Timor, it also provided the foundations for an all-Timorese Second Transitional Government. The elections brought new issues into public debate, issues such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of movement. The election was therefore a dramatic triumph for the people of East Timor and a testament to the best means available for avoiding violence. Nevertheless, to this day, multi-party activities at the village level are rare and when they do occur, it is often in a climate of fear and/or suspicion. The Fretillan party has one key advantage over most other smaller parties in that it has a long historical tradition whereas the newer parties are fundamentally untested, and voters, so far, do not know what more they can offer. The question I would like to raise is: could the UN have done much more to develop a healthier political environment for a multi-party democracy?

1.1. Power-sharing and Institution Building under UNTAET

It might be argued that UNTAET’s policies could have emphasised local participation and capacity building without the effect of compromising the strategic objectives of democracy, effective administration, and rule of law and should have encouraged moving towards early elections to establish ‘co-government’. UNTAET initially avoided dictating the shape of a permanent government in advance of a constitutional debate. UNTAET however accelerated the process of Timorisation in a fundamental and constructive manner by establishing a predominantly Timorese Government, albeit transitional, or interim in nature and other institutions of state. This was evidenced by the all-Timorese National Council, and the Timorese-dominated Cabinet as well as by the all-Timorese judiciary. This is the significant
conceptual and structural shift in the direction the mission was taking in the implementation of core requirement of its mandate that UNTAET assist the East Timorese in preparing - and transferring the skills necessary to them - for self-sufficient democratic government. Accordingly, the Transitional Administrator delegated, of course with the authorisation of the Secretary-General, many of his powers under Resolution 1272 to the Government structure. Indeed, the Government was entrusted with carrying out key elements of UNTAET’s mandate.

Security Council Resolution 1338 mandated UNTAET as being responsible for the organization and conduct of the Constituent Assembly elections held on 20 August 2001. An Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was created as the supreme and exclusive authority on electoral matters. Capacity building of East Timorese electoral staff was also a priority for the IEC. UNTAET’s Civil Registration Unit conducted registration from 16 March to 23 June 2001 at 350 sites in each of East Timor’s 65 sub-districts as well as at dozens of mobile sites. Individuals were categorised as either habitual or a long-term residents of East Timor. The result of the registration process showed the population of East Timor to be 737,811, excluding the refugees in West Timor. The IEC prepared its list of eligible voters based on the results of the registration process.

Sixteen political parties and the national and district independent candidates registered to participate in the election for the Constituent Assembly, of which 12 are currently represented in the National Parliament. The Frettilin Party won 57 percent of the vote and the rest was split amongst the 11 other political parties. Frettilin has total of 54 out of 78 seats, consisting of 42 of the 65 national seats, and 12 of the 13 district seats. It is interesting to note how the electoral law favoured small parties reflecting the deliberate effort made by UNTAET leadership. If the law had been drafted to favour territorially based constituencies, as was argued for by many at the time, Frettilin’s dominance would have been far greater. Minister of State Administration Ana Pessa has told me that in the next national election, Frettilin would make sure through electoral laws that parties get seats in Parliament according to the actual number of votes obtained by them.

There has been constant criticism that members of the National Parliament do not fight for the interest of districts. When I visited Oeuccusi with the President a few months ago, people complained that the members of the Parliament from the district had paid little attention to the welfare of their people. A critical problem of having few constituency-based seats in the National Parliament is that members may feel little accountability to the voters. Another problem, some would argue, is that there are too many small parties that make little contribution to the life and work of the National Parliament. The lack of a strong, organised, coherent opposition is a serious problem for Timor-Leste, but it is largely an internal problem that the international community can do little to change it for fear of rightly being accused of meddling in internal affairs of Timor-Leste. The smaller political parties in Timor-Leste need time to mature and I hope some positive developments will emerge in the lead up to the next parliamentary elections.
Some political scientists may argue that the Constituent Assembly elections could not have produced a better result in terms of promoting stability during a transitional period. One party won a majority of votes, but only just over 50 percent, so it has a clear mandate to rule thus bringing stability in the early years of a democracy without Timor-Leste becoming a "one party state." It is true that Fretilin, of course, dominates the Government, which it will use to its advantage, but then the party alone will have to be accountable to the people if it is unable to deliver basic services. Recent opinion polls suggest that electoral results would be similar now as in 2002, but this is far from assured if the population does not see economic improvement in their lives as increasingly felt by many marginalized groups. As in many post-conflict countries around the world, the mandate to govern is usually grabbed by education and shrewd political leaders who had spent many years in exile. The question is how long people will tolerate them or voted them out of office unless these leaders become more accountable to the people and create conditions that are beneficial to the electorate. The usual conditions apply in Timor-Leste as elsewhere for ensuring that one-party-dominance does not prevail in the long term. A strong and independent media, alongside an open civil society, would help ensure multiple political views are registered in the public sphere. Strong parliamentary oversight of the Government and the establishment of statutory watchdog bodies are also the key to ensuring the Government is held accountable to the people. These are all areas were UNMISET and its follow-on mission need to focus on.

1.2. UNMISET’s role in promoting the balance of powers

While UNTAET built core executive and legislative structures and institutional capacities critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor, the capacity of the counterbalance to the power of the Government remained less developed. President Xanana Gusmão assumed his presidency in April 2002. The Constituent Assembly transformed itself into the National Parliament in May 2002. Indeed, there has been an imbalance of the institutional capacities and experiences of the four branches of the state powers – the Presidency, Government, Parliament and the Judiciary - that would erode the effectiveness of the system of checks and balances among the state organs. It was, therefore, the primary task of UNMISET promoting the balance of powers, which was essential to the country’s democratisation and political stabilisation.

UNMISET has provided respective sovereign state organs with international advisers who assist the promotion of their institutional capacity for democratic governance. For instance, significant support is currently being provided to the National Parliament for effective promulgation of legislation, developing parliamentary oversight and control functions, fostering multi-partisanship and good governance and constructive representation. The UNMISET advisors are also providing assistance to the President’s Office in planning of activities and implementation of the Laws of the Superior Council for Defence and Security, a consultative organ of the President ‘on matters relating to defence and sovereignty’, and other consultative bodies such as Council of State of the President of the Republic, a political advisory body. More importantly, institutional strategies and preparation for the implementation of
training programmes is currently being provided for the Secretariat and Administrative Support of the Councils.

1.3. The further strengthening of state institutions under UNOTIL

Building a self-sufficient and sustainable democratic state should be based on significant local participation and a bottom-up approach. It is, nevertheless, difficult to rapidly create such democratic state within the governance vacuum in which there is virtually no experienced administrative elites, organised civil society, or history of self-rule with democratic norms. In my capacity as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, I meet Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri weekly and President Xanana Gusmão regularly to discuss day-to-day political, legal and other issues to promote democratic governance in the country. What we agree to is the difficulty of instituting the culture of inclusive democracy in a country that has been in Portuguese colonial rule for more than four centuries and Indonesia occupation for nearly quarter of a century. Indeed, respect for basic civil and human rights and for the principle of democratic governance cannot be rooted overnight. It is a learning process and the UN would continue to assist the Government of Timor-Leste to achieve this end.

2. Rule of Law

The rule of law in Timor-Leste has been gradually advanced by adopting key national legislation, the most recent being the law on the Council of State and laws on the Superior Council for Defence and Security. The Parliament exhibited responsiveness to public demand when it modified the draft law on freedom of assembly and demonstration to allow for demonstrations to be held within 100 meters of governmental and other key public buildings, rather than the more highly restrictive 500 meters originally proposed by the Council of Ministers.

UNMISET’s assistance in updating online publication of legal reference materials, including its own high-quality English translations of all legislation adopted by the Parliament and Government, along with a large library of subsidiary resources, have also contributed to advancement of the rule of law. These materials are made widely available in relevant languages by means of public and private web sites, and they are extensively relied upon throughout the Government and judiciary. This service has been retained under UNOTIL and will continue until its mandate phases out in May 2006.

The Judicial Training Programme, in which many advisers are involved as trainers of Timorese judges, prosecutors and defenders as well as private lawyers, continues to progress well. In the course of 2006-2007, this post-graduate training programme will produce a cadre of qualified national professionals who will be able to take over more and more of the functions currently carried out by the international advisers. Regrettably, according to the results announced on 20 January 2005, none of the 22 judges were deemed to be fully qualified for conversion to career judges from their current status as probationary judges. However, 20 of
them did succeed in completing the preliminary phase of the training programme and will continue with advanced training and might be permitted to work as trainee judges at the same time in certain exceptional cases. On 25 May, the Superior Council of the Judiciary announced that all Public Prosecutors and Public Defenders had failed the qualifying written test that they took in December 2004. The Prosecutors and Defenders can continue to participate in the training at the Judicial Training Centre, but will cease their functions at the Court. This is causing enormous delays in dealing with civil suits as well as criminal cases. The development of both a trained cadre of Timorese court actors and the maintenance of judicial service delivery is indeed a long-term endeavour that will require continued international support.

Despite the significant progress made in the justice sector there is still further need for human and institutional strengthening. During the recent Consultative Group meeting on Institutional Capacity Building, which I held in late June, stakeholders identified three priority areas to be included in a long-term strategic development policy: (a) the development and harmonisation of the legal order; (b) the strengthening of endogenous capacities for institution building; and (c) the management and capacity development of human resources. Continued international support will remain crucial for several more years in order to not compromise the achievements made so far.

3. Respect for Human Rights

An important priority task is to gain the full and genuine commitment of senior government officials to the human rights of the ordinary people. The Professional Ethics Office of PNTL recorded a total of 273 complaint cases from 2003 up to the first quarter of this year (as of March 2005). Under my direction, the United Nations Police (UNPOL) has since drawn up a Professional Skills Development Programme that places the utmost importance on the respect for human rights by all police officers. As the Programme took effect, the number of cases under review was reduced by almost 50 percent. Taking into consideration the number of additional complaints received until 20 June, there are currently 215 active cases under review. Furthermore, the recent launch of a new Police Training Manual on Human Rights, which reflects the inputs and extensive experience of national and international human rights experts and police officers, raises hopes that PNTL officers will increasingly observe and follow human rights principles when implementing their mandate in the field.

The Government also continued to make efforts to meet its human rights treaty reporting obligations. A common core document covering overlapping areas in all human rights treaties and a questionnaire based on the core document have been introduced to focal points engaged in data gathering for the preparation of the reports. It is encouraging that a Provedor for Human Rights and Justice was finally selected by Parliament and sworn in mid-June this year. The delay in the appointment was a cause for concern, especially in light of the recent increase in reported cases of abuse of police power, including assaults and threats, which have not been adequately addressed by internal disciplinary processes and rarely taken up by the Public Prosecutor for the institution of criminal proceedings. The tendency to use
police powers in dealing with political opposition is also a cause of concern. With the
appointment of the Provedor, UNMISET and UNDP will provide assistance in training the staff
of the Office.

As the Secretary-General stated in his latest report In larger Freedom, development, security and human rights constitute the triangle of imperatives that should go hand in hand in order to achieve larger human freedom. This is particularly so in a country like Timor-Leste that is emerging out of conflict and it is important to address this very important issue. UNOTIL’s mandate clearly reflects this imperative by providing training in the observance of democratic governance and human rights through the provision of 10 human rights officers and by mainstreaming the upholding of international principles, including human rights, into all its capacity building efforts.

4. Social Inclusion of Marginalised and Vulnerable Groups

In a post-conflict society, it is essential that marginalized and vulnerable groups including former independence fighters, returnees, widows, youths and children are provided adequate support in a timely manner so that they can re-establish their social status and livelihoods. In order to socially and economically support vulnerable groups of society including ex-combatants and youth, UNDP and some donors are providing assistance via a variety of inter-linked projects whose overall aim is to provide both short and medium to long term employment and sustainable livelihood opportunities to these people.

The international community has provided support to veterans and ex-combatants. In
Timor-Leste, veterans are those who served in the armed independence struggle between 1881 and 1999, while ex-combatants are referred to as those who served between 1975 and 1979. Two major programmes were implemented in support of the veterans and ex-combatants. The first programme, the Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP), was designed to facilitate the economic and social integration of armed ex-combatants. Funded by the World Bank and USAID, and implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), FRAP provided selected former independence fighters with $500 along with livestock, tools and other means to start income generating activities. RESPECT (The Recovery, Employment and Support Program for Ex-combatants and Communities for Timor-Leste) is the second Programme, funded largely by a donation of $3.9 million from Japan and a symbolic contribution from Thailand. It has addressed the social and economic integration of vulnerable groups that included not only veterans and ex-combatants but also widows and unemployed youth. Taking into account lessons learned from FRAP, RESPECT has concentrated on providing short and medium term employment and sustainable livelihood opportunities through the participation of vulnerable members of the population in agricultural development and reforestation activities, community level infrastructure rehabilitation, and vocational training. Both FRAP and RESPECT were undertaken primarily by international organizations, although decision making was entrusted to district administrators and local officials on the use of $100,000 given to each of the 13 districts.
As the need to empower and entrust national institutions is increasingly recognized, in collaboration with the UN Capital Development Fund, UNDP has decided to support the Government’s efforts towards decentralization and the formation of local governance policy with the launching of a Local Development Programme (LDP) in January 2005 in Bobonaro district. Moreover, the project aims at enhancing poverty reduction efforts in Timor-Leste through a decentralised approach to infrastructure and service delivery. The local level institutional arrangements for implementation of LDP projects reflect the actual local governance structure with district and sub-district councils composed of legally elected suco (village) and aldeia (hamlet) representatives and Government-appointed officials, including representatives of women, youth and the elderly. The local planning and implementation process will shift the preponderant responsibility for identifying and meeting needs and issues to local people, and away from central government. So far with the assistance of UNDP, the Ministry of State Administration has succeeded in training district, sub-district and village officials in project formulation and implementation. It is expected that some 60,000 people would benefit from the activities of the LDP project. The LDP is designed to apply the lessons learned from the implementation of FRAP and RESPECT and to maximise the benefit to local government and inhabitants by increasing ownership and accountability. The share of project budget spent on foreign inputs will be reduced substantially and the modality for project formulation and implementation will encourage more self-reliance on the part of local communities. We are watching carefully whether this programme can indeed deliver the necessary funds efficiently and effectively to the local level through governmental channels.

4.1. Risks for Instability and Internal Conflict

The major risks for instability and internal conflict that may lead to civil war in Timor-Leste in the medium-term are primarily related to lack of equitable and sustainable economic growth and development. The most effective way to minimize internal threats is to develop an endogenous and self-reliant economy, designed to prevent instability and exploitation of the poor and marginalized groups especially in the border areas and the enclave, and to build up effective, accountable Government and security institutions while minimizing disgruntled elements who feel they have been neglected or are outside the system. Failure to manage internal issues will increase the country’s vulnerability to external threats.

Stability and development require self-reliant and sustained economic growth. I would add that stability requires equitable sharing of wealth. To minimize the incidence of internal conflict and civil war, I agree that international intervention and support to vulnerable and marginalized groups are critically important and must be so tailored to meet specific challenges of the disadvantaged groups. I will identify these groups and indicate what the UN mission and UN agencies have been doing in Timor-Leste to address their grievances, which constitute a destabilizing factor.
4.2. Marginalized veterans and ex-combatants

The former armed resistance fighters and a larger number of former clandestine members hold the self-perception that they have been neglected and could also pose a threat to the stability of the country, especially those who were not recruited to the National Defense force (F-FDTL) or the National Police during the UNTAET transitional period. It was recognized that some of the former ex-combatants were facing difficulties in adjusting to the social and economic aspects of the new civilian life, and in competing with other East Timorese who have benefited from past economic and educational opportunities denied to the ex-combatants throughout their dedication to the armed struggle. There remains potential for the group to influence or mobilize unemployed youth to provoke social disturbances and unrest, which could lead to instability as happened on 4 December 2002 when countless numbers of youths and anti-government activists demonstrated and burned a number of retail stores and private houses in the capital Dili, including the Prime Minister’s own residence.

4.3. Massive youth unemployment and inequitable economic opportunities

Above all massive unemployment, particularly among the youth constitutes a major risk factor for the emergence of conflict. Continued rapid population growth and the relatively young population translate into rapid growth in the labour force. During 2003-2015, the labour force is projected to grow at 4.4 percent a year. New entrants into the labour force average 14,000 a year during 2003-2007, rising to 20,000 a year by 2015. This is a tremendous pressure for a small country like Timor-Leste, the total population of which is now estimated around 926,000 according to a recently completed population census conducted by UNFPA.

In addition to alienation and dissatisfaction voiced by former independence fighters and youths, a surge in the violent clashes by Martial Arts Groups in Timor-Leste has become a potential source of instability. Some of the clashes have resulted in serious injuries besides the killing of three Martial Arts Groups members on 16 June 2004. The confrontation had reached a height with the razing of twenty houses in a village community on 13 August 2004. The Martial Arts Group situation, if not controlled, could get out of hand and may affect the internal security situation of the county and cause increasing tension in local communities. This kind of violence is present in many countries, but in a country like Timor-Leste it poses a slightly more serious problem because of the inexperience of the police force to respond appropriately, and due to the poor economic outlook for gainful employed, in particular of the Timorese youths.

It was these kinds of groups that were manipulated in the past to terrorise the population, and could conceivable be financially motivated again in the future. It is reassuring, however, that following President Gusmão’s Independence Day Message to the Nation on 20 May, in which he indicated his concern about MAGs’ affiliation with political parties and the potential formation of party militias, representatives of major MAGs gathered in Dili and signed a declaration of a new umbrella group stating that member groups are not allowed to be affiliated to political parties. Along with the Prime Minister, I was invited by the President to attend the signing ceremony and observed it on behalf of the international community rendering the
legitimacy of reaching an agreement to behave and conduct their affairs in a peaceful manner.

4.4. Empowerment of Women

Another challenge for the Government and the development partners is an urgent need to support and empower vulnerable groups including women and widows, former independence fighters, unemployed youths and disabled persons.

Gender based discrimination continues to manifest itself not only in the family, but also outside the household including in the professional sphere. In the appointment of sub-district administrators only one woman was included in the 65 appointees. I do hope that more concerted gender mainstreaming efforts are made to include women in all levels of professional appointments in the Government so that the female half of the Timorese population is adequately represented in local as well as national governments.

Domestic and other forms of gender-based violence still dominate the agenda in Timor-Leste. Last month, UNIFEM re-established its office in Timor-Leste in recognition of the seriousness and widespread gender based discrimination. UNFPA is also supporting the Office for Promotion of Equality. UNICEF too is assisting in this area.

D. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

I refer to “transparency and accountability” not only with reference to financial accountability and anti-corruption measures, but also more broadly in terms of the need for ensuring transparency of government functioning, and redressing mal-administration, corruption and human rights violations. The Government has rightfully placed a priority on ensuring transparency and accountability. At the national level, there are several institutions which either currently or will in future play a central role in promoting transparency and accountability. These include (a), the Inspector General (b), the Prosecutor General (c), the Provedor of Human Rights and Justice and d) the Office of the Adviser on Human Rights to the Prime Minister. (The High Administrative, Tax and Audit Court (HATAC), provided for in the Constitution, has yet to be established). The mandate of these bodies to promote good governance through transparency and accountability does not limit, however, the important role to be played by each Government Ministry as well as sovereign organs such as the Parliament and the Courts.

There are as yet a number of challenges facing the Government in its efforts to promote a culture of transparency and accountability. A lack of concrete action by the Office of the Prosecutor General with regard to alleged cases of governmental misconduct has been perceived as a weakness that has to be addressed. Other challenges include the following:
• A lack of controls, sanctions, and knowledge in particular areas (petroleum) and sectors (finance, budget, procurement, audits, risk-management etc.);
• A lack of visible sanctions against civil servant misconduct;
• Weaknesses of law enforcement agencies;
• A lack of more specific training in both ethics, financial systems of accountability, administration and human rights for officials;
• Delays in the establishment of institutions (the Provedor’s Office);
  a. Delays in the adoption of laws (for Procurement, Inspector and Prosecutor-General Offices); and
  b. The limited information available to government officials concerning draft laws, decrees or other legal instruments that have been approved.

Legislation to establish the High Administrative, Tax and Audit Court (HATAC) has not yet been developed but is essential, since it is HATAC and its inferior tribunals that have the Constitutional mandate to monitor the lawfulness of public expenditures, to audit State accounts, and to judge decisions made by State officials.

UNMISET has been involved in a diverse range of important initiatives in order to facilitate a culture of transparency and accountability. Assistance for this has been provided by the civilian advisors, as well as other components of UNMISET: not only in terms of the specialist advisers for the Office of Inspector General (2), and the Advisers in the Ministry of Planning and Finance (14), but equally in relation to the Advisers in other Institutions such as Parliament (2), the Office of the Prosecutor General (3), the Council of Ministers (2), and the Prime Minister’s Adviser on Human Rights (1). Other line ministries and agencies as well as specialized units within UNMISET, including the Human Rights Unite and UNPOL Technical Advisers, have also provided assistance.

This assistance has included the establishment of a system of controls on financial expenditure and procurement, the drafting of appropriate regulatory documents, the implementation of the Civil Act of Ethics, the drafting of a Code of Conduct for civil servants in which income and asset declarations are suggested. Also seminars or workshops have been organized to socialize or publicize the concept of transparency and accountability; technical assistance has been provided in relation to the creation of the Office of the Provedor, and staff (police and army included) have been trained in ethics and other techniques of transparency.

Bilateral and multilateral donors have indicated their intention to assist in the work of enhancing transparency and accountability in Timor-Leste. USAID for example has indicated that advisers for the oversight institutions would be a priority for it in terms of funding. Although UNDP’s programme support to the Office of the Inspector-General ended in 2004, it will further help the Government address issues of transparency and accountability by supporting other oversight institutions through its programme of support to the Justice Sector over the next two to three years (with a proposed budget of $3.4 million, subject to availability of donor contributions) and to the National Parliament.
1. Prevention of Corruption and Nepotism

Furthermore, the Government of Timor-Leste has been vigilant and remained largely devoid of any major nepotism and corruption. It was due mainly to the high standards that the Timorese leadership has set for themselves in the conduct of public affairs. It may also have been due to scarcity of resources that have so far been available to the country. As economic activities expand with added revenues from Timor Gap, there will be a risk for corruption to emerge. With this prospect in mind, I commend the Prime Minister’s determination to keep the public service free of nepotism and corruption so that it can be clean and effective. The Office of the Inspector-General, under the auspices of the Prime Minister, has devised a five-pronged anti-corruption strategy: (1) Resolution of structural/jurisdictional/operational overlaps and gaps within the state administration, which could otherwise lead to duplication of mandates, competition for funds and unclear lines of responsibility; (2) Proactive detection and close collaboration with allies to enhance investigate capacity of OIG staff and encourage information sharing; (3) Advocacy for transparency and accountability in civil service to promote a cultural change through the codes of ethics; (4) Building of governance networks within communities, e.g. through local level consultative processes; (5) Development of more informed and active citizenry, e.g. through educational activities in schools or with civil society.

2. Accountability in Natural Resources Management

Natural gas and oil revenues from the Timor-Sea are widely expected to become the life raft of Timor-Leste. They may also be the major source of decidedly corrupt practices. The Government has established a “petroleum fund” and a set of regulations and fiscal regimes to maintain the proper use of petroleum resources that are critical to Timor-Leste’s efforts to achieve self-sustainable economic growth and resolve the problems of unemployment and poverty.

Expected revenues from known offshore petroleum fields represent a substantial amount of income for a small country such as Timor-Leste, whose population numbers just under one million. The total value of known oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea is estimated at approximately US$25-30 billion depending on the fluctuations of the oil price and other uncertainties, during its anticipated lifespan of 25-30 years. The Timor Sea Treaty between Australia and Timor-Leste, an interim agreement that regulates petroleum activity and revenue-sharing in the joint area of the Timor Sea, may earn Timor-Leste an estimated US$4-6 billion in the coming decades depending on the permanent maritime boundaries, which both countries will agree upon.

Production has begun in the Bayu-Undan field, one of the largest known oil and gas fields in the Timor Sea. The government of Timor-Leste received US$26 and US$38 million in tax and royalty revenues in the budget years 2002/03 and 2003/04, respectively. It is estimated that revenue from the Bayu-Undan field will increase dramatically this fiscal year 2004/05 to about US$200 million thanks to the extremely high global price of petroleum. For fiscal year
2005/06, the Government has just formulated the national budget amounting to $106 million, representing a more than 35 percent increase from the national budget of $75 million for 2003/04.

The Government is committed to ensuring that revenues from Timor-Leste’s petroleum resources are managed responsibly and transparently, especially considering the fact that many nations around the world are rich in petroleum or other minerals but have been unable to utilize their wealth for the benefit of their populations. If Timor-Leste’s revenues from oil and gas resources are properly saved and used, they will contribute greatly to the country’s economic development and reduce its dependence on external financial assistance. The Timorese government intends to use its petroleum revenues to pay for essential public services such as schools, hospitals and roads. But the government also intends to save some of the revenue so that future generations will benefit from Timor-Leste’s natural endowments.

The National Parliament adopted on 20 June the Government’s proposed Petroleum Fund Act (PFA), creating a Petroleum Fund for the prudent and transparent management of the nation’s petroleum revenues. The PFA was passed with the historical record of 68 votes in favour, none against and no abstentions. The PFA was sent to Parliament in April this year by the Council of Ministers, after extensive consultations with Parliament and civil society that began in October 2004. The Fund was officially established following promulgation by the President. The Petroleum Fund is designed so that it receives all revenues from petroleum exploitation, as well as the returns on the Fund’s investments. The opening balance of the Fund will consists of the approximately $70 m that has been accrued since 2004 from royalties from production sharing contracts in the Joint Petroleum Development Area and an amount to be decided by the Government from the taxes from petroleum activities in the Timor Sea that have accumulated (about $200m) in the Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET). It is an instrument to manage the petroleum wealth wisely and to help build an understanding of the need to save a substantial share of the petroleum revenues.

The Government has been keen to establish a petroleum regime based on global best practices suitably adapted for Timorese conditions, from the international community. It is important that such revenues are utilized in a transparent and accountable manner to achieve poverty reduction, economic growth and sustainable human development, as stipulated in the National Development Plan. Democratic institutions of the state and civil society must work together to ensure that all communities equitably share the benefits of economic growth.

The existence of democratic governance structures is critically important, as it will safeguard the proper use of increased wealth generated by expanded economic and commercial activities such as oil and natural gas production in the Timor Sea. Adherence to democratic principles and the development of human capacity to administer these activities will help ensure that the vast majority of people benefit from economic growth and improved living standards. Transparency is a prerequisite for working towards economic justice in society.
E. POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

The international community has concentrated its initial assistance on creating and enhancing the institutions of governance, perhaps at the expense of immediate welfare of the majority of the East Timorese population.

Good Governance, including the rule of law is the foundation of a civil, democratic society. Nonetheless, a democratic society requires that the citizens are healthy, physically, mentally and spiritually. A nascent country like Timor-Leste needs nutrition and physical care as a priority to build its body so that its intellectual and political capabilities can function and grow. The perfection of governance structures and capabilities is an ideal goal that Timor-Leste should aim at. The role of good democratic governance should be to ensure that all groups in society, regardless of language ability, intelligence, gender, ethnic origin, or geographic location, are provided access to development opportunities as they should to justice. The core development challenges facing Timor-Leste are different from structural impediments faced by most of developing countries.

Timor-Leste continues to face major challenges in the process of nation-building. It is one of the poorest countries in the Southeast Asian and Pacific region with rapid population growth (preliminary estimates from 2004 Census indicate an annual growth rate of 4.3 percent between 2001 and 2004). According to the 2004 Human Development Index, life expectancy at birth is 58.4 years (female 60.1 years and male 56.6 years, based on preliminary estimates of Census 2004); health standards, compromised by a lack of food, are very low, with widespread respiratory and diarrhoeal diseases as well as endemic malaria and dengue fever. The education level is also very low with the adult literacy rate at only 47.3 percent (female 41.2 percent and male 53.4 percent, based on preliminary calculations of Census 2004). Notably, illiteracy is greatest among the older population (among 15-34 year-olds, 85 percent are literate, while among those over 50, the proportion drops to 20 percent). Unemployment is also very high, with 41 percent of the population living below the national poverty line. Faced with limited prospects at home, a few of the more enterprising youth are migrating to seek their fortunes in foreign lands with an average of about 800 Timorese young people leaving the country each year looking for opportunities abroad.

The weak national economic situation results in slow progress in terms of improvements in human development indicators, as well as in social and political areas. One notable economic phenomenon is the presence of a large number of foreigners associated with UN peacekeeping operations, which has succeeded in creating a dual economy. Urban areas, particularly the capital city of Dili, have benefited enormously from the inflow of goods and services catering to peacekeeping personnel, while rural areas have been left neglected and their basic infrastructure facilities are mostly non-functional. The inequity among people within Timorese society has widened as the “Diapora” groups who had been educated in exile took up government positions or secured other employment, while those who had remained in the
territory became disadvantaged as they remained illiterate and uneducated. The Government will need to accelerate its efforts to improve agricultural productivity and marketing, develop a dynamic private sector, strengthen Timor-Leste’s institutional capacities and make effective use of the prospective oil/gas wealth in order to improve growth prospects and reduce poverty.

The mandate for peacekeeping missions does not address the imperative of reducing poverty and inequity while the nation’s main objectives have been to reduce poverty and promote economic growth. UNDP and development partners supported the Government of Timor-Leste in internalizing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and aligning the National Development Plan with the MDGs. With support from the UN Country Team, a National MDG Steering Committee was constituted under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister in March 2003. Timor-Leste now aims at reducing poverty by a third by the year 2015. This goal appears short of the target set by the Millennium Development Goals as they call for halving the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a year and who suffer from hunger. However, this is due to the fact that Timor-Leste’s independence was achieved about halfway through the 25-year timeframe over which the goals were to be achieved. UNDP, in cooperation with other UN agencies, has been assisting the Government of Timor-Leste in achieving the MDG targets by providing policy advice. There have been a myriad of MDG-related global and regional events that the Government has participated in with the support of UNDP and other agencies. Together with the Prime Minister, an MDG workshop was launched on my initiative on 5 April 2005, bringing together senior government officials, international advisors, UN agencies and development partners.

The National Development Plan (NDP) of Timor-Leste was prepared in 2001/2002 by the National Planning Commission through participatory consultations in over 1000 forums with about 38,000 people throughout the territory, under the leadership of President Xanana Gusmão. Several sector working groups with government and civil society were actively involved in the formulation of the Plan, which was adopted by the National Parliament on the eve of the restoration of independence, and it has served as a key guideline for Timor-Leste and its development partners since 20 May 2002. This was a good example of the early involvement of national and local authorities in the development plans of the country, as this contributed to their sense of responsibility and ownership. From this national dialogue came the 20-year national vision for the country known as Vision 2020. It identifies education, health and employment as the people’s top priorities. The NDP works towards this vision, providing a 5-year development framework and strategy with the main objectives being poverty reduction and promotion of economic growth that is equitable and sustainable, and improves the health, education and well-being of every Timorese. Key development indicators in the NDP explicitly draw on the global MDGs.

- Poverty reduction (Goal 1)
- Food security and eradication of hunger (Goal 1)
- Universal primary education (Goal 2)
- Gender equality in education and other areas (Goal 3)
Improving health including reducing infant mortality (Goal 4), and
- Maternal mortality (Goal 5)
- Reducing the spread of non-infectious and infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS (Goal 6)
- Sound management of natural resources and the environment (Goal 7)
- Extending access to clean water and safe sanitation (Goal 7)
- Addressing the needs of youth including employment (Goal 8)
- Cooperation with other countries, regional and international organizations, including the UN (Goal 8)

As a tool to implement the NDP and to structure the development assistance requirements of the respective sectors, the Government recently launched a Sector Investment Programme (SIP). The SIP is an instrument that enables the Government to articulate policy frameworks, development priorities, and concrete programmes for each sector, which can serve as a basis for decisions on the effective allocation of scarce donor and budgetary resources. The SIP, therefore, is also a tool for more effectively coordinating resource mobilization and assistance design/implementation in line with the objectives and priorities set by the country itself. The SIP represents a pivotal stage for Timor-Leste in assuming greater responsibility for the coordination of external aid, since the Government had previously been heavily dependent on the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) and joint donor missions for the systematic development of sector policies and programmes.

Within the SIP framework, the Government has established a sector coordination mechanism. For each sector, a Working Group will facilitate dialogue and coordination with international donors, under the leadership of the key governmental entity in that sector. Timor-Leste has made important headway in taking over responsibility for planning, mobilizing, coordinating, and managing external assistance in line with its development priorities. However, a number of challenges remain.

Meanwhile, the Transition Support Programme (TSP), (now the Consolidation Support Programme (CSP) led by the World Bank), has become an ideal budgetary support mechanism that has worked very successfully in Timor-Leste. It allows for policy dialogue and coordination as well as internal and external regular monitoring that increases the exchange of information and views between international experts, their national counterparts and civil society with a view to assisting the Government in its efforts to tackle poverty. It was particularly interesting to note that during the recent visit of the CSP Appraisal Mission in mid-Match, the development partners expressed keen interest inter-alia in enhancing integrity, transparency and accountability in the government's budget execution and management process.

As I said in a meeting of NGOs organised by Lao Hamutuk earlier this year, my sincere hope is that Timor-Leste will be elevated in its position in the Human Development Index from
the current rank of 158th along with the bottom 20 other low human development countries that are found in Africa to the group of medium human development countries that include Indonesia (111), Viet Nam (112), India (127), 130 (Cambodia) and Papua New Guinea (133). It is my vision that Timor-Leste with poverty reduction, economic growth and the corresponding sustainable human development will reach a position of comparison with other neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific by year 2020. It would mean that (1) the per capita income of Timor-Leste will increase by five to six times to $2,500 PPP to $3,000 PPP; (2) adult literacy rate should reach 80 to 85 per cent in official language of either Tetum or Portuguese; and (3) life expectancy at birth should increase at least by 10 years from current 58 to 70 years.

With this vision of Timor-Leste reaching the level of development comparable to other countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific in mind, I wish first to present a conceptual framework for economic justice and poverty reduction; secondly to document how poor the living conditions of ordinary people of this country are in comparison with other countries; thirdly, analyze human poverty in Timor-Leste; fourthly to discuss the roles of democratic institutions of this country in achieving economic justice and poverty reduction by addressing economic policies and practices through enhanced transparency and accountability. I will then turn to the importance of improved food security as part of a sound poverty reduction strategy and lastly, outline sector investment programmes and private sector development.

1. Concept of Economic Justice and Poverty Reduction through Pro-Poor Policies

The interrelationship between economic growth and poverty has been the subject of very extensive research in recent years. A large amount of cross-country evidence suggests that growth and poverty reduction are strongly positively correlated. The countries that have experienced high growth over a sustained period have made a greater reduction in poverty. This result is consistent with the "trickle down" theory that some benefits of growth will always trickle down to the poor. Thus, the incidence of poverty can diminish with growth even if the poor receive only a small fraction of the total benefits.

The expansion and growth of economic and commercial activities can indeed be an important contributing factor for poverty reduction and rising standard of living of the majority of population. We should also be aware that economic growth can also contribute to emergency of a widening gap between the rich and privileged on one hand and the poor and disadvantage on the other followed by instability in society. Economic growth generates additional goods and services in the economy, which, if shared in an equitably manner, can help realise a rapid reduction in poverty. On the other hand, if additional wealth created through economic growth is monopolized by a small segment of society, economic growth will simply create more injustice in society as it necessarily reduces the opportunities for a large segment of society to move out of poverty and enjoy better education and health care as well as increased employment and income.
The existence of democratic governance structures is critically important as it safeguards the proper use of increased wealth generated by any expansion of economic and commercial activities such as oil and natural gas in Timor Sea. The adherence to democratic principles would ensure the benefit of economic growth for improving the standard of living of the vast majority of people. As people are guaranteed to express their opinion and exercise their choice freely in electoral process, political and government leaders are compelled to adopt and pursue policies that are beneficial to the majority of the population.

How growth is generated and whether this process is equitable, needs to be addressed. An equitable growth means concentrating on the economic opportunities of the poor—namely, their access to assets, resources and jobs that enable them to secure a decent material standard of living and thereby significantly widen their options for human development.

Pro-poor policies may be defined as policies that benefit the poor proportionally more than the rich and place a greater welfare weight on the well-being of the poor rather than that of the rich. The key question is: how should we determine that any particular policy should be pro-poor and to what degree? This is indeed an empirical question. But in the economic literature many general observations have been made about pro-poor policies. The Asian Development Bank’s *Fighting Poverty in Asia and the Pacific: The Poverty Reduction Strategy* (ADB 1999) indicates that “growth is pro-poor when it is labour absorbing and accompanied by policies and programmes that mitigate inequalities and facilitate income and employment generation for the poor, particularly women and other traditionally excluded groups.” It is also generally perceived that discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnicity, and religion hurts the poor more than the rich. The policies that include adequate public spending for basic education, health and family planning services, improved access to credit, and promotion of small and medium enterprises are generally believed to benefit the poor more than the rich.

However, critics would argue that a pro-poor growth strategy gives rise to distortions in the economy, resulting in inefficiencies or loss of growth. Such loss of growth may be so much that the overall well-being of society falls. This is the old argument of trade-off between equity and efficiency. Do pro-poor growth policies necessarily create inefficient outcomes? Probably not. More likely, it depends on specific policies implemented. If they do, then it may also be argued that pro-rich growth policies also create as many, if not more, distortions, thereby resulting in lower than optimum output. The issue of trade-off is closely related to the choice of a social welfare function. If the concern is more about the well-being of the poor, then greater weight must be given to those at the bottom of wealth distribution than those at the top. In such a situation, the contribution of efficiency to social welfare will be small. Thus, it may be reasonable to focus more on the equity aspects of pro-poor growth, though efficiency plays a critical role in poverty reduction policies.

Can Timor-Leste reach the MDGs?

One of the targets of the Millennium Development Goals is to reduce the income
poverty by half between 1990 and 2015. On the basis of past trends, the data shows that the East Asian region as a whole will have no problem in meeting its millennium target. The percentage of population below $1 per day in the region is expected to be only 5.43, whereas the region’s target is 13.79 percent. The expected number of poor in 2015 will be 124 million, whereas the target is 226.2 million. There are four countries in the East Asian region that will not meet the target of reducing the number of poor to half in 2015. These countries are Cambodia, Lao PDR, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines. Timor-Leste may also fall into that category, as its starting year was 2001, so 12.5 years behind the countries that have started earlier (i.e. 1990).

To meet the first Goal of the Millennium Development Goals, the percentage of poor in Timor-Leste must reduce from 39.7 percent in 2001 to 26.9 percent in 2015. This means that the incidence of poverty must reduce at an annual rate of 2.73 percent from 2001 to 2015. The poverty gap ratio must reduce from 11.9 percent in 2001 to 8 percent in 2015.

If Timor-Leste is to reach the target of halving extreme income poverty, rapid and environmentally sustainable growth is certainly essential. The pro-poor growth is good for the poor but is even better for the ultra-poor. However, if growth is more equitable—so that the incomes of the poor grow faster than average—Timor-Leste has a much better chance of reaching the target. In many countries, high inequality has been an obstacle to sustained growth—by depriving a substantial proportion of the population of access to economic opportunities. Hence, a strategy of equity-led growth will be needed in many countries if they are to meet the challenge of halving poverty between 1990 and 2015.

2. Inequality in Timor-Leste

Poverty is closely linked to inequality. This is normally measured using the Gini index, which varies from zero (perfect equality) to 1 (one person owns everything). Timor-Leste’s Gini index for 2001 was 0.37, an increase from the figure of 0.35 for 1995. An econometric analysis indicates that the correct Gini index is 0.41. This is a fairly higher figure compared with the rest of the region. Inequality can also be expressed in terms of share of total expenditure: in Timor-Leste the poorest two-fifths of the population account for less than 18% of total expenditure while the richest two-fifths account for 66%. As in many other developing countries, inequality may have increased between urban and rural areas and higher within urban centres than in rural areas.

Poverty and inequality are usually expressed in terms of income. But there is also inequality in assets. For the three-quarters of the population that relies on agriculture the greatest asset is land. Average landholdings are small at 0.4 hectares per person. However among the poorest half of the population that has access to land the average is less than 0.22 hectares. Fewer than 5% of the population with land access hold more than one hectare per capita.

The next most important rural asset – and factor of production – is livestock,
comprising cattle, pigs, chicken and other animals. Around 90% of the rural population live in households that own livestock. The average value of this livestock is $100 per capita – roughly four times the average monthly expenditure. However 10% of people in the rural areas have per capita livestock holdings in excess of $200.

Another area of inequality is the rural-urban imbalance. Based on my own observation in the districts and participation in the Open Governance meetings held in Viqueque, Bobonaro and Manufahi, I could not but help recognize the large development divide between urban centres and the rural areas of the country. Data from such sources as the Timor-Leste Poverty Assessment confirm this. It shows that poverty affects two in five persons, and is predominantly rural. Urban areas like Dili and Baucau are considerably better off than rural areas. While one person in seven is poor in Dili and Baucau, more than four in ten are poor in rural areas.

Decentralization not only of government services but also of development assistance is a means to address this rural-urban imbalance. Centralized systems in the provision of basic services tend to be inefficient and ineffective. If we want to improved education and health services to reach the populations in the villages and hamlets, we need to decentralize the decision-making power and resources to at least the districts and sub-districts. We need to bring the services closer to the people. We need to make the service delivery accountable to the people at the grassroots.

3. Human poverty in Timor-Leste

While the data on income poverty give some indication of deprivation they show only part of the picture, since people can be deprived in many ways other than having a low income – they may be in poor health, or illiterate, or malnourished or lack access to services. In an attempt to reflect this, UNDP has developed the human poverty index (HPI) which is a composite measure of deprivation that combines the probability of survival to age 40, illiteracy, the proportion of children who are underweight and the proportion who lack access to clean water. Timor-Leste’s HPI for 2001 was 48.9, virtually the same as for 1999, with improvements in life expectancy being offset by deterioration in living standards and in access to safe water.

In 2002, the global Human Development Report calculated HPIs for 94 countries. It did not include Timor-Leste but the country’s value of 48.9 would have placed it after the 86th country, Mauritania, and just above Mozambique. Preliminary estimates of HPI in 2004 indicate a value of 45.2, or a drop of 3.8 percent as compared to the 1999 figure. The decline is largely related to the drops in “probability at birth of not surviving to age 40” and “adult illiteracy rate” during the period, while “unweighted average of deprivation in a decent living standard” increase from 45.7 percent in 1999 to 49.5 percent in 2004. This increase was mainly due to a significant increase in the incidence of under-weight children under five from 44.5 percent to 55.2 percent during the same period. This would place Timor-Leste between Côte d’Ivoire (45.0) and Benin (45.7) in the 80th rank.
Poverty is high and may be increasing. There are two potential poverty measures. The most useful one is the national poverty line which was set at $0.55 per day. On this basis, and adjusting for Timor-Leste’s late start, the target would be to reduce the current proportion of 40 percent to around 27 percent by 2015. An alternative measure is the standard used for international comparison of $1-per-day in purchasing power parity dollars. Since the cost of living is remains low in comparison with the United States, US$1.00 in actual dollars in Timor-Leste is considered to be worth about $2.60 in the United States. On this basis the current income poverty rate is 20 percent in terms of US dollars at price purchasing parity and the target for 2015 would be 14. Another target is to reduce the proportion of underweight children, which would mean reducing the rate from the current value of 48 percent to 31 percent by 2015. This will require much stronger policies on food security and also greater support for mothers.

4. The Role of Democratic Institutions in Addressing Economic Justice

It is primarily the Government’s responsibility to pursue its poverty reduction strategy. One of the primary requirements for poverty reduction will be sustained economic growth. Poverty reduction and economic growth are inextricably linked and should be mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, growth provides the resources that individuals can use to escape from poverty and that governments can invest in anti-poverty programmes. On the other hand, as poverty rates come down, and standards of health and education improve, so the Timorese will become more productive and their efforts will in turn boost future economic growth.

The immediate prospect, however, seems to be a reduction in growth – largely due to the phased withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission and a decline in development assistance. The NDP had predicted that negative growth in 2002-03 would be followed by years of steady recovery. In fact the decline seems likely to continue for a few years more, followed by a modest revival from 2005-06 onwards. It should be noted, however, that data on GDP are by no means firm and that these projections, which come from the Ministry of Planning and Finance, are more pessimistic than those from the IMF.

Although growth will be essential, it has to be the right kind of growth. If increased economic activity is accompanied by increasing inequality it will have little chance of reducing poverty; indeed it may well exacerbate it. What is needed is ‘pro-poor growth’ that is equitable and that can create sufficient employment for Timor-Leste’s growing labour force. It will also need to be sustainable, and not overexploit the natural environment – as well as being based on activities that can help enhance national culture and identity. Above all it needs to be based on the skills and work of the Timorese themselves. The farmers, the fishermen, the traders and the labourers, as well as investors large and small, all have important roles to play. And critical to all is the participation of the two-fifths of the population who are poor. They are among the country’s most valuable resources and their efforts can help Timor-Leste accelerate economic growth.
A small minority of the population, however, is likely to need financial support – including widows, for example, and the disabled. The Government will need to investigate the best ways of helping those in need and ensuring that the mechanisms chosen are fiscally sustainable. The overall objective therefore should be to enable the poor to participate in development – and reap the benefits – while protecting the few who cannot help themselves.

The main planks of the Government’s poverty reduction strategy are:

- **Increase the productivity of the poor** – Creating an enabling environment that can generate economic opportunities for the poor, enhance their productivity and boost their incomes.

- **Ensure adequate social services** – In addition to providing its own services the Government will encourage others to offer services to the poor at affordable prices.

- **Provide security** – The Government’s aim is to protect the poor from external shocks and disasters and in particular to build systems for food security.

- **Promote empowerment** – Enable the poor and other vulnerable groups to participate in and manage development in their own areas – at all levels: aldeias, sucos, postos and districts.

This will mean paying close attention to agriculture, to employment creation particularly in the informal sector, to social services, and to infrastructure. Timor-Leste urgently needs a clearly laid out strategy for pro-poor agricultural and rural development and for rural service delivery. Although this should involve close integration between the different sectors and activities it would be more manageable if broken down by target group, or major commodity, or geographical area – with simple monitorable targets. This would also require much stronger coordination within the government. At present the responsibility for rural development is spread across a number of ministries and agencies. The Government will also need to coordinate and cooperate with civil society organizations, NGOs and the development partners if the rural areas are to receive essential social and economic services in an integrated way. Such coordination is often difficult, however, and will probably require a more structured organizational set-up. Reducing poverty and achieving the other Millennium Development Goals in Timor-Leste will require a determined effort on the part of the Government, civil society, and the population as a whole. But as well as choosing the most appropriate development strategy, Timor-Leste will also have to find the resources – both human and financial – to meet this challenge. Many oil-rich countries have experienced high economic growth rates but human development remained at appalling rates.
5. Food Security

Following the severe food crisis in 1999-2000, which required the provision and
distribution of food aid to more than 450,000 Timorese, the food security situation has greatly
improved. However, periodic cycles of food shortage persist, as it was the case during the
eight-month of severe food shortage, generated by two years of drought, followed by serious
flooding in June and July 2003. An estimated 110,000 people, or nearly one eighth of the
population, required emergency food aid during these months.

Given its annual reoccurrence and disastrous set-back to overall poverty reduction and
human development, the improvement of food security remains on the top agenda of the
Government’s poverty reduction strategy. The major two elements of food security is the
production of more food of better nutritional quality. For increased food production, the way
forward is to improve production efficiency of the main crops (in the case of Timor, these crops
are rice, maize and cassava) through the use of better farming systems, better seed varieties and
fertilizer as well as improved market access. Improving food quality basically means increasing
protein intake, which can be done by increasing livestock production and consumption and by
growing more vegetables. These principles have been embodied in the Government’s policy
and strategy framework for sustainable agricultural development.

In anticipation of possible food shortages around the turn of each year, the Government
has taken the initiative to lead the coordination of food aid distributions, for the first time since
independence. The State Secretary for Solidarity and Labour, in close coordination with the
National Office of Disaster Management, is chairing an inter-ministerial Commission on Food
Aid which, with the assistance of international actors, is currently drawing up a national
strategy to identify and distribute food to those most vulnerable to shortages, mainly in coastal
and lowland areas. Government officials expect to be ready for distribution in a few months
time, when the shortages are expected to begin. If the Government is successful in
implementing this short-term relief project then it will be a positive indicator of inter-ministerial
capacity to implement future social welfare programs. Despite the reality of food shortages
there is a common consensus across agricultural professionals that the country is facing a
structural challenge rather than a period of “disaster” or “starvation” as is often portrayed in
the local media. The key issue is to facilitate change among rural communities to adopt their
food production by taking advantage of natural resources locally available and to overcome the
current dependency on rice and maize staples.

The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, in close consultation with WFP,
completed a Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis and is currently drafting a long-term
National Food Security Policy. As an integral part of its strategy, a Strategic Food Reserve is
being established to be stocked by local surplus production of rice as well as other types of
commodities from regional and international sources.

Although the Government is taking fiscal, institutional and policy measures to address
both the short and long-term challenges, Timor-Leste will need continued international assistance, especially in the capacity to implement these policies, if Food Aid is eventually to be replaced by self-sufficiency.

6. Sector Investment Programmes and Private Sector Development

With the assistance and consultation with development partners, the Government has prepared a medium-term investment programme through the formulation of sector investment programs covering more than 15 sectors and sub-sectors. The Government plans to seek donor assistance for the investment program in the coming months. The positive engagement and adequate support of development partners will be critical for the economy in the short and medium-term, before substantial oil and gas revenues from the Timor Sea begin to flow in 2008 or soon thereafter.

The Government has now launched the Sector Investment Programmes (SIP) as a process of preparing and refining annual and medium-term public investment programmes on a rolling basis in combined sources budget framework. The Government intends to use the SIP as a framework and guide for setting priorities and resources allocations with the results incorporated in the budget and other planning activities of the Government.

Along with the adoption of SIP process, the Government hopes private sector will become a strong driving force for realizing sustainable economic growth and solving the problems of unemployment and poverty that would eventually alleviate the incidence of conflict. The private sector currently accounts for half of the GDP of Timor-Leste, or about $190 million a year. As characteristic of the subsistence economy, private production is dominated by agriculture, which accounts for about $100 million of GDP. Non-agriculture private sector output is relatively small, although the sector experienced rapid growth during 2000-2002, having expanded at about 12 percent a year under the impetus of donor-funded reconstruction works and retail business associated with the build up of UN personnel. These expenditures have been the driving force for income and employment growth for much of the past four years.

The economy of Timor-Leste is at a critical juncture now. The decline in the UN presence has already led to contraction in the economy, with adverse effects on the small non-agricultural private sector. Growth in 2002 slowed appreciably. With prospective reductions in donor funding, the current contraction of the economy is expected to continue for at least another year or more. The Government is very conscious of the importance of a growing economy that is able to generate new employment opportunities. Given its size, the non-agriculture private sub-sector has only limited capacity to create productive employment opportunities, even with strong growth. Yet it is the non-agriculture sector that must bear the brunt of employment creation for the 14,000 new entrants into the labour force each year. Although the agriculture sector employs about three quarters of the labour force, it has only limited capacity to create productive new on-farm employment. Most of the output gains in this
sector are linked to increasing the very low levels of productivity of the existing labour force. If anything, the agriculture sector can be expected to shed labour.

The private sector must increasingly become the primary source of growth in incomes and employment for the Timorese. The Government recognizes that a major effort is needed to stimulate private business and investment activity. Part of the solution is related to the further commercialization of agriculture and the production of marketable surpluses for domestic and export markets. Increased agricultural productivity and improved rural livelihoods translate into increased demand for off-farm goods and services. Another part of the solution requires increased private investment that leads to diversification of the economic base. Despite the current weak domestic demand, there are important opportunities for business growth and investment in the medium term; these include the construction industry, tourism, and further commercial development of the natural resources of the country. The path towards a stronger private sector also requires that the large investments in the Timor Sea lead to early onshore investments in the non-oil and gas sectors, especially those areas that involve labour-intensive activities and import substitution manufacturing activities.

The Government has embarked on a major effort to improve the enabling environment for domestic and international private investment in Timor-Leste. It is expected that this achievement will be accomplished over the next four years, thereby laying the foundations for future sustained strong growth led by the private sector. This initiative will be coupled with a more aggressive programme, to be undertaken in close collaboration with the domestic and international business community, to attract additional investment to the country. To this end, the Government has adopted a private investment policy and various laws and decree-laws have been passed or are at various stages of drafting or consultation prior to enactment. Only in this way, can the country expect to be able to create productive employment opportunities for new entrants into the labour force and create increased opportunities for productive off-farm employment for the much larger numbers of people currently employed at low levels of productivity in agriculture.

This increased emphasis on the role of the private sector is entirely consistent with past policy pronouncements. The central role of the private sector in national development is enshrined in the Constitution, which requires that the economy be based on market principles. The role of private activity as the engine of growth was also underscored in the National Development Plan (NDP), and in the Road Map exercise completed earlier last year. More recently the Government adopted in early 2004 a private investment policy, which brings greater focus and clarity to the economic operation leadership role expected of the private sector, both domestic and foreign.
F. GLOBAL AGENDA IN LOCAL CONTEXT: JUSTICE, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

In order to set the framework for my analysis of the justice, truth and reconciliation process in Timor-Leste, I wish to quote a statement made by the United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan in his recent report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: “Where transitional justice is required, strategies must be holistic, incorporating integrated attention to individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform [...] or an appropriately conceived combination thereof. It is now generally recognized that truth commissions can positively complement criminal tribunals, as the examples of Argentina, Peru, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone suggest. And in Timor-Leste, the Serious Crimes Unit worked in close conjunction with the Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission [...]”1

That long-term sustainable peace cannot be achieved without justice and reconciliation is a lesson learned in successive United Nations efforts in peacekeeping and peace-building in post-conflict situations across the globe. The complementary approach of justice, truth and reconciliation in the post-conflict context significantly supports and enhances sustainable peace-building. As these concepts are often misunderstood and at times abstract, I will begin by providing some basic definitions in light of the local context.

There are different forms of “justice” from the retributive justice of most formal judicial systems, where the guilty are punished by imprisonment, to the various systems of non-judicial restorative justice, where apology, compensation or community service may be received by victims or communities after an admission of guilt by the perpetrator.

What connects reconciliation as a form of societal healing and justice as instrumental in securing that reconciliation is the notion of “truth”. Many experts in the area of transitional justice argue that only with the identification and the telling of Truth or truths through formal judicial systems and non-judicial means can any real healing of society be achieved and any sustainable peace be secured.

To define “reconciliation” is a complex matter. For our purposes, I will adopt the definition of “reconciliation” as societal healing where a society reconciles with its past and groups of individuals reconcile with each other. The notion of reconciliation is multi-faceted including interconnected concepts from individual acceptance, restoration of dignity through recognition and memorial to justice whether as formal retributive justice or in the restorative sense.

---

1. The Complementary Processes of Justice and Reconciliation for Sustainable Peace

With this conceptual background in mind, I will address the challenges in the implementation of the complementary process of delivering justice, searching for truth and promoting reconciliation to build long-term and durable peace in post-conflict Timor-Leste.

In the early peacekeeping phase, the United Nations transitional administration in East Timor adopted a holistic approach, often referred to as a transitional justice approach, to addressing and dealing with the complex conflict in Timor-Leste while fulfilling the mandate of the United Nations peacekeeping mission to bring the perpetrators of serious crimes in 1999 to justice.

To deal with crimes committed before and after the popular consultation in 1999, the approach combined a formal judicial process for international crimes against humanity and other serious criminal offences committed between 1 January and 25 October 1999, with a complementary system of restorative justice through a community-based reconciliation process with the aim to reintegrate former militia. The Commission has also worked to examine the human rights violations from the 25 years of conflict in Timor-Leste through national truth-seeking and truth-telling.

1.1. The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste

In understanding the establishment of the formal judicial process to prosecute serious crimes, it is important to recall that in the months following the violence after the UN-organised popular consultation in August 1999 that the UN Security Council emphasised the importance of establishing a formal judicial process to bring to justice perpetrators of serious crimes in 1999. The United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (ICIET) visited Timor-Leste after the ballot in 1999 and reported there was evidence of “a pattern of serious violations of fundamental human rights” by the Indonesian security forces and Timorese militias, expressing a view that “ultimately the Indonesian Army was responsible for the intimidation, terror, killings and other acts of violence”. The Report of the ICIET called, inter alia, the United Nations to “establish an international human rights tribunal consisting of judges appointed by the United Nations”.

In the identical letters accompanying the transmission of the ICIET report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General recognised the determination of the Government of Indonesia to act against impunity and the national investigation process underway in Indonesia. This subsequently led to the establishment of the Indonesian Ad Hoc Tribunal for Human Rights with regard to human rights violations in East Timor. The Secretary-General also indicated that, inter alia, the UNTAET transitional administration would be strengthened to

---

conduct investigation "[w]ith a view to bringing justice to the people of East Timor". Accordingly, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes and the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit were established in Timor-Leste under UNTAET Regulation. In this arrangement, the United Nations had envisaged the extradition of suspects between both jurisdictions as agreed in an MOU from April 2000 signed by the UN transitional administrator, the late Sergio Vieira de Mello and the former Attorney-General of Indonesia. The agreement was never ratified by the Indonesian Parliament which has unfortunately resulted in no suspects being extradited between the two countries.

The relevant entities that were involved in the serious crimes process in Timor included the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (court), the Serious Crimes Unit (prosecution) and the Defense Lawyers Unit (defense).

The Special Panels were established in the early phase of peacekeeping in Timor Leste under the UNTAET transitional authority. The UNTAET Regulations borrowed heavily from the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over war-crimes, crimes against humanity and international violations of humanitarian law. The Special Panels have often been described as "hybrid" as in the regulations, each Special Panel was comprised of two international judges and one East Timorese judge. The establishment of Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste represented an important process in Timor-Leste as much in delivering formal justice as in support of the institution-building of the national justice sector in Timor-Leste. Many observers consider those convicted as the "small fish". However, at the national level and particularly in the victim communities these convictions are significant and represent formal justice being carried out with the convictions of some East Timorese members of the Indonesian military and many East Timorese district and sub-district militia commanders as well as one Indonesian militia company commander.

The Serious Crimes Unit was established in 2000, however, did not open until September 2002, and began effectively functioning only in April 2003. The Unit's responsibility included investigation and prosecution of serious crimes committed in 1999 as well as the preparation and filing of indictments with the Special Panels. The SCU was located within the Office of the Prosecutor-General of Timor-Leste, headed by a Deputy Prosecutor-General for Serious Crimes.

The Defense Lawyers Unit, in turn, provided legal representation for virtually every defendant who came before the Court, given their often very limited financial means. The Unit slowly evolved into a full-fledged entity and eventually created a balance between the prosecution and the defense side.

In 2004, the Security Council in its Resolution 1543 ordered the SCU to stop all

---

investigations in November 2004 and directed the Special Panels to complete all trials by 20 May 2005. During its tenure, the SCU has filed 95 indictments charging 391 persons with serious crimes. As some accused appear in more than one indictment, the total number of defendants amounts to 440. Following the indictments, the Special Panels called before the court 101 defendants, 13 of which had their cases withdrawn or dismissed and 1 was found mentally incompetent. Thus, 87 defendants, mostly Timorese members of the local militia, were brought to justice with 84 being convicted and 3 acquitted. Doing the math, this means that 339 defendants have not come before the court, presumably because they are outside the country. As Timorese law does not permit trials in absentia, and in the absence of an extradition treaty with Indonesia, where the overwhelming majority of defendants resides, no prosecutions can proceed in these cases. It is widely accepted that approximately 1400 persons were killed in the 1999 violence. Yet the 95 indictments that have been filed only account for 579 of those murders. This means that over 800 killings remain to be accounted for by way of indictment. In addition, the Special Panels have issued 284 arrest warrants, including for General Wiranto. Most of the warrants are still in the hands of the Prosecutor-General of Timor-Leste who has not yet forwarded them to Interpol.

With respect to the outstanding indictments and the potential return of absent defendants, it is vital to ensure that a national judicial system is in place that could address these cases through continued bilateral or multilateral assistance or nationalisation of the process. The latter would require parliamentary amendment to the existing UNTAET legal provisions on the Serious Crimes Process to allow for purely national panels. It is hard, though, to conceive how the prosecution of remaining defendants can be successful without the continued international support and assistance, at least for some more years to come.

1.2. National Reconciliation

During the early phase of peacekeeping in Timor-Leste, UNTAET, the East Timorese leaders, human rights activists and civil society recognised that a truth commission could serve as an important mechanism in the transition from conflict to stability. Many have argued that formal justice for all minor and serious crimes without reconciliation initiatives would have resulted in a huge functional and financial burden on an embryonic justice system but, more significantly, would have not confronted the need to reconcile divisions in very localised communities which would have had the potential for instability and further conflict especially in the border regions with Indonesian West Timor.

Pursuant to this expressed desire that there be a parallel truth and reconciliation process, UNTAET established the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in 2002 (commonly known by the acronym CAVR from its Portuguese name: Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste). The CAVR concept grew from a workshop of East Timorese human rights activists in mid-2000, supported by the UNTAET Human Rights Unit, and subsequently endorsed by the CNRT Congress. The mandate of the CAVR encompassed three main aspects: (1) establishing the truth with regard to human rights violations that
occurred in Timor-Leste between 1974 and 1999; (2) facilitating reconciliation between perpetrators of "less serious" crimes and their victims and the community; and (3) preparing a final report containing findings and recommendations for the prevention of similar human rights abuses in the future.

As part of its truth-seeking mandate, the CAVR received approximately 7,800 statements, many concerning crimes against humanity and other serious violations of human rights during the period 1974 to 1999. These statements formed the basis for the grassroots information and truth seeking process of the CAVR, informing its final report.

With respect to the second function, the Community Reconciliation process with its mix of traditional social structures and the legitimacy of the formal justice system is the first such process to have been implemented in any post-conflict situation with hearings completed involving more than 1,400 low-level militia perpetrators from across Timor-Leste. The programme was designed to complement the Serious Crimes process by providing at least a partial solution for the widespread less serious crimes such as beatings, house-burning and looting in recognition that the problem of impunity for such lesser crimes is a potential major threat to stability at a grass roots level. The process deals with lesser crimes through local traditional conflict resolution mechanisms as legitimised through the national formal justice sector. Through the mechanism of restorative justice at the community level, the acceptance of apologies and possible punishment such as symbolic payment or community service provide a form of justice while repairing the fabric of society. Moreover, the high level of community involvement in the process with the participation of victims, perpetrators and communities has ensured the restoration of dignity of victims, facilitated the reintegration of former low-level militia in their own communities and assisted the reparation of community relationships.

The programme of localised and national truth-telling and the community reconciliation across the districts has significantly supported the maintenance and the building of peace at the grass-roots level in district communities. The work of the Commission has demonstrated that its gains have made important contributions to the eradication of the culture of impunity while facilitating the societal healing necessary for sustainable and durable peace. While there have been achievements, it is recognised that truth and reconciliation commissions can only achieve reconciliation at a local level if there is accountability for those responsible for the most egregious crimes through other appropriate mechanisms. In view of future post-conflict peacekeeping and nation-building efforts, the community reconciliation model as developed in Timor-Leste based on restorative justice through traditional structures may provide a new direction in the design of truth and reconciliation commissions in post-conflict situations.

CAVR took a victim-centred approach to all its work, and this process was most noticeable in its national and sub-district public hearings, and in its intensive healing workshops. This care for victims, and efforts to publicly restore their dignity and place in society was a key element to the transitional justice process of the CAVR.
CAVR submitted its comprehensive, 2000-page final report in July, containing a
detailed account of its activities and its findings on human rights violations committed by all
sides of the conflict from 1974-1999 and concrete recommendations to the Government of
Timor-Leste and the public to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations, to address the
needs of the victims, and to promote a culture of peace and respect for human rights and the
rule of law. To maximize access to the contents of the report in Timor-Leste, where literacy
levels remain low, CAVR has also been producing 'popular' versions of the report to be shown
on video across the country, as well as booklets on public hearings and survivors. The former
prison, which was rehabilitated as the CAVR national office, will become a permanent human
rights and reconciliation documentation and education centre, and a site of memory recalling
and honouring the past suffering of the East Timorese people. The Commission completed its
mandate on 30 July 2005.

Where do we stand at the conclusion of the Serious Crimes Process and ending of the
CAVR mandate in Timor-Leste? Let me review some of the achievements made as well as
challenges encountered during the past 5 years and address the intricacies of this
complementary process.

1.3. The Achievements and Challenges of the Complementary Process

To begin with, the investigative work of the SCU, the resulting indictments, and the
numerous trials conducted before the Special Panels, have made a significant contribution to
establishing the facts and creating a historical record concerning the events of 1999. If it is
important to acknowledge the victims of 1999, it is equally important to name the names of
those responsible for serious crimes. The serious crimes process has brought justice to the
victims by having charged and tried those perpetrators for their crimes. Similarly, reconciliation
efforts greatly contributed to the reparation of the social fabric by addressing minor crimes
conducted between 1974 and 1999 through its mechanism of restorative justice at the
community level.

Secondly, given the hybrid structure of the Panels, the process was impartial and
applied international standards of due process. The holistic approach of transitional justice
adopted in Timor-Leste has proceeded on the premise of delivering justice and promoting
reconciliation. The delivery of formal justice for the serious crimes of 1999 ensured national and
local stability while concurrently establishing and promoting the formal justice sector, judicial
mechanisms and the rule of law, which remains crucial to peace and nation-building. The local
reconciliation initiatives complement the formal prosecution of serious crimes thereby further
engendering respect for rule of law within society while the truth-seeking programme supports
the broader local and national reconciliation process. However, the international community, in
its desire to do justice quickly and inexpensively, established a legal structure which, at critical
junctures, lacked adequate staff, funds and logistical support. These shortcomings often led to
"too little too late". Moreover, it has been criticized that the serious crimes process suffered
from a lack of prosecutorial strategy by failing to clearly define the mandate and scope of the process, particularly through indication of level and nature of crimes to be investigated and rank or position of persons to be prosecuted. A clearer mandate would have provided guidance as to what our expectations should be and hence, define the actual rate of success or failure of the process.

Furthermore, national reconciliation and restoration of peace has been promoted by bringing closure to cases from the past, discouraging private retribution and confirming the importance of the rule of law. In the context of Timor-Leste, national reconciliation would arguably have not been possible without the assurance of formal justice for the most serious crimes and may have resulted in localised retribution. Any approach towards international reconciliation between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, without justice for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes can be seen as pragmatic in terms of bilateral political relations and indeed may be effective in building a cooperative relationship between the two states. It may, however, also create internal instability, since justice is high on the agenda for many East Timorese. Moreover, it is important to demonstrate the need to respect the rule of law and legal institutions in the national context as a deterrent to avoid the return to violence and subjugation by force which has such potential in post-conflict societies. The fight against impunity, that is the acceptance of legal mechanisms as means of protection and a way to bring about justice, constitutes a vital part of building and consolidating peace and stability. It will be recognised that demands for such justice also emanate from many sections in Indonesia, as that country successfully continues its transformation into a vibrant and modern democracy.

Lastly, the serious crimes process sent a powerful message and will hopefully deter those who could commit serious crimes in the future. In ensuring keeping peace and nation-building in Timor-Leste, the transitional justice approach to conflict resolution has been much developed in Timor-Leste but not without difficulties. As United Nations peace-building support to Timor-Leste will come to a closure with the phasing out of UNOTIL in May 2006, it is important to carefully consider and address how the complementary approach of justice and reconciliation as adopted in the context of Timor-Leste will support future nation-building. There remain practical challenges in the implementation of the complementary processes of justice and reconciliation.

In spite of the systemic limitations, a great deal has been achieved in Timor-Leste in delivering retributive and restorative justice as well as promoting reconciliation. However, it is not possible to claim that there has been total formal justice delivered for crimes committed in 1999. After all, only a limited number of perpetrators have been convicted in Timor-Leste and a very small number of convictions secured at the trials in Jakarta. There clearly remains a justice deficit. It would also be far-fetched to claim that there is full reconciliation among the East Timorese people or between Timor-Leste and Indonesia. The process of reconciliation as societal healing has not only begun but has developed through the coordinated mechanism of CAVR in addition to more ad hoc initiatives of the Office of the President, the National Government, the Church, national civil society and local communities in Timor-Leste.
Nevertheless, as in all post-conflict situations, the road to reconciliation and the healing of society remains long and may take generations. What is significant is that the process has commenced widely across the local communities in Timor-Leste but, as importantly, between political leaders at the national level in Timor-Leste and, crucially, between political leaders in Timor-Leste and Indonesia.

2. The Future of the Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Process

At this critical juncture, the future of the complementary processes remains unclear due to diverse interests and different opinions of multiple stakeholders in addition to the potential for change in the political environment. What is clear is that the intertwined journeys of justice, truth and reconciliation will confront challenges and obstacles at all levels, especially in addressing the widespread demands for justice in Timor-Leste, emanating mainly from representatives of civil society, victims and district communities.

A statement made by the Bishops of Dili and Baucau in April 2005 clearly reflects the challenges in accommodating these various interests: “International justice is now a crucial last resort to bring justice to the victims, particularly as both the Timorese and Indonesian Governments have agreed on a Truth and Friendship Commission that will not submit to a process for genuine justice and real accountability”.

Which is the right way forward? The future of the formal judicial process is very much dependent on the political will of the East Timorese leadership and also on the support of member-states of the United Nations in the event a decision is taken to continue the process in some form, with UN funding or under the auspices of the UN. Two decisive processes - a Commission of Expert and a Commission of Truth and Friendship - have been initiated earlier this year, which I will briefly explore before concluding this chapter.

2.1. Commission of Experts (CoE)

In February 2005, the Secretary-General appointed a Commission of Experts, consisting of three members, who were requested to report to the Secretary-General within three months on the developments in the area of prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in East Timor committed in 1999.

The mandate of the Commission of Experts was six-fold, namely to (1) review the judicial processes of the work of the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor in Jakarta, and the SCU and Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Dili; (2) assess their effective functioning; (3) identify obstacles and difficulties encountered by the two entities; (4) evaluate the extent to which the two institutions have been able to achieve justice and accountability for the crimes committed in East Timor; (5) consider and recommend legally sound and practically feasible measures so that those responsible are held accountable, justice is secured for the victims and people of Timor-Leste, and reconciliation is promoted; and (6) consider ways in
which its analysis could be of assistance to the Commission of Truth and Friendship that the Governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste have agreed to establish, and to make appropriate recommendations to the Secretary-General in this regard.

Following its visits to Timor-Leste and Indonesia in May, the Commission submitted its report to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Secretary-General submitted it to the Security Council in June for consideration by the Council members. The three experts analyzed the two judicial processes in Jakarta and Dili and submitted a set of recommendations, the most pertinent of which are:

- The Serious Crimes Process carried out in Timor-Leste was considered as credible, and accountable to “a notable degree” but as “having not yet achieved full accountability for those who bear greatest responsibility for serious violations”. The Commission recommended a continuation of the serious crimes process until it can complete all of the remaining cases which numbered more than 500 out of nearly 1,500 civilians killed in 1999. The Commission, however, also raised concerns about the lack of political will in Timor-Leste and the independence of the Prosecutor-General.

- The Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for Timor-Leste in Indonesia was considered “manifestly inadequate” and not in conformity with international standards. From the list of 22 suspects, 18 were indicted, 17 of which have been acquitted. The CoE recommended the re-opening of all cases and suggested SCU evidence and files to be delivered to the Indonesian Attorney-General so as to accept international assistance to build judicial and prosecutorial capacity. Indonesia has been requested to report to the Secretary-General after six months on the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations.

- The CoE also commented on the Commission on Truth and Friendship, expressing its grave reservations about some of the provisions in the terms of reference (ToR), though recognizing that the CTF could contribute to rebuilding relations between Indonesia and Timor-Leste. The experts recommended that the International Community should not provide finance or advisory assistance until the two Governments review the ToR and the Secretary-General is satisfied that the ToR meets international standards.

- The Commission concluded its report by proposing that if the Governments Indonesia and Timor-Leste do not initiate the recommended actions as it had suggested within the given timeframe, then the Security Council was recommended to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII to establish an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Timor-Leste, to be located in a third State. Alternatively, the International Criminal Court could be charged to investigate and prosecute the serious crimes committed in Timor-Leste in 1999. Furthermore, member states may exercise universal jurisdiction and initiate investigations and prosecution of those responsible for serious crimes.
The CoE report and its recommendation met with immediate rejection by both Governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste, while they received strong support from international and national non-governmental organizations. In the light of the current political context, Timorese political leaders have raised questions about the effectiveness of such an international judicial model as an international tribunal and how appropriate it would be to exert political pressure or potentially sanctions against Indonesia as the country remains in a fragile state of democracy. The President and the Foreign Minister of Timor-Leste are also concerned about the impact of the approach advocated by CoE on the progress made in bilateral relations and international reconciliation between Timor-Leste and Indonesia. The improvement in bilateral relations has been manifested by enhanced cooperation, regular meetings of the Joint Ministerial Commission for Bilateral Cooperation and, most prominently, by the state visit of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in early April this year.

Timor-Leste and Indonesia have both expressed their disappointment towards the report of the Commission of Expert, sharing the opinion that the CoE report does not promote the process of reconciliation, which the political leadership in both countries is committed to pursue, notably through the recently established Commission of Truth and Friendship.

**2.2. Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF)**

In December 2004, the leaders of Indonesia and Timor-Leste decided to establish a Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF), fully owned and operated by the two countries. Subsequently, the two governments signed the mutually agreed terms of reference in March 2005, expressing their commitment to resolve residual problems of the past and to deepen and expand bilateral relations both at the government and societal levels. They ascertained that prosecutorial processes can certainly punish the perpetrators but may not necessarily lead to the truth and promotion of reconciliation. Indonesia and Timor-Leste opted to seek truth and promote friendship as a new and unique approach. And indeed, for the first time, a truth-seeking mechanism has been established at the bilateral, rather than the purely national level.

The mandate of the CTF, extending over a period of initially one year, very much reflects the forward-looking and reconciliatory approach taken by Indonesia and Timor-Leste. Ten Commissioners, five Indonesians and five Timorese, have been appointed to (1) reveal the factual truth of the nature, causes, and the extent of reported violations of human rights, that occurred in 1999; (2) issue a report establishing the shared historical record of the reported human rights violations; and (3) devise ways and means as well as recommend appropriate measures to heal the wounds of the past, and to restore human dignity, *inter alia* by recommending amnesty, rehabilitation measures, means to promote reconciliation and innovative approaches to enhance intra- and inter-communal cooperation.

In spite of the enthusiasm demonstrated by Timorese and Indonesian leaders, representatives from civil society, church leaders as well as the international community
expressed their reservations about the proposed Commission. The main argument is that
neither the serious crimes process in Timor-Leste nor the Ad Hoc Tribunal in Indonesia have
brought to justice those responsible for serious crimes and that the CTF is not considered to be
an option capable of achieving justice for the victims. Further criticism is targeted at the Terms
of Reference of the CTF, pointing out the lack of distinction between lesser and serious crimes,
amnesty provisions for crimes for which amnesty is unacceptable in international law,
questionable independence of the CTF, contradictions to human rights law and the inadequate
provisions for reparations. Furthermore, the CTF will not lead to prosecution and emphasize
institutional responsibilities, therefore, preventing individuals to be held accountable for their

A solution for these issues addressed above has yet to be found. The questions of how
to deal with the remaining cases of crimes against humanity and continuing the process of
national and international reconciliation while ensuring good cooperation between Timor Leste
and Indonesia will most likely remain on the agenda for many years to come. Durable solutions
to these complex issues to ensure sustainable peace for Timor-Leste will require careful
dialogue and much consultation in order to reach mutually-beneficial positions, without
allowing impunity and ignoring human rights violations as recognised in the United Nations
Charter.

In Resolution 1599 member states reaffirmed the need for credible accountability for
the serious human rights violations. UNOTIL will, therefore, seek to further assist the Timorese
authorities to ensure the adequate archiving of all records compiled by the Serious Crimes Unit
as well as in the implementation of the recommendations made by the Commission of Experts,
including possible ways of assisting the Truth and Friendship Commission.

To conclude, the transitional justice approach of justice, truth and reconciliation,
initiated in the post-conflict situation of Timor-Leste, has been an effective mechanism for
peace-building and nation-building. In its peacekeeping mission as well as its agency work, the
United Nations has worked along with other partners towards the goal of eradicating impunity
and engendering respect for human rights through the complementary process of delivering
justice, thereby upholding International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law while
recognising the importance of providing support to a concrete reconciliation programme. With
the imminent closure of the United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building operations in
Timor-Leste, stakeholders continue to face diverse challenges and difficult decisions in the
delivery of justice and promotion of reconciliation. Albeit valuable achievements the road of
justice and reconciliation remains a long and difficult one for Timor-Leste and indeed for the
international community.
G. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO PEACE AND NATION-BUILDING

The nature of the UN involvement in peacekeeping and peace-building has been rapidly changing. An increasing number of operations are multifunctional in nature with mandates ranging from immediate stabilisation and protection of civilians to supporting humanitarian assistance, organising elections, assisting the development of new political structures, engaging in security sector reform, disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former combatants and laying the foundations for a lasting peace. While carrying out its mandate, the UN has increasingly involved a number of actors, including other international and regional organisations, development partners, host governments and civil society. Moreover, mission design and structure should draw on the expertise of relevant UN organisations in country to promote integration and avoid unnecessary duplication. The role, function and form of such an integrated mission must be determined by a clear strategy, should embody benchmarked targets in order to ensure a smooth transition from the peacekeeping to the recovery and development phase, and guarantee a long-term commitment as prerequisites for sustainable peace.

1. Five success factors

The first success factor, in my view, is the discipline exercised by the organizers of the initial multinational forces led by Australia in adhering to the original mission mandate. The multinational forces arrived in East Timor within a few weeks after the eruption of violence and restored immediately security and stability of the territory. But, following the successful peace execution, the multinational forces resisted any temptation to engage in long-term peacekeeping efforts and handed over the peacekeeping power to the United Nations as soon as the UN Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) arrived in East Timor in March 2000.

The second success factor is the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of resolutions that created both the United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET) and the United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET). Although it is often taken for granted, it is significant to note that the unanimous approval of the Security Council established the full legitimacy of successive UN peacekeeping missions to East Timor.

Thirdly, the post-independence phase of UN peacekeeping provided valuable support to achieving long-term peace and stability in the newly-born nation, although some Timorese have questioned the effectiveness of UNPOL and PKF in dealing with the December 4 riot in 2002 and the militia attacks in Atsabe and Hatolia in January 2003. Without the presence of UN peacekeepers, the security of Timor-Leste could have been threatened and the society destabilized.
Fourthly, the integrated approach of military, police and civilian operations laid the foundation for maintenance of a single command and control of their operations. The security and civilian components of peacekeeping activities were indeed integrated under the single authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Furthermore, we should note that the activities of UN agencies and Bretton Woods institutions were holistically managed under the coordinating authority of Deputy SRSG and SRSG who acted as Humanitarian and Resident Coordinators and linked to the goals of the National Development Plan and the Annual Action Plans as soon as they have been adopted by the newly independent state of Timor-Leste. It should also be noted here that the UNMISET leadership has fully recognized and respected the legitimacy of four state institutions and supported the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance and Planning in exercising effective coordinating power since May 2002.

Fifthly, the peace and stability of the newly independent country has been possible only for good neighbourly relationship that the leaders of Timor-Leste and Indonesia have developed successfully during the last five years. My personal experience with peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Somalia has taught me a lesson that the UN can do very little to prevent recurrence of violence and conflict if neighbouring states continue to allow armed groups to destabilize each other. It is Indonesia’s genuine acceptance of Timor-Leste as an independent nation that has stopped the incursion of former militia into Timor-Leste.

2. Lessons learnt for future peacekeeping and peace-building operations

The consolidation of peace in Timor-Leste, which was achieved by the smooth transition from post-conflict recovery and reconstruction to state institution building, provides valuable insights and important lessons for future peacekeeping and peace-building operations. In my view, the experience of United Nations support to post-conflict Timor-Leste also reveals an operational shift taking place in peacekeeping operations in implementing an integrated and holistic approach to peacekeeping and peace-building activities.

In exploring a brief case history of peacekeeping and peace building in Timor-Leste, what I would like first to impress on you is the need to recognize not only the externality but also the holistic nature of entire peace activities, as defined by the Brahimi Commission in 2000. They are precisely the kind of activities that both the UN and the state institutions of Timor-Leste must carry out in partnership with a common goal of establishing a sustainable democratic society that is inclusive and respectful of human rights and cultural freedoms of all of its citizens. Indeed I would like to underline the value of a holistic approach to peacekeeping operations in post-conflict situations. An integrated approach builds on the need for maintaining security as it moves into the peace-building phase, while the holistic approach empowers the initiatives in such areas as institution-building and engenders respect for the rule of law and promotion of human rights. Moreover, I would like to emphasise to this forum that any future peacekeeping operation should adopt a holistic exercise that systemically links it to long-term development initiatives so that the consolidation of peace is anchored to the
foundation for democratic governance and sustainable development.

3. From successful peacekeeping to sustainable peace and nation-building

The United Nations has been successful in its peacekeeping operations in preventing so far recurrence of a major civil conflict or inter-state war, but we all know that peace is not only the absence of conflict or war and peace-building is not merely the rebuilding of infrastructure and institutions destroyed by war. Peace building is laying the foundation for long-term human security and development that requires more than maintenance of law and order. In Timor-Leste, we have just begun the peace-building phase after a successful peacekeeping operation. It is important not to confuse the process of peace building with the process of economic growth and development as nation building is not possible without first achieving peace building that requires building of a solid state institutions and full acceptance of democratic principles by both people and leaders of the country, most importantly human rights consisting of seven freedoms.

As I stated last week at the Security Council, in my view, national ownership and determination to rebuild a caring society with full recognition of human rights and dignity of all people are a success factor of primary importance in re-building of any post-conflict society. In this respect, I wish to emphasize that the widely recognised success of UN peacekeeping operations in Timor-Leste is largely due to the determination of the people and the leaders of Timor-Leste to maintain peace and stability themselves. It has been the tolerance of the dignified people of Timor-Leste and the accommodating leadership, represented by President Xanana Gusmão, Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and Foreign Minister José Ramos-Horta, that has proved that a post-conflict country can indeed successfully govern and develop itself by anchoring their authority not only to the principles of constitutional democracy but also to the truth that peace is as important as justice and future is more important than past and present combined.

Since independence, Timor-Leste has made considerable achievements in spite of formidable challenges faced by the leaders and the people of this newly born country. I believe that Timor-Leste will, in the long run thrive on sound, inclusive and people-centred development based on joint partnership and constructive dialogues among the four state institutions of Presidency, Government, Parliament and Judicial Branch as well as civil society, business communities and international development partners. It is essential that as the international community has supported so effectively in keeping peace and stability in Timor-Leste for the last five years, it continue to support independent Timor-Leste as it now goes through the process of peace building and sustainable development.

4. Genuine partnership between national authorities and the UN

The path-breaking efforts of late Sergio Vieira de Mello who established a National Consultative Council composed of Timorese leaders, followed by the first and second
Transitional Governments, were taken forward under the able leadership of the first SRSG, Ambassador Kamalesh Sharma, to an independent Timor-Leste. Ambassador Sharma instituted a practice of weekly meetings with Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and at least once every fortnight with other leaders, notably President Gusmão, the President of the National Parliament, Francisco 'Lu O'lo' Guterres and Foreign Minister José Ramos-Horta. These provided avenues for discussions over a wide and broad spectrum of issues, some of which, while not explicitly related to the mandate of UNMISET, were nevertheless critical for the establishment of traditions, norms and practices in a young and nascent country. The cultural sensitivity demonstrated by UNMISET, particularly towards the genuine and legitimate national aspirations, while endeavouring to positively influence decisions that might not have been in full conformity with the highest standards of human rights and principled international relations, has been deeply appreciated by the Timorese leaders. Prime Minister Alkatiri has indicated that UNMISET senior leadership and staff members should be a model for other peacekeeping missions.

It is difficult to attribute developments to preventive diplomatic efforts, particularly in the near term, lest such efforts be impeded in the future. However, I would like to mention, as an example, some of the many positive developments that occurred largely due to the advice of the UNMISET leadership and the constructive and open manner in which it was received by the leaders of Timor-Leste. On the first ever International Human Rights Day commemorated in an independent Timor-Leste on 10 December 2002, the country ratified and then later acceded to a large number of human rights conventions and treaties. Since then, I have continued to encourage the authorities to take their reporting obligations seriously, and Timor-Leste would soon become the first pilot country to prepare a basic core document for all these reports. UNMISET is assisting the preparation of this document through expertise, training and hard data. The humane handling of Sri Lankan refugees who had drifted to Timor-Leste while on their way to New Zealand was a credit to the young Timorese state, and I am proud of the role that I played, under Sharma's leadership in making this possible, encouraging all concerned senior members of the Government to resolve their differing perspectives on this issue.

Similarly, UNMISET encouraged efforts by the Government and the Presidency to enhance the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Timor-Leste. UNMISET participated in the first high level meeting between Indonesia and Timor-Leste in July 2002 that led to the establishment of a Joint Ministerial Commission between the two countries and has consistently assisted the efforts of both countries to finalise an agreement demarcating their land-border.

I can refer to several other joint initiatives of UNMISET and the Government, such as the Joint Needs Assessment Missions on Police and Justice Sectors, the workshops and seminars on international civilian assistance and integrity, transparency and accountability, and efforts aimed at promotion and protection of all human rights. These may not have been subjects of traditional peacekeeping but nevertheless are critical for any emerging democracy. They have to be approached in a spirit of partnership and cooperation, sympathy and understanding, advice and assistance. We may not have always succeeded in doing so, but where we did, the
country and its relationship with the United Nations was considerably strengthened.

Any post-conflict society carries old unhealed wounds and scars of the past. Generally, these societies are characterised, due to their historical experience, by mutual suspicion and distrust, rather than by a spirit of conciliation, compromise and consensus that must be the hallmarks of a broad-based participatory democracy. Even after these wounds have healed, their scars continue to afflict daily relations in a variety of ways.

Realising the critical importance of promoting open communication, as an adjunct to building trust between the government and those governed, SRSG Sharma and I have encouraged Prime Minister Alkatiri to visit districts, accompanied by the members of his Cabinet, to listen first-hand to the experiences of the people, their worries and concerns and their hopes and aspirations. This programme, known as the Open Governance initiative, was commenced in January 2003, seven months after the beginning of the UNMISET mandate and has proved to be highly successful. The Government has visited ten districts so far and after covering the remaining three, proposes to commence on a second round. President Gusmão has also visited several sub-districts as an integral part of the Open Presidency programme and also hosted national dialogues on important topics, such as the condition of veterans, activities of the martial arts groups and the like.

Timor-Leste, for a country of its size and population, has been remarkably fortunate in having as its leaders a visionary President, a highly capable and motivated Prime Minister who can make the change and evolutionary process possible, and a Foreign Minister who enjoys international renown and acceptance. UNMISET has encouraged these leaders to continue their balanced relationship so that their complementary competences can be utilised for the growth and development of Timor-Leste. I am happy to report that weekly meetings have been held over the last two and half years between the President and the Prime Minister with a view to harmonizing their positions.

However, there is one important area, the media, that could have benefited more from UNMISET’s assistance but it was difficult for UNMISET to play any major role. The dilemma of promoting free speech, while recognising that any incendiary, or false rumours, have a tendency to spread far more easily in post-conflict societies and could prove to be destabilising as was seen in Rwanda, is difficult to resolve. Having earlier served in Rwanda and Somalia, this is an experience that I have lived through before. During the remaining period of the UNOTIL mandate, I intend to foster the culture of transparency and accountability through proactive and professional media that can monitor and report the conduct of state institutions to the people.

Timor-Leste re-gained its political independence in 2002 and has secured peace and stability. The Government is now striving to enhance its spirit of self-reliance and economic independence with less dependence on foreign aid. In order to achieve these goals, it is essential for the Government to expand its efforts to improve in a strategic manner the human security of
ordinary people, including the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. Focusing on traditional state-based security alone will not guarantee peace and prosperity to any country, including Timor-Leste. States no longer hold the monopoly over security issues. Increasingly, people in this country wish to make their own choices with regard to pursuing their interests, aspirations and security, which will determine their destiny and that of their country, Timor-Leste.

Timor-Leste is now at a critical stage of planning a smooth transition to financial sustainability while at the same time effectively mobilising donor resources to address many of the country’s most urgent development challenges that centre on poverty reduction. If the actions I have described above today are taken by the Government, a solid foundation will be laid for peace and security in Timor-Leste, as pursued by the Timorese leadership of President Gusmão and Prime Minister Alkatiri.

The development perspective includes also the vital need for capacity building for sustainable peace and nation-building in Timor-Leste. This is especially so as a new phase of UN involvement in Timor-Leste has began, one in which its mandate focuses on capacity building and nation-building. Tangible progress has been achieved in establishing sustainable state institutions and in promoting democracy, transparency and accountability and respect for human rights during the last six years of the UN’s involvement in Timor-Leste. The capacity of key state institutions, including those in the areas of finance and law enforcement, continues to improve as personnel acquire new skills and experience.

However, significant challenges remain, and for this reason the UN Security Council authorized in its Resolution 1599 the establishment of UNOTIL reflecting the commitment of the international community to continue the promotion of long-lasting security, stability and sustainable development in Timor-Leste by assisting the country in its current peace-building efforts. Our capacity building efforts have been focusing on the further development of critical state institutions, the police and border patrol unit as well as on the observance of democratic governance and human rights. In view of the phasing out of UNOTIL in May 2006, the UN will work closely with the Government and bilateral and multilateral development partners to ensure a smooth and rapid transition to a sustainable development assistance framework.

In conclusion, I wish to commend the Government and people of Timor-Leste for their determined efforts and tangible progress made on several fronts in realizing their aspirations to build their nation up from the ashes of violent destruction following the UN sponsored referendum in September 1999. In my role and function as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Timor-Leste, I have been privileged to share a cordial and cooperative partnership with the Government and other state institutions through the assistance provided by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) in developing the capacity of state institutions and civil society organisations in their path to sustainable peace and development.
H. THE RELEVANCE OF HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT IN NEW NATION BUILDING EFFORTS

The United Nations Development Programme introduced a comprehensive concept of human security for the first time in 1994 in its global Human Development Report. It defined human security as addressing the concerns of the ordinary people who, in their daily lives, have to seek protection not only from the direct physical threats of violence caused by international and internal conflicts, but also from hunger, disease, ignorance, unemployment, political repression, and environmental hazards. The ordinary people in Timor-Leste are those who are not well educated and unable to speak either Portuguese or English as well as those who do not have any gainful employment.

These ordinary Timorese need human security that in the United Nations’ view should be provided to all regardless of their ethnic, religious or linguistic backgrounds. Human security comprises seven freedoms that are essential for preserving human dignity.

1. Freedom from fear of threats to personal security, torture, arbitrary arrest and other violent acts;
2. Freedom from want to enjoy a decent standard of living;
3. Freedom from discrimination by gender, race, ethnicity, national origin or religion;
4. Freedom from injustice and unequal access to employment and other opportunities;
5. Freedom of participation, expression and association;
6. Freedom for decent work without exploitation; and
7. Freedom for realisation of individual human potential.

Human security complements state security as progress in both areas is mutually re-enforceable.

1. Democratic Governance for Human Security

Two years after independence, the Executive Organ or the Government has emerged as the strongest institution in Timor-Leste, when compared with the other independent institutions that make up the state. Progress has been made in certain areas of governance, but there is more to do. We need to move forward by strengthening and building key institutions of democratic governance for enhancing the security of ordinary citizens in this country.

Over the past three years, the state institutions of Timor-Leste, the United Nations, its agencies, programmes and funds, and development partners have formed a strong partnership to enhance the institutional capacity of the Public Administration. The UNDP’s support to the Office of the President, the Veterans’ Commissions, the Parliament, and the Justice Sector (including by UNICEF and UNFPA), in addition to the large support by all UN agencies to the Executive Branch is a clear demonstration of our commitment to Timor-Leste’s efforts to
promote good governance and participatory democracy. Yet, there is an acute need for augmenting the support for strengthening the capacity of these institutions with a view to enhancing human security of ordinary citizens particularly the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. It is especially important for the Ministry of Planning and Finance to strengthen the capacity and influence of its planning unit so that it can not only formulate a clear and forceful vision and plan but also help direct more of the available national budgetary resources and international assistance towards the enhancement of human security through attainment of the objectives of the National Development Plan and the Millennium Development Goals.

2. Poverty and Human Security

Human security is and can best be achieved by fighting poverty to improve the lives of the most vulnerable groups. Timor-Leste's extent of poverty is well known. More than two-in-five Timorese are living below the national poverty line of US$0.55 per capita per day. Over three-quarters of the population live in rural areas and the rural poor comprise about 46 per cent of Timor-Leste's population. The concept of human security stresses that all people should be able to take care of themselves by providing opportunities to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living. This would allow them to make a full contribution to their own development and that of their communities and the country. The challenge is to provide the enabling environment for them to participate in, and partake of the benefits of development, while assisting the few that cannot help themselves.

3. Fighting Discrimination to advance Human Security for All

The advancement of human security in Timor-Leste will depend on how well it can include the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in its development activities. The vulnerable groups include women, children and the elderly or old aged people as well as ex-combatants, veterans and their families, and people living in remote areas without adequate access to health and education.

Human security from a gender perspective is particularly pertinent. It is about asking the central question: what is different about women and men's security? It should not be seen as an add-on to the main discussions. Women, youth and former fighters lack proper social recognition as significant actors of social, political and economic development. Unless approaches to human security can be used to improve the situation of these disadvantaged groups, they will remain at best a burden to the Government, even though they can contribute to the advancement of the nation. In the final analysis, human security should be about addressing injustice, inequality and discrimination and enabling people to deal with the new forms of power and subjugation that shape their lives.

4. Investment in Human Security

Ensuring human security at an early stage is a better preventive measure. It means
taking actions to reduce vulnerabilities, minimising risks and instituting remedial measures when prevention fails. Timor-Leste is on the right track in its investment in human security. The legitimacy of Sector Investment Programmes is strengthened if they form part of the overall investment strategy for enhancing human security. The people's vision to the year 2020 and the National Development Plan contain a framework of how the Government should design its development actions to achieve the two over-arching development goals of poverty reduction and promotion of economic growth that is equitable and sustainable. These are also the key elements of human security and the Millennium Development Goals.

SYNOPSIS

Situational Analysis

1. The East Timor conflict shows that the main cause of conflict is the desire of people to attain independence and freedom rather than economic welfare. Indonesia contributed more in 24 years to raising the standard of living of ordinary East Timorese than Portugal did in the preceding entire four centuries. During the 1990's, the amount of budgetary support provided annually by the central Indonesian government was more than $100 per person.

2. The intervention by the international community through INTERFET stopped wide-spread violence and destruction, during which the lives of several hundred Timorese had been lost and almost all private property and public infrastructure facilities were destroyed.

3. UNTAET, under the leadership of Sergio Vieira de Mello, succeeded in not only carrying out peacekeeping functions but starting peace building activities such as establishing a basic governance structure necessary for an independent country to function reasonably well on political, economic and social fronts.

4. After May 2002, UNMISET provided increased support for national peace-building efforts in terms of Timor-Leste's border negotiations with Indonesia and Australia; strengthening the capacity of the PNTL national police force; and supporting the delivery of public services by four sovereign State institutions.

Successful Undertaking of Peacekeeping and Peace-building Operations

1. The UN has conducted one of its most comprehensive and successful peacekeeping and peace-building operations carried out by UNTAET and UNMISET in Timor-Leste since the popular consultation was organized by UNAMET in August 1999. UNOTIL is now tasked to ensure a smooth and rapid transition to a sustainable development assistance framework.

2. The success of the UN missions was achieved in part through integrated implementation under the leadership of the SRSGs of security, humanitarian and development activities undertaken by the military, police and civilian components in
close cooperation with the UN agencies, funds and programmes as well as Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral development partners.

3. The successful undertakings by the UN missions were realized by full acceptance by Timorese people and their leaders of the transitory administrative authority exercised by UNTAET, of the advisory supporting role played by UNMISET and UNOTIL.

4. Also, the security and integrity of the State of Timor-Leste since its independence has been realized in part by the Indonesian acceptance of Timor-Leste as an independent and sovereign nation.

Positive Signs for Stability and Good State Governance

1. With the establishment of UNTAET in October 1999, the international development partners and the newly established State institutions carried out recovery, rehabilitation and development works worth around $1.0 billion for the period of almost five years until June 2004. While heavily dependent on external assistance provided by '100 stability advisors' and '200 development advisors' the Government and other State institutions started functioning and delivering basic services through community policing, schools and public works.

2. The revenues from Timor Sea oil and natural gas exploitation are expected to amount to more than $100 million by 2007 for this small country with its national budget of $106 million in 2005-2006. The Government has adopted a 'Norway Plus' approach and decided to establish 'a Petroleum Fund' to manage the revenues from the Timor Sea.

3. The Timor Leste Government has embarked on the preparation of Sector Investment Programmes (SIPs) for 15 sectors in order to seek and programme in a coherent manner donor support to meet priority activities. Along with adoption of the SIP process, the Government hopes to secure foreign direct investment (FDI) for private sector investments. The SIP process and FDIs are expected to address massive unemployment and poverty that pose a potential threat to stability.

Risks for Instability, Internal Conflict and Civil War

1. Massive unemployment particularly among youths constitutes a major risk factor for internal conflict and even civil war. On 4 December 2002, youths along with others who were dissatisfied with the Government and the police in particular resorted to riot and burned many stores and buildings including the official residence of the Prime Minister. With the labor force increasing at the rate of 4.4 percent a year, new entrants into the labor force which now number 14,000 a year is expected to rise to 20,000 a year by 2015.

2. Marginalized veterans and ex-combatants along with a larger number of former clandestine members consider that their contributions to independence have been neglected and they have been excluded from public employment opportunities. Many of the former independence fighters are facing difficulties in adjusting to the social and economic aspects of the new civilian life and competing with other East Timorese who
have returned from their exile abroad. They can influence unemployed youths in provoking social unrest and disturbances.

3. Unresolved border negotiations have cast doubt over the sustainability of cordial relationship the East Timorese leaders have nurtured with Indonesia. The Indonesian military has maintained two battalions along the border and has no plans to 'demilitarize' the border. The enclave of Oecussi that is located in Indonesian West Timor, in particular, presents a major potential for border incidents and conflicts with Indonesia.

4. Diasporas' consolidation of political power and the decision to adopt Portuguese as one of the two official languages are creating antagonisms among a large segment of the national population, more than 90 percent of whom have limited education and comprehension of the Portuguese language.

5. Foreigners' acquisition of economic opportunities and wealth are causing anxiety and resentment of indigenous East Timorese who have neither the 'mentality' nor entrepreneurship skills to compete against foreigners. Anti-foreign sentiment particularly directed against the Chinese can be aroused by any leaders as Suharto did regularly during his 40 years of his authoritarian rule.

6. Personalized political conflicts do pose an element of political instability as the political elite is far from unified. Any serious deterioration of the relationship between the elite can precipitate broader conflict because of the fragility of the State institutions, particularly the military, police and the justice system.

7. A number of East Timorese leaders - both in the ruling circle and in positions in political parties - have conveyed to SRSG the eminent danger of personal differences and conflict of interests developing into armed conflict once the UN leaves the country.

Towards Justice, Truth and Reconciliation

1. Justice, truth and reconciliation for the crimes for 1999 and before remain an issue of major importance in Timor-Leste.

2. The Serious Crimes Process undertaken by the Serious Crimes Panels, the Serious Crimes Prosecution Unit and the Defense Lawyers Unit in Timor-Leste has been carried out efficiently and professionally at an annual cost of only $8 million in comparison with annual budgets of over $100 million for the International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively. Since the establishment of the Special Panels in Timor-Leste in 2000, 87 defendants, mostly Timorese militia, have been brought to trial with 84 convicted mostly of crimes against humanity.

3. The Serious Crimes Process of Timor-Leste has encountered a major systemic limitation as it has not been able to bring to trial 339 indicted persons who are believed to be outside of Timor-Leste most likely in the Republic of Indonesia.

4. Around 800 murder cases and others are not indicted.

5. Parallel to the Serious Crimes process, Timor-Leste constituted a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), which proved highly successful in mobilizing community participation in truth-telling and facilitating localized
community reconciliation agreements through an approach of restorative justice for lesser serious crimes such as arson and physical assault.

6. The complementary approach of justice and reconciliation in the post-conflict context significantly supports and enhances sustainable peace building.

7. With completion of the UNMISET mission the serious crimes process ended but the truth and reconciliation process continues. In March 2005 Indonesia and Timor-Leste agreed to establish a Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) with a view to revealing the truth with regard to the events prior to and immediately after the popular consultation in 1999, and to further promoting reconciliation and friendship between the two countries.

8. The UN Commission of Expert, tasked to review the judicial processes of the work of the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor in Jakarta and the Serious Crimes Unit and Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Dili, put forward key recommendations on sound and feasible measures to bring to justice those accountable for crimes against humanity and on ways in which the CTF can assist in this endeavour.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


EAST TIMOR AND

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

José RAMOS-HORTA
Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs & Cooperation,
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
Nobel Peace Laureate in 1996
- A Keynote Presentation -

East Timor and International Cooperation

José RAMOS-HORTA
Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs & Cooperation,
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
Nobel Peace Laureate in 1996

Allow me first to express my most heartfelt appreciation to the Chancellor Prof. Masajuro Shiokawa for the honor bestowed on me with the degree of Doctor Honoris Causa from one of Japan’s leading academic institutions, Toyo University. I am also grateful to the conference organizers for making my stay here a very comfortable one.

I am particularly pleased that I am sharing this platform with Dr. Sukehiro Hasegawa, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who has been in Timor-Leste for more than three years, always displaying much energy and passion in his work. With a long and solid experience acquired over 30 years of diligent service to the United Nations in numerous conflicts and post-conflict situations in many parts of the world, Dr. Hasegawa was well chosen by the Secretary-General to help consolidate what was started with Sergio Vieira De Mello and Kamalesh Sharma.

The people of Timor-Leste are fortunate that the Secretary-General always chose the very best of his experienced international civil servants to serve in our country. To organize the 30th August Popular Consultation, the Secretary-General chose Mr. Ian Martin, a man of impeccable human rights credentials, as his Special Representative, and head of UNAMET (May – September 1999). The unforgettable Sergio Vieira De Mello, who for more than two years from October 1999 to May 2002 headed UNTAET, followed Mr. Ian Martin. A respected senior Indian diplomat, Kamalesh Sharma, who headed UNMISET, followed Sergio. Dr. Hasegawa has the added advantage that he served as Deputy SRSG to Kamalesh Sharma during the period of the first UNMISET (2002-2004). Each one of them served under different circumstances with a specific mandate tailored for each phase of our nation building.
I wish to pay tribute here to our beloved friend Sergio Vieira De Mello brutally murdered in Iraq just over two years ago. Our people wept over his death and Sergio will always live in us. His passage through Timor-Leste, his charisma, compassion, energy and smile will be with us forever. I also pay tribute to all the UN personnel who lost their lives in our country and in many other difficult regions around the world.

Speaking here today on the eve of the Millennium Summit in New York, I think it is timely that besides elaborating on the theme, _Timor-Leste and International Cooperation_, I should touch upon other subjects, all somehow interconnected, and that is, our experience in East Timor, the eternal dilemma of war and peace, UN reform and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It is an ambitious proposition and I can anticipate that some of you have strong views on some of the issues raised in this presentation.

Our people’s right to self-determination was realized through a long engagement process with the international community, but our people were always at the centre of this struggle for no amount of international generosity and solidarity can substitute for people and leadership.

Our on-going task to consolidate peace, democracy and prosperity depends on active engagement with the international community, but again our people remain at the center of this daily struggle; they are the main actors and stake-holders, beneficiaries or victims of our policies.

My experience with the United Nations dates back 30 years when I first walked into the UN HQ in NY one freezing morning in December 1975, in the midst of the North American winter, having never seen snow in my life, to appear before the Security Council.

My country had just been invaded; a 24-year conflict was beginning, while the wars in Indochina had just ended with communist victories that seemed to have confirmed LBJ’s “domino theory”. Timor-Leste thus became a casualty of the “domino theory”, a footnote of the Cold War, an expendable people in the grand contest of wills between the US and the USSR. Many millions of innocent peoples lost their lives in Asia, Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Central America, casually killed as the two superpowers struggled to assert their spheres of influence.

My first direct experience with the UN system brought mixed emotions; of euphoria because the Security Council (SC) had adopted a rare unanimous resolution “deploring” the invasion of
my country; then of bitterness as I soon realised that the same SC did nothing to follow through with its own resolution. At least two of the five permanent members (P5) became major weapons suppliers to the regime that was in defiance of the SC resolutions. I learned then, and since, that not all UN resolutions are to be implemented; that often they are not worth the paper they are written on.

I have also learned that no one has a monopoly on virtues or sins, and that in spite of its shortcomings and failings, the UN is the sum of all of us, with our strengths and weaknesses, ideals and pragmatism, virtues and vanities.

As I observe the current news coverage surrounding the Oil for Food scandal with the United Nations painted as the villain, I am certainly disappointed as once again I see that the Organization that we idealise is deeply festered with corruption.

We must accept that the Oil for Food corruption scandal is just one of many. For instance, there were persistent allegations and reports of corruption among some UN advisers serving in the customs and procurement services in Timor-Leste from 1999 up to 2003, as well as of sexual abuse by some peacekeepers and police officers in the years of 2000-2002 during the UNTAET phase. However, in this case and others in my country, UN superiors took decisive action to punish the culprits.

There have been reports of sexual exploitation of poor young women by UN peacekeepers and civilian personnel in African missions; and of UNHCR elements extorting money from the destitute people they are supposed to protect. In this case, there were full investigation and prompt action against the culprits.

In referring above to the cases of corruption and abuses by UN advisers, police officers and peacekeepers, my sole intent is to pose a question to all of us, members of the large UN family. Who is to blame when someone wearing a UN badge is engaged in criminal activities? As Governments/Member States do not have the humility to accept their failures, we blame all on the UN, making it the convenient scapegoat of our own failures.

While we should be happy to know that a vast majority of the peacekeepers, police officers and civilian advisers do perform and behave exceptionally well, every time a small number of elements misbehave they severely undermine the image of the whole UN.
The management of the UN is far more complex and challenging than managing a large corporation or even a medium size country. The SG and the people around him have to be sensitive to the interests and views of a significant section of the UN members, in particular of the larger powers. The Secretariat itself is also made up of people from different nationalities with different experiences and loyalties, mirroring the diversity of the UN family; yet it is supposed to assist the Secretary-General with utmost dedication and loyalty. However, the Secretariat’s staff too is vulnerable to the interests and pressures from member countries, and cannot escape their origins, prejudices and loyalties. We are all like that even when we serve in an institution that is supposed to be neutral, professional and whose integrity should be beyond reproach.

While the Foreign Service staff of a given country has only to worry about their country’s interests, UN officials have to be sensitive to the interests of 191 countries and in their day to day activities they usually walk in a diplomatic mine-field. I am often impressed by their unique ability to sail through the rough seas of international diplomacy and intrigue.

In the area of peace-keeping and conflict prevention, we must remember that while the SG has the responsibility to inform and alert the SC to an on-going conflict or a potential one that may threaten international peace and security, the ultimate decision to act rests with the SC, in particular the P5 members.

The UN does not have a standing army, a police force and a pool of experienced experts in various fields ready to be dispatched anywhere in the world whenever the SC authorizes a mission. The Secretary-General has to rely on countries that are willing to provide the forces that are solicited and in regards to civilian personnel the constraints on the UN to recruit the best and brightest are too evident.

The UN’s role in the world has not been limited to peace-keeping; it has provided facilities and the environment for informal meetings between parties in conflict; it has mediated hostage situations or border disputes; it has mobilized resources and coordinated assistance to war-torn countries or to communities affected by natural disasters; it has helped with the development of norms of international law without which we all would be at war with each other over issues like border, land and water resources, trade, sea navigation, and even space exploration; through agencies like WHO, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, the UN has brought cure, food, hope to millions of human beings; it has made possible the awareness world-wide of, and respect for, human rights. I could go on listing the extraordinary UN accomplishments that would make us
all proud. The case of East Timor is a salient example but it is not the only success the dedicated people working in the NYHQ should be proud of.

It was only a little over three years ago that the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan handed over power to our elected President. Since then, we have made real progress in most sectors such as public administration, education and health. We are doing less well in the justice sector. Our economy is recovering from the dramatic downturn in 2002-2003 when a vast majority of UN military and civilian personnel left the country.

When our good friend Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, visited Timor-Leste in May 2002, to preside over the formal transfer of sovereignty to our elected President, I said to him, “Mr. Secretary-General, you are going to lose your job as President of Timor-Leste.” Kofi Annan did not seem too upset to be relinquishing this unpaid and difficult job. Standing here I want once again to pay tribute to him for his wise stewardship of Timor-Leste’s transition to independence, his personal engagement and support, without which we would not have achieved the notable progress we can proudly boast today.

In the case of Timor-Leste, despite the allegations and reports that I cited above, I will say that on balance, the intense three years of the UN peace-keeping and peace-building mission in my country has been very positive.

Without the understanding and active involvement of our friends in the region and in other parts of the world, the indispensable leadership and coordinating role of the United Nations, the active involvement of its many agencies, as well as of the Bretton Woods institutions and of the Asia Development Bank, we would not have been able to achieve the impressive progress this far.

Our population is roughly 1 million today with the highest demographic growth in the world, with 8 children per family. We are mostly a very Catholic country and we are overdoing what God told us all many millions of years ago “Go and pro-create”.

As a result of the unexpected high price of oil and gas, Timor-Leste now enjoys a significant surplus, thus enabling our government to significantly increase our public expenditure by 30% this fiscal year 2005-6. This increase will benefit mostly rural areas and the poorest of our country. More than 30% of our budget goes to education and health. Malaria, TB, and mal-nutrition are widespread. HIV/Aids infection rate is relatively low at about 0,60%. With
the assistance from Brazil and Thailand, our health authorities are addressing the HIV/Aids problem through education on prevention and treatment.

Ours is a multi-party system with the President directly elected by the people, and an executive branch also elected by the people, headed by a Prime Minister. Twelve political parties are represented in the National Parliament where women hold almost 30% of the seats. We have a very vocal opposition and an equally vocal civil society and media. We live in a free and open society where there are no political taboos or untouchable individuals. Everything and anything is subject to public debate and scrutiny.

Timor-Leste has acceded to all seven core International Human Rights instruments and we are among the first countries in the world to pioneer a streamlined treaty reporting procedure. Having ratified the core human rights treaties, my government is committed to fulfill our obligations under these treaties. Right now we are drafting our first reports and all government agencies are participating in this exercise, jointly coordinated by the Human Rights Unit in the Office of the Prime Minister and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, engaging peoples in the rural areas in taking an interest and participating in this unique process.

The internal political and security situation is peaceful and stable and this includes our porous common land borders. In record time we have reached agreement on 96% of our common land border with our closest neighbor. By the end of the year we should close the gap.

We are fostering a new relationship even if the troubling question of past violence and lack of accountability continue to haunt all.

Commenting on the general situation of peace and stability in East Timor, a recent World Bank reports offers a sober and optimistic assessment:

"...many countries emerging from violence, relapse into violence again within five (5) years, but... Timor-Leste has avoided that fate, maintained peace and political stability, and established security."
[World Bank Report No. 32700-TP August 8, 2005]

With our closest neighbors, Australia and Indonesia, as well as with New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, The Philippines, ROK, Japan, China, India, we have fostered the best possible relationship. At the end of July we have become the 25th member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, a political and security forum that brings together the 10 ASEAN nations plus
Australia, NZ, PNG, China, ROK, Japan, Russia, the US, Canada, India, Pakistan, etc.

Beyond our region, we have developed solid relations with countries like Portugal, Brazil, Spain, the UK, Ireland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland, etc. On a per capita basis, Timor-Leste remains the fourth largest recipient of US development assistance. Our friends are engaged in support of nation-building and state-building either bi-laterally or through the UN, providing training for our security forces, public administration, banking and finance institutions, small and medium size businesses, and more.

Japan has been a generous friend of Timor-Leste, having made decisive contributions to the UN peacekeeping mission in our country, first through the International Force for East Timor, and later through UNTAET, UNMISET and now UNOTIL. We recall Japan’s contribution of US$100 million to the Interfet Trust Fund; its pledge of $130 million at the first Tokyo’s Donors’ Meeting in December 1999, followed by another pledge of $60 million in the 6th donors’ meeting in Dili in May 2002. In close consultation with our government, Japanese assistance focuses on four pillars, namely, infrastructure, agriculture, human resources development and peace consolidation.

The Japanese Self-Defense Force deployed an Engineer Group in 2002-4, which proved to be invaluable in the maintenance of some key roads and bridges. The behavior of the Japanese soldiers was flawless in the way they carried out their professional task and dealt with the local communities.

This does not suggest that other nationalities behaved differently. In fairness I must add that the forces from the ROK, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Australia, NZ, Fiji, Kenya, Ireland, Portugal, Brazil, to mention only some that come to mind behaved in an exemplary manner. Unfortunately there were soldiers and police officers from one particular nationality whose record was less honorable and as it has happened in other peacekeeping missions, the irresponsible behavior even of a tiny few can undermine the good name of the entire mission. Hence the troop contributing country must be extra careful in selecting their soldiers and police officers.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We believe that as a responsible member of the international community and of our region, our first obligation is to build a peaceful, stable, democratic and prosperous community in our own
country. By consolidating nation-building, internal peace and stability, improving our peoples living conditions, lifting our people out of the shackles of poverty, we may contribute to wider peace and stability.

We owe it to our people that we make every effort to build our country based on the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. But we owe it also to the international community and accept that when it comes to upholding human rights there cannot be claims of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. Hence our decision to accede to the seven core international human rights treaties and fully cooperate with the United Nations in insuring that the binding provisions of the treaties are not only received into our domestic law as our constitution mandates, but fully absorbed into our domestic law as well and are implemented.

The most fragile sector of the administration in Timor-Leste is the judiciary. We have very few trained judges, prosecutors or lawyers. We are committed to creating a strong and independent judiciary but this is still many years off. We thank those countries that have assisted us in improving our judiciary and we plead with them to continue their efforts for many years to come.

Our economy is doing much better than anticipated when the UN began to drastically downsize its presence in 2002. We are confident that in two to three years we will experience a strong economic growth as a result of revenues from oil and gas, as well as capital investment in public infrastructure such as roads, bridges, ports and airports, telecommunications, public housing, health, agriculture, fisheries and tourism. We should then be able to begin drastically reducing unemployment and poverty. We in Timor-Leste are trying our best to work towards the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and we are confident we will meet our stated goals of halving poverty by 2015.

If you have the opportunity to read what I read, among others, the latest World Bank Report on the developments in my country, you will reach the same upbeat conclusion about the impressive gains we have attained in only three years. Let me share with you some quotes from the latest World Bank Report on East Timor.

"Timor-Leste, the world’s newest nation, was created out of ashes. Given that the country started from scratch both physically and institutionally, Timor-Leste has done remarkably well. Yet Timor-Leste is at a crossroad, and progress remains fragile. Over the past five years, strong partnership with donors around a whole-of-Government, results-oriented framework firmly anchored in the National
Development Plan (NDP) and the Stability Program (SP) has been key to Timor-Leste’s successful nation-building process.” [WB Report No. 32700-TP August 8, 2005]

We have had a multitude of bilateral, regional and multilateral partners, and more, such as individuals and NGOs from many parts of the globe, each with their own perspective, experience, prejudices, preconceived notions about what is good and what is not good for us, offering us advice, often stating the obvious, but without the practical tools to implement their brilliant ideas. We just patiently listen for the 100th time what we already know for many years of our own rich experience in engaging the international community. When you are poor, you have to be ever so polite...sometimes pretending to be ignorant so that the other guy lecturing you feels good about himself.

We endure endless meetings with our donors, (now we call development partners), we report on budget execution, item-by-item, sector-by-sector, we are questioned, and scrutinized for every dollar we are given.

Even as we are sincerely grateful to our friends in the international community for their generous assistance, and not wanting to sound ungrateful, I should humbly suggest that the rich countries should also make a serious appraisal and reassessment of how their pledged assistance should be used in the targeted countries. I dare to say that much of the so-called ODA ends up back in the donor metropolis with only a fraction of this much-publicised aid benefiting the recipient country.

There has to be a thorough reform of ODA with a view to ensuring that developing countries actually receive what is pledged. We wonder sometimes about the usefulness of the endless meetings, study trips, evaluations, and feasibility studies, when actually all the information required can be downloaded from the Internet by a 7 year old.

We have instituted a very novel approach in engaging our people through what we call an “Open Government” practice that brings the entire cabinet for several days into a rural area where we hold open town meetings, listen to our people, their criticisms or constructive suggestions on how we can improve our work, particularly service delivery and our relationship with them.

In order to improve government response and effectiveness in dealing with the concerns, interests and priorities in the rural areas, the Prime Minister has just appointed five new cabinet
ministers who will be in charge of the five regions of the country and who will be residing in
the area.

I want to tell you now about one of our outstanding good governance success stories, managing
our petroleum wealth that covers all the areas of governance that I have alluded to. This
provides a blueprint for government and community engagement

We have researched, debated and developed a draft model law, the Petroleum Fund, which we
took directly to the people, listened to them and then took on to the Parliament for approval.
We do not want Timor-Leste to fall prey to the developing nations “resource curse” where
God-giving resources are squandered by corrupt and incompetent elites while the people
remain poor and marginalized.

The key principle is that only the sustainable income from our petroleum wealth will be
available for current expenditure. This principle means that the fund would retain about half
the petroleum revenue earned each year.

Revenue from the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) is expected to be very volatile
over the next 20 years. The essential point is this: If we want to generate sufficient capital to
earn income for future generations, we need to save an average of 50% of our revenue from the
Timor Sea. Government investment for our domestic needs will come from the National
Budget.

The Fund will have oversight from a board of prominent citizens, which will be required to
report to the National Parliament on how much revenue has been retained in the fund.

Commenting on our Petroleum Fund, the World Bank said:

Timor-Leste “...has adopted a state-of-the-art legal framework for on and off shore petroleum production
and taxation and a draft savings policy and associated Petroleum Fund Act consistent with the
Extractive Industries Transparency principles even before EITI existed. Consultations over these
policies and laws have been broad-based, both externally and internally; creating a national consensus
over principles that will determine Timor-Leste’s future. True to stated principles, the Government has
adhered to a provisional savings policy for petroleum revenues ahead of the adoption of the permanent
savings policy.” [World Bank Report No. 32700-TP August 8, 2005]
Prime Minister Alkatiri was recently congratulated by Woodside’s CEO Mr. Don Voelte, for his vision in making Timor-Leste a “model for the world” in the prudent and transparent management of petroleum revenues, with the introduction of the Government’s ‘Petroleum Fund Law’. He added that the Petroleum Fund confirmed that Timor-Leste “is the kind of country Woodside wants to do business with…”

War and Peace

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, allow me now to turn to the second theme of my remarks, and share with you some concerns of mine.

I will do so not so much in an opinionated fashion but rather my intention is to challenge you into reflecting and maybe providing answers to the eternal dilemma of war and peace.

The tragedy of World War II should have been a lesson to humanity to abandon war once and for all. Even as the memory of the Holocaust was still fresh in our collective mind, a coalition of Arab armies attempted to eliminate the newly born State of Israel. The Korean peninsula saw a devastating war when the communist North invaded the South in an attempt to impose its Stalinist model on the capitalist South.

The French fought losing battles in Vietnam and Algeria. The vanquished French abandoned Indochina and the US took upon itself what it believed to be its God-given mandate to prevent a communist take-over of the region.

 Millions of lives were lost in these senseless wars in Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, Biafra, Bangladesh, Congo, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, to mention only a few of a long list of conflicts.

In the last two decades or so, our world was the stage of several major conflicts, namely, the invasion of Iran in the 80’s by Saddam Hussein resulting in the death of over a million people. Chemical and biological weapons were unleashed on civilians and combatants. The West turned a blind eye when Kurds and Iranians were gassed to death by the thousands by the butcher of Baghdad. There were no peace marchers in the West or even in the Muslim world as two Muslim nations, mostly sharing the same brand of Islam, slaughtered each other. The war lasted eight years.
Soon after the end of the Iraq-Iran war, the same regime in Baghdad unleashed yet another invasion, this time against the State of Kuwait. Only then a coalition of countries intervened and Kuwait was freed but not without wanton destruction carried out by the retreating forces that set on fire hundreds of oil wells. This was the first time ever that a regime had launched an environmental war.

Saddam Hussein dragged his nation into two tragic and senseless wars, ruining his once prosperous country. Other leaders loose their jobs or even their heads when they loose a war.

Former Argentinean dictator Gen. Galtieri was deposed after he led the botched invasion of Malvinas in 1982. Richard Nixon was forced out of office for cheating. Joseph Estrada of the Philippines is languishing in jail for stealing. Imelda Marcos was disgraced for her obsession with shoes. She had a collection of 3,000 pair of shoes and bulletproof bras.

But Saddam Hussein was to be different. He invaded his Muslim neighbors, slaughtered millions of his own people, Kurds, Iranians and Kuwaitis; blew up oil fields; and unleashed chemical and biological weapons, sponsored with cash Palestinian extremists who blew up innocent Israeli civilians, and yet seemed untouchable.

In the 90's the European continent that believed it had shaken off the demons of war of a recent past woke up to the tragic ethnic wars in the Balkan region. The last chapter of the Balkan wars was the war in Kosovo in 1998 and the apparent peace in the region remains at best precarious.

Most of us have now relegated the Cambodian tragedy of the 70's to a footnote of our intellectual and moral library. But let us not forget the genocide unleashed by the Khmer Rouge regime with almost universal indifference, or the Taliban rule in Afghanistan in the 90's that took us back to the savagery of the Middle Ages.

We cannot forget the 1994 genocide in Rwanda when 800,000 people were slaughtered in 100 days right under the nose of an impotent UN peacekeeping force.

In the Darfur region of Sudan ethnic cleansing was underway for several months and yet it elicited little reaction from the rest of the world. In this regard, maybe the only powers that deserve some credit for trying to end the violence, has been the African Union led by South Africa. However, hampered by limited logistics and human resources its intervention has been too little, too late, for many thousands of innocent victims.
It is in Darfur and similar crisis situations that the UN and regional organizations might wish to consider the possibility of standing arrangements or partnership with the only political-military alliance in the world, NATO, which has the means to assist in providing the tools necessary for quick and effective intervention. With the end of the Cold War and as the US and Europe no longer fear an external aggression, NATO has had to evolve and maybe sometime in the not distant future we will see closer if not formal partnerships between NATO and other regional political organizations in dealing with major humanitarian catastrophes.

With only few notable exceptions, for most part the international community has failed to pre-empt the occurrence of violence and to intervene when violence had begun. More often than not the U.N. is paralyzed and becomes hostage to the narrow interests of some of its members. We had illusions that the (mis) use of the veto was a fact of the Cold War and it would be less and less exercised in the New World Order. However, with notable exceptions, national interests endured beyond the Cold War and the Security Council has remained hostage to them.

Like you, I am opposed to violence and wars, any war. But sometimes, we must ask ourselves some troubling questions. Should we oppose the use of force even in situations of genocide and ethnic cleansing?

On the war of words over Iraq, there are those opposing the war, period. In their view, there can never be justification for war. This is a highly moral and valid sentiment. There is a second group, the realists, who support the use of force if the UN Security Council sanctions it. But what should we do when the Security Council fails to act as a unified body because of conflicting political interests?

Should the Security Council be always at all times the only valid source of legitimacy for an armed intervention? If not, then we should deal with the next question, who - the only existing superpower with enough fire power?

Those opposing the use of force under any circumstances have not been able to articulate a better strategy to deal with situations of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Patient diplomacy lasts as long it lasts and might bear fruits, and might not. But genocide goes on as was in the case of Cambodia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Sudan.
Let me offer an example for reflection, the case of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime in the 70’s. The world knew, or at least the US and much of the West as well as Cambodia’s neighbors knew, that an evil regime was deliberately cleansing the nation and causing the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings. The Security Council did not even discuss the Khmer Rouge genocide.

There was no chance the Security Council would act, assuming there was a general political will to intervene. Vietnam finally intervened unilaterally in 1979 putting an end to the Khmer Rouge rule.

The Tanzania intervention in the late 70’s in Uganda put an end to Idi Amin’s genocidal rule. But for many years, the Organization of African Unity and the Security Council opted to do nothing for reasons of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference.

Was it wrong that NATO led by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair intervened in Kosovo in 1999 bypassing the Security Council, saving the lives of thousands of Kosovars? This was the first time in NATO’s 50-year history that it intervened to save a Muslim community that was being slaughtered in the heart of Christianity.

If there had been a lone world leader with moral courage who had ordered his country’s armed forces to intervene unilaterally in Rwanda in 1994, would he have been condemned for this unilateral action? The UN and in particular the Secretary-General has been criticized for his alleged failure to act on Rwanda. But it is too convenient to lay blame on the Secretary-General who does not command an army, nor direct the Security Council.

The uni-polar world, the US and the rest of us

Many have written and spoken on the world’s misfortunes as a result of the current prevailing uni-polar system whereby one single world power imposes its will on the rest of us. I will put forward a question - was the bi-polar world that prevailed during much of the 50 years after the end of World War II up to the implosion of the USSR, a safer and more just world?

During the bi-polar world, the world witnessed numerous intra-state and inter-state conflicts, involving directly or indirectly the two rival super-powers that dominated the bi-polar power system. An estimated 40 million people died in conflicts during these years.
The US and the USSR fought or sponsored wars in Latin America, Africa and Asia in their attempt to exercise influence and control over strategic areas of the world such as Central America, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, Southeast Asia, etc. The US fought a senseless ugly war in Indochina, and the USSR had its own Vietnam in Afghanistan and had parts of Europe under its brutal and incompetent Stalinist rule. The nuclear threat was much more real then than today.

The abrupt collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War in 1990 ushered a new era, a more promising New World Order free from the nuclear threat and proxy wars sponsored by the two superpowers.

Human rights and the struggles for democracy that were hostage and fell victim of the Cold War seemed to have gained new life and momentum. Soon after the end of the Cold War we saw the beginning of the end in rapid sequence of the class of military regimes in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Much to the consternation of the enemies and critics of the US, the American Empire emerged triumphant as there was no doubt that the collapse of the totalitarian communist system and beliefs were a vindication of the Western liberal thought and values.

Much has been written and said, always in the language of frustration and regret, that the world we are living in today is a uni-polar one based on the unchallenged American economic and military power.

But I dare to say, is it so bad? The alternative, the past bi-polar world, built on two rival ideological systems, gave us a fragmented world with many wars that resulted in tens of millions of dead and the ever present nuclear nightmare. The counter-force to the US was the USSR with its Stalinist brutality and expansionist doctrine; it was not a rival benign superpower democracy. Hence there was jubilation and celebration by tens of millions when the rotten Soviet totalitarian system imploded.

The US was the winner of the Cold War, but so was Europe and so was all humanity. However, while Europe remained divided along their own individual national interests without a real political unity and a strong economy and defense, the US harvested the fruits of the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Countries of the South that had certain political value during the Cold War and were adept at exploiting the US-USSR rivalry were at a loss trying to reposition themselves
in the new uni-polar world.

There is no equal or rival to the US today and whether we like it or not, the US is the world’s unchallenged sole superpower and will remain so for many more years, perhaps as many as 30 years or more until the full emergence of the superpowers of China and India. But there are many question marks clouding the future of the two Asian neighbors and competitors so let us not celebrate yet the end of the uni-polar world.

Those who regret the current uni-polar world seem to blame the US for its status. The fact is that the US is the sole surviving superpower because of its highly educated people, its ingenuity and creativity, the ability of its industries and commerce to engage in a continuing process of reform and adaptation, its diversity and intellectual and political dynamism, and its investment in research, science and technology. Its universities produce far more Nobel Laureates in sciences, medicine and economics than Europe, Japan and Russia combined. It is a superpower partly by default, by the failures of others, and by design because it wants and plans to be a superpower.

For 50 years, the US provided the only credible deterrence in Europe against Soviet expansion, and it continues to be the only credible security balance and has thus averted catastrophic wars in the Indian sub-continent, Middle East, Korean Peninsula, China Straits, and so on. An American retreat from Asia could precipitate an uncontrollable arms race between or among rival neighbors that would almost inevitably result in open warfare and set back the impressive economic and human development of the past 20 years.

This does not in anyway suggest that the US has been a benign power, a sort of a giant Mother Theresa. Its history is also one of conquest, greed and sometimes of barbarism. Latin America bears witness to US imperial arrogance. Vietnam and Cambodia were carpet bombed back to the Stone Age. It cultivated and propped up despotic regimes all over the world.

The US can be a force for change and good, and it can be a benign power. It can turn the world into a much safer, better living common home for all of us, as long as it has the humility of the truly great and walks half-way and meets its other half of fellow human beings, acknowledges its own limits and errors, and shares with the rest us a more compassionate vision and agenda. The US can use its enormous power in leading the fight against poverty and the debt trap that stunts progress in many parts of the world.
This is after all the only surviving superpower whose wealth and security depends on the state of the rest of the world. The US economy feeds on the wealth of others but at the same time, the economies of much of the world are dependent on the US market for their growth and for the well being of their people.

We are in a mutually interdependent world destined to find ways how we can all survive and prosper.

Allow me to move on to another topic of the day, one that affects how we live our daily lives.

Religious fanaticism and terrorism

Extremists strive in many cultures and religions. The daily news bulletins are dominated by the extensive coverage of the actions of a few but their actions have turned Islam into a word almost equal to terrorism.

But Christians cannot be too proud of our own dark history of fanaticism and intolerance that at least in part have given rise to modern Islamic fanaticism. After all, slavery, colonialism, conquest genocide and the Holocaust were part of the experiences of Christian Europe.

There has to be the recognition that if a vast majority of Europeans, Americans, and Australians, are exemplary in their intellectual appreciation of peoples of other cultures and religions, the daily experience of non-white minorities living in the West, including migrant workers, foreign students and visitors from Asia and Africa, has often been humiliating.

We all know how an Arab looking individual (you can even be a Greek, Portuguese, Spaniard, and look Arabic), a Pakistani, or a Sikh from India, attracts special attention at airports in Sydney, New York or London inviting humiliating searches. While millions of Muslims in the West have a far better life and privileges than their fellow Muslims in some of their countries of origin, not all is rosy for them. Many endure prejudice, humiliation and physical attacks.

There is deep-seated resentment and anger among Muslims and many non-Muslims around the world over Israeli policies of land grabbing and annexation, denying the Palestinians their right to a dignified existence and a homeland. We can imagine how a Palestinian feels when he/she sees a continuing influx of foreigners into his/her ancestral land and yet is denied the right of return or for those lucky enough to be on the ground see their daily life turned into restrictions
and humiliation, suffering eviction from their modest homes, harassment at check-points, and arbitrary arrest.

But we should not ignore Israel's own legitimate right to exist in peace and security, nor should we ignore a long history of Arab miscalculations and invasions that have carved modern Israel siege mentality.

Israel's Arab neighbors and Palestinian leaders are not free of responsibility for this seemingly endless cycle of violence. The Arab rejection of the 1949 partition plan was a tragic error, as were the many wars waged aiming at the destruction of Israel.

However, if Israel wishes to live in peace in the region, it has to have the courage of the great and walk halfway to meet the Palestinians, with both sides burying their past of hatred and wars. Jews should not forget that when they were persecuted in Europe in centuries past, they found safe heaven among the Arabs. The Holocaust was a modern European creation aimed at the elimination of Jews as a nation. It was not an Arab or Muslim creation.

It is a fact that the terrorist network that spans the globe mostly originates from the Middle East and some Muslim countries. While some hold high the banner of the Palestinian suffering and humiliation as their rallying cry against Israel and the West, others have a more ambitious agenda to overthrow the secular regimes in all lands inhabited by Muslims, with the imposition of conservative theocratic rule inspired by the experiences of the Ayatollahs in Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan. These are their models.

I am optimistic and believe that the Islamic extremism that is the basis of the current wave of international terrorism is a passing phenomenon. Like other extremist groups before them, namely the European terrorist groups of the 60's, they have no popular support and can be defeated through a multi-pronged strategy. The West and its allies have an almost complete domination over modern communications technology and significantly the financial means.

The terrorists have made good use of this technology and global funds to enact their war on the West and on all secular Arab and Muslim nations. The key is to subvert, undermine, and disrupt their ability to use modern means of communication, cut them off, isolate them, and deny them access to funds. Prudent but firm security measures are also necessary.

However those fighting the terrorists should be careful not to descend to their level of
inhumanity. There has to be always a careful balance between legitimate use of proportional force against terrorists and their supporters and respect for human rights.

The terrorists are not interested in the battle of ideas. Fanatics believe in their exclusive truth; they are not prepared to be questioned and be proven wrong.

They win over new recruits among the poor and uneducated through propaganda, brainwashing, coercion and bribes. To carry out deadly acts of terror they need only a few hundred loyal, fanatic cadres scattered around the globe, linked by modern communications.

While their agenda is the overthrow of secular regimes and disruption of the daily life of their declared enemies, they know they will never be able to gain control of a country and govern it. In the remote scenario of declared sympathizers of Al Qaida achieving power in a given country, they make themselves much more vulnerable; an open target for destruction as was the case with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The same time as the international community must further cooperate in the fight against international terrorism, there has to be much greater efforts in eliminating some of the obvious sources of discontent and resentment in the Muslim world through dialogue.

The seemingly intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the prejudices against Arabs and Muslims in general have fuelled the perception among Muslims that the West has an agenda to undermine Muslims. However, responsible Muslim leaders must do more, must speak out and denounce those who use their faith to justify terrorism and the killing of innocent people.

Arab and Muslim leaders were silent in the face of the barbarities and genocide carried out by Saddam Hussein and most are silent today in the face of the crisis in Sudan.

I turn now to the third theme of my remarks. The Iraqi crisis has prompted renewed calls for United Nations reform and this debate is being waged right now in New York and so far it is proving to be very divisive.

United Nations reform

The existing UN collective security mechanism is out-dated and undemocratic, a relic of the Cold War that no longer meets the challenges of today’s world and does not reflect today’s
economic, demographic and strategic realities.

There is a need for an expansion of the membership in the Security Council to include new Permanent Members that would reflect 21st century realities and challenges, and provide demographic, economic and strategic balance.

However, I would dare say even a reformed UN system would not resolve all problems. After all, ultimately, in facing up to the challenges, what is required is moral and political leadership, for no amount of structural adjustments to the UN bureaucracy can make up for the moral vacuum and the lack of political leadership.

We are a small, poor, vulnerable and the newest emerging democracy in the world, owing much of our freedom to the international community. Hence we are deeply attached to the principles and purposes of the United Nations, and cherish the unique relationship we have with the United Nations, its many agencies, as well as with the Bretton Wood Institutions, and various regional bodies that it is now a member of.

As a small nation we particularly value regional and international cooperation and share the views of many that in this day and age of multiple and complex challenges facing humankind, we must all strive to strengthen regional and international organizations and cooperation.

Regional organizations must also strive to reform, democratize, become more transparent and reflecting the aspirations of their peoples. International bodies such as the United Nations can be more effective only if regional bodies do their share in addressing the challenges in their respective regions. Hence there has to be a closer partnership between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations.

Much has been said and written about the need for a thorough review of the United Nations system and much of the debate has been focused on the Security Council, and overshadowing all other issues, namely the much needed reform of the General Assembly itself, the Commission on Human Rights, Specialized Agencies, etc.

I believe that while a substantive reform of our collective security system is long overdue, there must not be rigid deadlines or haste, nor there should be undue delays.

Much needed reform is also necessary in the humanitarian and development agencies to render
them leaner, more transparent and effective. Reform is also urgent in regard to the existing human rights system. The proliferation of treaty bodies and agenda items result in duplication, waste, inefficiency and loss of focus.

The concentration of UN agencies like the UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO, WHO, etc, in some of the rich countries result in very onerous costs both for the said agencies and the peoples they are supposed to serve. These agencies should be relocated to countries of the South to be closer to the people they are supposed to serve and where infrastructure facilities and professional services rival those in the West and are many times less costly.

The General Assembly

The General Assembly remains the prime UN organ bringing together all nations, rich and poor, large and small. It is the body that elects the members of the SC, International Court of Justice, ICC, etc. Hence it must have commensurate authority in certain key security areas. But it too must be reformed to make it more operational and effective.

It might be necessary that the endless and repetitive yearly "general debate" be reviewed to save time and costs. Its agenda must be reviewed to shorten it and make it more focused.

Commission on Human Rights

The premier human rights body, the Commission on Human Rights, has been much discredited and we all should share in the blame. It is far too simplistic or convenient for one group of countries to blame another for the almost collapse of the system.

Selectivity has not been a monopoly of a country or group. We have all been good practitioners of selectivity, focusing our attention on certain issues that are usually remote from our shores or do not collide with our friendships, alliances and interests. The victims are those on the receiving end of despotic regimes who are forgotten and silenced by us all.

But how can we be more responsive and effective in promoting and protecting human rights? Is public advocacy and denunciation the only and best way to promote human rights and protect the victims?

Or should we give more emphasis to active engagement and mediation? But is discreet
mediation enough to induce behavioral and policy changes? Should the High Commissioner for Human Rights be a mediator, a bridge builder between the state and the people, government and civil society, or a public advocate?

The idea of a new Human Rights Council is worthy of further study but like in other areas of human activity only political will and leadership will really advance the cause of human rights promotion and protection for no amount of structural reforms can substitute for political will and compassionate leadership.

However, assuming there is a consensus or a clear majority to disband the CHR and replace it with the HRC, extreme care has to be taken in order to prevent that the new body falls prey to the same conflicting interests and agendas that plague the CHR and that it becomes an instrument of certain advocacy groups with their own interests and agenda.

Peace Building Commission

Timor-Leste strongly supports the creation of a Peace Building Commission that would play a critical role in post-conflict situations. Timor-Leste shares the views of others that the proposal for a PBC should be considered as a priority item in the September High Level Event and agrees with some views regarding its possible composition. Besides the Bretton Woods Institutions, maybe other regional financial agencies should become members.

Maybe a Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation Group should be set up and be jointly chaired by the Presidents of the GA and SC and the SG, and comprising a limited number of “wise men and women” to be chosen from a pool of eminent persons, in and out of government, who would advise and act as envoys/mediators whenever their services are needed. This Group could be part of the UNSC or the office of the SG.

ECOSOC

ECOSOC must be reformed. It seems to duplicate or add little value to its 26 subsidiary bodies. I do not believe in expanding ECOSOC’s mandate into managing UN’s post-conflict activities.

The Security Council

In regard to the Security Council, it seems that there is a clear majority view that it must be
reformed, not only in terms of its expansion to make it more representative and reflective of current world realities, but also to be more adequately equipped to address the new security challenges that did not exist some 20 to 60 years ago.

The new security challenges are transnational and trans-border in nature and scope. They include foreign debt, poverty, currency speculation by unscrupulous individuals who have turned globalization into a global casino, ruining many economies; terrorism, nuclear and/or biological and chemical weapons trafficking by non-state actors; HIV/AIDS, and airborne contagious diseases that can decimate millions of peoples in record time and damage economies, etc. Should the SC deal with these complex security challenges? Or should HIV/AIDS, SARS, Avian Flu, etc be dealt with in the traditional way, only by health officials and WHO?

The aspiring SC members must accept that the status to which they aspire brings responsibilities and commitments. Hence I believe that SC members must make a firm commitment to shoulder the extra burden in terms of financial contribution and commitment to the ever-increasing demand for peacekeeping and peace-building missions.

A permanent member of the Security Council should not limit its contribution to peace keeping with eloquent rhetoric and yet refrain from sending in the troops necessary to back up its words. We are all capable of delivering eloquent speeches with apparent moral force. But we do not all have the same political will, moral courage and raw power that match our words.

Hence we must all display humility and a sense of realism in acknowledging our limitations and not aspire to too high fields than we can.

Aspiring SC members, permanent and non-permanent, should be countries with stable and open political systems, with effective credible national leaderships that inspire trust and respect in their respective regions and internationally. Does a country with a decrepit autocratic regime, a collapsing and failing economy and State, have much credibility as a guarantor of world peace?

My Government holds the view that the G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) should not be treated as "second class citizens" in relation to the original P5. If as we all assume there is a need for expansion of the number of permanent members, the four are natural candidates.
While the veto power should not be discarded too lightly, I wish to pose a simple question, should one single country continue to have the power to block decision even in cases of genocide or major humanitarian catastrophes? The lessons of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, Kosovo, Rwanda and Darfur, should compel us to reconsider the very negative implications of the veto power.

The major powers who are asking us to entrust them with the responsibility of securing peace in our world, we hope, will not betray this sacred trust by showing that they can work together in a mature way and hence the use of veto power might naturally fade away in some years.

My Government holds the view that proportional geographical representation remains a sine quo non-principle but so should be demographic and civilisational representation. This being so, Asia is the most under represented region in the UN system. Asia would remain the least represented region even with the possible addition of India and Japan in the expanded SC. Proportional geographic representation should not be distorted at the expense of demographic weight of each region.

Postponement of the debate and decision on SC reform

Should the General Assembly consider via way of vote the various proposals on the table, including the G4 Framework Resolution before September 2005?

I believe that no effort should be spared to forge the broadest possible consensus on such a critical issue. Hence, patience and prudence must be observed.

A debate on UN reform should be deferred to the month of November/December followed by a cooling-off period of a few weeks or months for consultation, reflection and a decision (vote or consensus) to be held only in the spring of 2006.

Timor-Leste fears that the clash of interests and views in regard to the Security Council reform could overshadow the 60th anniversary celebrations and more importantly have a negative impact on the war on poverty and Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Summit planned for September.

Timor-Leste supports the “G4” initiative because it believes that the four countries concerned cannot be excluded from a new expanded SC. It will support the “G4” Framework Resolution if
it is put to a vote but it hopes that more time is given for further consultation so that all views, concerns and interests are bridged in order to prevent a damaging split among the different proponents of UN reform.

Timor-Leste earnestly believes that the existing differences among the various countries are not insurmountable and given time a consensus can be reached.

The War on Poverty

Before concluding my remarks, I wish to touch on the fourth issue, one that will be on top of the 60th Anniversary Celebration of the United Nations next month and that is the fight against poverty.

The world is faced with a growing Aids pandemic, the epicentre of which is now shifting to Asia. Malaria and TB have been with us for many generations yet there is no real commitment of resources that will enable our scientists and societies to address these epidemics.

Developing countries, including three Asian neighbours, that cannot provide clean water for their people, clothe their poor; educate their children, opted for short cuts into super-power status by developing nuclear weapons.

Rich countries and others not so rich continue to produce and trade in conventional light weapons that exacerbate conflicts in volatile regions of the world.

On the other hand, I am saddened that the combined ODA of the rich industrialized countries does not exceed US$50 billion annually. Compare this with the more than US$300 billion in subsidies provided to their obsolete farms and industries.

Europe and the US should gradually eliminate all agriculture subsidies to farmers in the US and Europe that kill competition and market access for poor countries. I can understand the political difficulties faced by friends in Europe and US when dealing with the issue of subsidies. Hence, I believe that developing countries, the EU and US should be able to reach a reasonable compromise that will see the gradual ending of agriculture subsidies and other trade barriers. However, Europeans and Americans have legitimate concerns in regard to the practices of certain countries in the South who scream the loudest about market access and fair trade and yet fail to comply with international labour standards, continuing to tolerate exploitative labour
practices.

I applaud Prime Minister Tony Blair’s initiative in proposing a degree of debt elimination for some highly indebted countries. This is long overdue. However there has to be some firm criteria for any country to benefit from the debt pardon initiative, namely, the country concerned must have enacted reform laws and other legislation preventing the recurrence of corruption and waste. Countries must be compelled to accede to the core international human rights instruments and adapt their national laws to their international obligations. Corrupt and undemocratic regimes should not qualify for any benevolent debt pardon.

May God the Almighty and the Merciful bless you all.
The Future International
Cooperation and New Paradigm

Hidetoshi KITAWAKI
Professor, Dean of Graduate School of Regional Development Studies, Toyo University
Researcher, Center for Sustainable Development Studies, Toyo University
1. 序

ホルタ大臣、長谷川代表、そしてご列席の皆様、本日このような場で「国際協力とニューパラダイム」という非常に高尚なタイトルについてお話ができるという点について非常に光栄に思っております。

私は国際政治をやっている者ではございません。また、国連の平和構築に関係している者でもございません。私は開発途上国の現場、特に汚いところ、水がないところ、トイレがないところ、ごみ処理がないところ、そういうところの現場をこの足で歩いてそして幾分かでも改善していこうと、そういうプロジェクトに携わり、これを実践して来たものです。このコーヒーブレイクの時間に外出パネルをご覧になった方があるかと思いますが、その中の写真の大部分は私が海外の現場で環境衛生の改善のプロジェクトに携わったときに撮ったものです。こういう現場中心主義という私がこの場で「ニューパラダイム」という非常に国際政治に近いような話をするというのは、いささか場違いかもしれませんが、しかし、私のような途上国に行って井戸を掘ったり、トイレを作ったり、そういう目から見て国際協力というものがどういう風に映っているか、また何が必要なのかということを、見当違いかもしれないけれども、少しでも今日、お話できればと思って見てこうというテーマとさせていただきました。
今日これからお話しする内容ですけれども、本日 4 人のプレゼンターがいまだに 3 人の方々がお話になりました。その内容の総括を含めて今日お話していければと思っております。

2. 国際共生社会研究センターの概要

今日の私の講演内容のうちのうち、第一点ですが、国際共生社会研究センターの概要ということをあげております。私は国際共生社会研究センターを今日、代表いたしましてお話させていただくわけですが、ご列席の皆様方の中にはセンターがどういうものかご存じない方がいらっしゃるかもしれません。そこでこのセンターの概要の説明という点を盛り込ませていただきました。そして本日のキーノートスピーチ、最初にお話しいただいた塩川総長、それから長谷川代表、そしてホルタ大臣、このお三方のお話に触れまして今日のメインテーマであります、「今後の国際協力とニューバラダイム」につなげていきたいと思っております。

我々の国際共生社会研究センターは、フィールドでの活動というものにかかわる重点を置いております。その一環として東ティモールに今までに 2 回ミッションを派遣したのですが、その中で今年の 2 月に派遣した調査団が行った調査調査の内容も写真を交えて紹介させていただきたいと思っております。また、国際共生社会研究センターは、今年度で最終年度を迎える予定ですが、我々は、その後引き続き活動に発展した研究を続けていきたいと思っております。その内容と目標を最後にご紹介したいと思っております。

第一点目に、国際共生社会研究センターはどういうものかという説明を最初にさせていただきます。この国際共生社会研究センターは文部科学省の持っております補助スキーム、「オープンリサーチセンター整備事業」によって設立されたもので東洋大学大学院国際地域学研究科を母体としております。存続期間は 2001 年度から 2005 年度ということで、今年度が一応の最終年度ということです。

この英語名ですが、"Center for Sustainable Development Studies" としました。日本語のタイトル名にある「共生」という言葉は研究員一同、非常に大事にしている言葉です。先進国と途上国の共生、また、違った意見を持つグループの共生などいろんな意味がありますので、日本語の方では「共生」という言葉をセンター名に入れましたが、英語では「共 生」を表すのが難しいので、"Sustainable Development Studies" としております。私のこれからの話の中で、「共生」という言葉が度々出てきます。そのキーワードを頭の中において話を聞かせていただければと思います。

そのセンターの内容ですが、研究、それからコミュニケーション点としましては、ニュースレター、本の出版、国際シンポジウム等による情報公開活動、そしてフィールドでの活動等を一生懸命行っているというところです。センターが 5 年間取り組んでおります研究プロジェクトは 3 つあります。
まず、アジアの大都市圏、先ほどホルタ大臣から、アジアの人口は世界の半分以上というお話がありました。人口が多いアジア大都市をいかに環境整備して整えていくかということがひとつの大きな研究テーマです。

また、そもそも「環境共生社会論」というものは何になるのか、「環境共生」とは何になるのか、そういう後味も含めてではありませんが、その環境共生社会論を体系化しようという研究も行われ、それに関する2冊の本を既に出版しました。

それから地域開発データベースと計画作成・評価支援ということで、最近使えるようになりました情報機器、コンピュータ、こういうものを駆使して地域開発を支援していこうということをやっております。これが本センターの3つの大きな研究テーマです。

3. 本日のキーノートスピーチを振り返って

次に本日の二番目の内容に入ってきたいのですが、本日のキーノートスピーチのお三方のお話を振り返ってみますと、塚川正十郎総長の方からは、国連が若千、弱体化してみたのではないか、地域がブロック化してきたのではないか、そして付き合える国と付き合ってはどうか、という強いご提案がありました。その中には、日本のODAの使い方が充分機能していないのではないか、というご指摘もございました。

それに対して、長谷川代表の方から、長い国連勤務経験をもとに「いや国連はそうではない、非常にきめ細かい対応をして東ティモール等で非常に成果をあげているのだ。」というご指摘が丁寧にございました。拝聴しておりまして感動したスピーチでございました。

さらにホルタ大臣からは「東ティモールと国際協力」というタイトルで、東ティモールの中におけるサスペンストーリーで、そしてどういう経緯で今に至っているかというお話がございました。また、国連改革についての貴重なお話をありがとうございました。

さらに余談でありますが、東ティモールのコーヒーの非常に興味深いお話、ありがとうございました。実は日本には「草の根技術協力」というスキームがあります。それは、JICA（国際協力機構）の資金でNGOが東ティモールの中でアグロフォレストリー、つまり森林を育成すると同時にその木の下でコーヒーの木を育てるというプロジェクトです。この中にも関係の方がいらっしゃるかもしれませんが、我々もそのプロジェクトを陰ながら応援しているというところです。

4. 今後の国際協力とニューパラダイム

そういう議論を踏まえまして、三番目のトピック、今後の国際協力とニューパラダイムという点に入ってまいりたいと思います。
4.1 対立の論理

今日、私は具体的な話をするのではなくひとつの大きな仮説を提供したいと思っております。今後の国際協力においては、「対立から共生」への移り変わりが非常に大事ではないかと思ってお話をするわけです。今まで紛争がいろいろな地域で起こっております。この紛争が起こる原因はなんだろうかと考えると、一つ考えられますのは「対立」ということではないかと思います。私は人生経験、非常に浅くはありませんが、いろいろ見ておりますと、人間はどうしても「グループ」を作ります。これはおそらく自分を守るためではないでしょうか。野生動物に例えるのは失礼かもしれませんが、草食動物などは、集まって自分を守ります。「グループ」を作って自分を守っているうちに自分たちのグループが正しいと信じ、そして自分たちのグループの利益のために行動する。すると、利益がぶつかる場合には、競い合ってそこで紛争が起きたり、さまざまな対立が起こるということになるかと思います。その「対立」ということばを国際共生研究センターの名前の「共生」の逆の言葉とここでは捉えてお話をしていきたいと思います。「対立」とは何でしょうか。まずイデオロギーの対立があります。民族間の対立、宗教の違い、国家間の経済格差や、貧富の差が対立を招くということはご承知のこととおりです。その結果紛争が起きたり、環境破壊と健康問題が起きたり、あらゆる世の中の問題に繋がっていくわけです。そうすると、今後国際協力のあり方としまして、さまざまな対立の軸を解消する方向に持って行き共生社会を実現するということが国際協力のあり方ではないかと考えるわけです。

4.2 近年の世界の変化

① 対立軸の変化

今までの世界の変化と対立の軸の変化を見ていきますと、今までの講演者の中からもご指摘があったように戦争が終わるたびに対立の軸が変わるということがいえるとかと思いましますが、第二次世界大戦が終わってイデオロギー対立による冷戦の時代になりました。そのイデオロギー対立が自分たちのグループの支援、援助をするようになってきました。

ところが、1989年末に、冷戦が終わってしまって、今まで計画経済をとっている国が、自由主義陣営的に経済的に参入しました。そして同時に自由主義経済同士でブロック化が強化され、EU、NAFTA、WTO、拡大ASEANなどいろんな形で経済のブロック化が起こって来ました。その結果、イデオロギー対立から経済対立へ、対立の軸が変化してきたと思いまます。また、それ以外に非常にいろんな世界の変化が出てまいります。

すなわち交通の発達によって時間軸が短くなりました。また、情報の発達で時間軸が短くなりました。フィールドを歩いている経験から言いますと、パングラデシュの田舎を調査しておると、非常に大きな違いを感じます。十年前、村には電話がなく、我々が調査する時は、まず伝え令を走らせたものです。人力車が輸送手段ですから、人力車の運転手さんに料金を支払い、いつここに行くから待っていてくれという伝令を走らせたものです。それが1990年ぐらいのパングラデシュの田舎でした。最近、村に携帯電話が出現しました。
もちろんマイクロクレジットによって誰かがその携帯電話を買い、それを使って電話屋さんをしているのが電話のある理由なのですが、こういうバンクレデシュの世の中を見ていても、通信が発達したことがわかります。情報産業が発達し、交通も段々便利になると非常に変わってきた世の中になってきました。そしてさまざまな要因が絡み合って、対立の軸が複雑化しているというのが現在の状況かと思います。

2. 情報の流れの変化

次に情報の流れもさせていただきたいと思います。私も、インターネットを使う機会が非常に増えたくてわけではありませんが、このインターネットというのは、アメリカの軍事技術であったと聞いております。一箇所に核攻撃があっても、ネットで繋がっていれば、他の場所のコンピュータが生きていれば全体として機能するというわけではないかと思いますが、冷戦が終結することによって世界に解放され世界中で使えるようになった。開放すると同時に、英語が世界語になって、デファクトスタンダードといいますか、英語が世界の共通語になってしまいましょう。フランス語はもう共通語ではなくなってしまったわけです。このように情報を掴むグループが対立に勝つということになってきました。「ネットワークスパイダー」という言葉があります。いろんな情報が、ちょっと蜘蛛の巣の中心に集まってくるときにその蜘蛛の巣の中心にいる人が、情報を握り勝つということです。そういう「ネットワークスパイダー」がだんだんと優位に立つ時代になってきました。

それから我々、途上国で仕事をしておりまして、よく聴く言葉に「アングレア」という言葉があります。雨傘のことですね。傘には骨がたくさんついておりまして、その骨の一本一本にいろんな組織がぶら下がっていると考えていたければよいのですし、会議をする時にいろんな組織を招集し、ちょうど自分がしててる傘にいろんな組織をぶら下げてそこでの情報を吸い上げるようにする。これが「アングレア」です。

このように、戦い方が変わってきました。いろんな情報を、「ネットワークスパイダー」、「アングレア」で集めて、そして戦いに勝とうとします。この場合の戦いは必ずしも紛争ではないのです。経済の戦いにおいては特にこれが顕著に現れております。そういう情報の流れの変化に伴って、国際協力も変わるのではないかでしょうか、つまり、当然ながら情報提供も重要な国際協力です。例えば、東ティモールで立派なリーダーがいて、きめの細かい国連による支援があったと、平和構築がうまくいったような事例を伝え広めていくということも国際協力かと思います。ある国の情報を別の国に伝え、できるだけうまく活用していただく。これが情報の流れが激しかった時代の国際協力のひとつのあり方であるかもしれません。

4.3 国際協力の意味（スライド10）

①国際協力に関わるいろいろな言葉

そこで、国際協力という言葉の意味をここで洗いなおしてみたいと思います。国際協力
に関係してあります、いろいろな言葉を比べてみることにします。
例えば、「援助」や「支援」。これはどちらかというと援助する側と援助される側の上下関係を表したような言葉ではないだろうかと思います。それに対して、例えば、「国際貢献」とか、「国際協力」というややニュートラルな言葉もありますが、「交流」、「共生」という対等な関係に近いような言葉もありますが、段々とこの下の対等な関係を持っていくというのが理想ではないかと思います。また、国際協力に対して、「民間協力」という言葉を使っておられる NGO もいらっしゃいます。よく作ったなと思いますけれども、民間レベルの国際協力、民間援助団体 NGO による国際協力も最近ではなくてならないものです。それから法政大の後藤先生の言葉かと思いますが、ODA を「公的発展支援」というふうに語られている場合もあります。こういう国際協力のいろいろな意味を並べて書いてみると、一つのキーワードとしてやはり「共生」ということばが出るのではないかと思います。
我々の国際共生社会研究センターでは、この対等な関係に近くなるような努力を国際協力で行うということを目指しています。

②日本にとっての「国際協力」の意味の変化（スライド 11）
最初の塩川総長のほうから、歴史的背景のお話がございましたけれども、第二次大戦に日本が負けてから、日本は援助の受入国でした。世界銀行等から借りたお金を返し終わったのが、1990 年ということですから、戦後かなりいろんな援助を受け入れていたわけです。それが戦後復興期です。その後日本が戦争で迷惑をかけたいろいろな国に、戦後賠償という形で国際協力がスタートします。しかし、これはお詫びですから、日本が自分の国益を重視するという風潮はこの時代からあまりありませんでした。この歴史的経緯から日本は国益重視という国際協力をあまりしてきませんでした。その代わり、人道援助というところが若干強いのではないかと考えております。
戦後賠償以外に過去の歴史をみますと、国際協力の意味が西側先進国からの技術導入と似た意味で使われていた時期もあります。昔は、日本がいろいろな先進国とお付き合いをして先進国を学ぼうと、国際協力していただいているといってもいいのですが、このいろんな技術導入を受けまして、日本が経済的な大国になりました。そして大戦になった後、自分自身が今度は先進国として途上国援助を行ってきた今に至っているわけです。さて、この後が問題です。この後が今後の国際協力とニューパラダイムともいう点につながるかと思いますが、今後途上国と対等な関係にある「共生」にまでいくのであろうか、それともその前の段階のところで止まるのだろうか。先ほどのスライド（スライド 10）でありますますが、この援助・支援の段階から貢献・協力を経て交流・共生に行くかどうか、この辺のところをこれからセンターでも研究していく必要があるかと考えております。

③国際協力とインセンティブ（スライド 12）
さて次に国際協力とインセンティブという点をお話したいと思いますが、そもそもなぜ
国際協力をやるのか、何が国際協力を動かす原動力であろうか。私は非常に自分自身、プラクティカルな人間だと思っておりますけれども、何かインセンティブがないと人間は行動を動かさないのではないかと思っております。そしてそのインセンティブとは何でしょうか。究極的には人間の安全保障というところにも関係しておりますが、生命だから、安全は人間がもっと大事だと思うもので、これを守ることがインセンティブになるかと思います。

国益の観点からしますと、資源が欲しい、石油が欲しいから、資源が採れる国を援助するなどのケースがあります。資源や自国の経済発展のために援助をするということは当然、国にとってのインセンティブになるかと思います。

それから社会的なインセンティブとしても、文化を広めたい、言語を守りたい、信仰を守りたい、というところもインセンティブになるかと思います。フランスなどが、フランス語の言語を守って文化を広めるためにODAを広くやっているということはご承知のとおりです。

そういうものを、もう少し別の角度から見ますと、通常、政府開発援助といわれますODAは国民の税金を使ったものです。だから、インセンティブとしては国益につながる必要がある。資源が欲しいというようなあからさまな国益でなくても日本に対する印象がよくなるというような間接的な国益でもよいのですし、日本の税金を使ったODAの場合は、日本の国益というインセンティブを重視しなければなりません。

それから、私も若干関係しておりますが、民間援助団体（NGO）による活動は、何をインセンティブとしているのでしょうか。これはNGOのかたは、いや違うというご意見もあるかもしれませんが、例えば、援助、国際協力をして達成感がある、それから正義感に駆られてそういう活動をすることもひとつのインセンティブではないかと考えております。

それから、国際協力という中で、近年のアクター、またはひとつのステークホルダーとして、登場してきているのが、民間企業です。広い意味的には、民間企業が行う活動も国際協力であるというふうに私は思っておりますが、この民間企業の場合は企業利益がそのインセンティブになるかと思います。

これらそれぞれの主体が別々にこのインセンティブを追求していくという状態で果たしてうまくいくのか、相手側の立場、被援助国の立場はどうなのか、ということを考えてみたいのです。被援助国の便益、援助側のインセンティブが共に達成できるwin-winの考え方が必要です。どちらかがhappyで、片方がunhappyであるというのはよくない、両方ともhappyである。このように両方happyでないと長い付き合いができないんではないかと思います。"win-win"は時々聴く言葉ですが、これが一つの「共生」のあり方ではないかと考えております。

①国際協力のステークホルダー（スライド13）
さきほど、国際協力のステークホルダーということを申し上げましたが、その歴史的な
流れを少しみていきますと、最初、国連国際機関、それから二国間援助機関、その後 NGO、市民、大学が登場して、南南協力においては当然被援助国も援助する側に回るということになります。

この後がまた問題なのです。これが、純粋な民間ビジネスでもやはり、相手国に対しての便益があれば、国際協力に含まれるような時代になっているのではないかと思います。例えば、ひとつの技術を広い地域に普及させる時、ODA では限界があります。NGO でも限界があります。私は、先々週はアフリカのモザンビークという国におりましたけれども、そこでは援助で掘った井戸に手押しポンプが付けられています。そのポンプが壊れたら供給するルートが十分でない。援助で行ったら、100 個か 200 個しか付かないから商売になりにくいのです。民間ビジネスとしてきちんと住民が代金を支払って、1000 個、10000 個にポンプを買うところまで発展しないと、うまくいかないと思います。広範囲に発展させるためには、民間の力が不可欠かと思います。ただし、あとで申し上げます国の発展段階の低い時期にこの民間ビジネスを安易に受け入れてしまいましょうと、経済的に植民地になってしまう場合があるかもしれません。東南アジアのいろんな国で、中華系企業が非常に経済を牛耳っていくと新たな対立を招き、いろんな国にとって必ずしも happy な状況ではないかと思います。発展段階に応じて民間ビジネスとお付き合いをすることも今後必要になってくるかと思います。

4．4 国の発展段階（スライド 14）

途上国の発展段階ですが、ひとつの仮説を立ててみました。国の発展段階、特に紛争最終結団とか、今回の津波のような大災害を受けたような地域から、発展した国に戻るために三つのステップがあると仮定しました。これは、混沌つまり chaos、それから変遷（transition）、発展（development）の三段階です。例えばイラクのような国は、まだ混沌の段階にあるかもしれません。東ティモールはおそらく変遷の段階であろうかと思います。発展の段階にある国は例えば、タイのように順調に発展を遂げている国かと思います。そしてこの三つの段階の対し、それぞれ国際協力の対応の仕方が異って来るのであらうかと思います。

特にその三つの中でも、変遷の段階にある国は国際社会が重点的にサポートする必要がありませんように。長谷川代表の国連をはじめ、いろんな主体が国際協力を行っておりますが、この変遷段階にある国への援助または、国際協力の手を緩めると混沌に逆戻りする場合もあるのではないでしょうか。この段階をしっかりサポートする必要があるというのが、我々の国際共生社会研究センターの一貫した意見です。そのそれぞれの段階に必要な援助のタイプ、国際協力のタイプは、混沌の国ではまず、国連などによる平和構築が必要なのではないか、それから変遷の段階では、二国間援助機関等によるインフラ整備、NGO による生活支援、そして最後に発展の段階に達しますと、今度は公民連携や民間ビジネスなどに移行していくのではないかと考えております。
さて本日のテーマでもあります「国際協力のニューバラダイムに向けて」ということで
すが、我々、国際共生社会研究センターでは、今後「対立」から「共生」を国際協力のニューバラダイムと位置づけて活動を継続したいと思います。また、混沌から発展へと至る過程の変遷期の研究を重要視したいとも思います。変遷期の国のフィールドとして、東ティモールを重要なパートナーとして今後も関係を持ち続けたいというふうに思っております。
実はこの 11 月、東ティモール国立大学の先生を国際共生社会研究センターにお招きいたしまして、共同研究をスタートさせることになっております。

5. 東ティモール環境調査（2005.2）（スライド 17）

この東ティモールにおける我々のフィールドワークのことについて若干の説明をさせて
いきたいと思います。今年の 2 月に東ティモールにミッションを出しました。何をしに行
ったかと申しますと、我々だ単に研究しているだけではうまくない、できれば国際協力
機構、JICA のような援助機関のプロジェクトを発掘して、そのプロジェクトの後方支援を
したいとの意図で調査をしました。私は衛生工学をやっている者ですから、その対象は当
然限られますが、水供給、トイレ作り、廃棄物処理などの状況を見に行ったりました。
さて、東ティモールの写真、いくつか撮ってきたものを紹介いたしますが、非常に自然
がきれいな所で観光資源になりそうなものもたくさんあります（スライド 18）。その中で日
本の NGO 等がマングローブの植林をしたりしています（スライド 19）。また RESPECTO
（退役軍人の方々の生活支援プロジェクト）により、植林をしている NGO 等の活動もあり
ます（スライド 20）。

一方で、環境に目を向けますと、未だ手が充分回ってないところもあります。川の中に
廃棄物が流れ出ていたり、川の水が汚染されていたりする、こういうところは我々が今
後援助プロジェクトとして作っていく必要があるかと思います。

スライド 22 は地方の水供給です。先ほど大臣からもお話がありましたが、援助により水
供給等の大規模プロジェクトが行われていないようなところでの水供給をいかに改善して
いくかは依然問題です。

それからこれは公衆トイレ（スライド 23）ですが、水浴び場と、洗濯場と、トイレが一
緒になったシステムを田舎では普及させています。

それからこれは廃棄物の処分場です（スライド 24）。こういうところに我々がお手伝いす
る場面が出てくるのではないかと考えております。

6. 国際共生社会研究センターの今後（スライド 25）

さて最後のスライドですが、国際共生社会研究センターは、最初申し上げましたように
2001 年から 2005 年で終わります。しかし、我々センターの活動を 3 年間延長する方向で
努力をしております。もし、延長が可能になればどういうことをしたいかといますと、もちろん現センターの活動の継続と強化、これを行います。

しかし、新たな取り組みと致しまして、東ティモールをはじめとする戦争終結国などの変遷期の共生社会の実現の支援、地域的にはアフリカ、それからトピック的には農村開発、それから、また北東アジア、最終的な発展段階の国では公民連携等、いろいろなトピックを盛り込んだ研究を進めていきたいと考えております。非常に幅が広くて ambitious なテーマかと考えておりますが、始めなければ実現できないと思います。東ティモールに植えられたコーヒーの木が実をつけるのは、私の記憶が正しければ、3年間かかかります。そして出荷できるようになるには5年かかかります。東ティモールをはじめいろんなフィールドに我々の研究の種を植えて、そしてそれが育つのに3年かかったら5年かかったら、我々としてはそれを始めて、続けて行きたいと考えております。今後も国際共生社会研究センターの活動にご理解とご支援を頂きますようお願い申し上げます。どうもありがとうございます。
今後の国際協力とニューパラダイム
The future international cooperation and new paradigm
東洋大学国際共生社会研究センター 北村秀敏
Hidetoshi Kitawaki, Researcher, Center for Sustainable Development Studies, Toyo University

講演内容
1. 国際共生社会研究センターの概要
2. 本日のキーノートスピーチを振り返って
3. 今後の国際協力とニューパラダイム
4. 東ティモール環境調査(2005.2)
5. 国際共生社会研究センターの今後

センターの主要研究プロジェクト
①アジア大都市圏地域を対象とした定住環境の形成・整備
②環境共生社会論の体系化
③地域開発データベースと計画作成・評価支援シミュレータの開発・整備

2. 本日のキーノートスピーチを振り返って
- 坂川正十郎氏「日本の国際化と国際協力」
- 長谷川祐弘氏「国造りにおいて国際社会が果たすべき役割」
- ラモス・ホルタ氏「東ティモールと国際協力」

3. 今後の国際協力とニューパラダイム
「対立から共生へ」を切り口として今後の国際協力のあり方を考えてみたい。

(1) 対立の論理
人間は「グループ」を作り自分を守る。
自分のグループが正しいと考える。
グループの利益のために行動する。
グループ間で競い合い、対立する。
↓
さまざまな対立が生まれる。
対立の軸:
イデオロギー、民族、宗教、経済格差…
↓
紛争、環境破壊、健康問題…につながる
↓
対立の軸の解消と共生社会の実現とが今後の国際協力のあり方ではないか。

(2)近年の世界の変化
①対立の軸の変化
1945年：第二次世界大戦の終結と冷戦へ
1989年：冷戦の終結と経済のブロック化強化
地域統合（EU、NAFTA、WTO、拡大ASEAN）
イデオロギー対立から経済対立へ
交通の発達で空間軸が縮小
情報産業の発達で時間軸が縮小
複数の要因が絡み合い対立の軸の複雑化

情報の流れの変化
冷戦の終結によるインターネットの開放と変化
情報の流れも「グループ」が「対立」に勝つ
多くが「ネットワークスバイダ」を目指す
また「アンプレ」を目指し情報を吸い上げる
↓
情報提供も重要な今後の国際協力
↓
（東ティモールの平和構築の事例を伝えるのも国際協力）

(3)国際協力の意味
①国際協力に関わるいろいろな言葉
援助、支援…上下関係
貢献、協力…ややニュートラル
交流、共生…対等関係
「民間協力」を使うNGOもある
ODAを「公的発展支援」と訳す人もいる
「共生」が国際協力の一つのキーワード

日本の持つ「国際協力」の意味の変化
戦後復興期：援助受け入れ国
↓
戦後賠償（お詫び）
（この歴史から国益を重視する風潮はない）
↓
西側先進国からの技術導入
↓
自身が「先進国」として途上国援助
↓
今後途上国と「共生」が可能か？

(3)国際協力とインセンティブ
国際協力の原動力を「インセンティブ」と仮定
インセンティブとは？
究極的には生命・安全 現実的には資源・経済
社会的には文化・言語、信仰など
国民の税金によるODA→国益（直接・間接）
市民の発意によるNGO活動→達成感・正義感等
民間企業による活動→企業利益（直接・間接）
非援助側の恩恵と共に援助側のインセンティブを評価
win-win（共生）でなければ長い付き合いができない
④国際協力のステークホルダー
初期には：国連・国際機関、二国間援助機関
↓
民間を巻き込み多様化し：NGO、市民、大学等
↓
南々協力等で：被援助国も
↓
今後は純粋な「民間ビジネス」も「国際協力」へ
（広範囲に発展させるには民間の力が不可欠）
ただしそい発展段階で受入ると経済構成地に

④国発展段階
センターでは今後紛争集団国や大規模災害
から復興し発展する過程を次の三段階に区
分して研究したい。

混沌→変遷(変革)→発展
chaos→transition→development

変遷段階の国は混沌に戻らないように最も
支援が必要であり、今後の国際協力の重点
支援対象である。

①「混沌」の段階
国連などによる平和構築が必要
平和維持軍、緊急援助、離民対策など

②「変遷(変革)」の段階
二国間援助機関によるインフラ整備
NGOによる生活支援など

③「発展」の段階
公民主権、民間ビジネスなども可能になる

国際協力のニューパラダイムに向けて

・センターでは今後「対立から共生へ」を国際
協力のニューパラダイムと位置づけて活動を
継続したい。

・「混沌」から「発展」へ至る過程の「変遷期」の
研究を重視したい。

・東ティモールを重要フィールドの一つとして
今後も協力関係を持ち続けたい

4. 東ティモール現地調査（環境分野）

・日程：2005年2月20日～2月27日
・調査団構成：研究員2名、コンサルタント1名、
学生1名
・目的：援助プロジェクトの発掘
・調査主体：国際共生社会研究センター
（協力：(社)国際厚生事業団）
・調査項目：水供給、衛生設備、廃棄物処理等
5. 国際共生社会研究センターの今後

- センターの延長（2006年度〜2008年度）に向けて努力
- 現センター（2001年度〜2005年度）活動の継続と強化
- 新たな取り組み課題例
  ①紛争終結国などの変革期における共生社会実現支援
  ②アフリカでの共生社会実現のための研究成果の実践
  ③発展途上国の農業・農村における共生社会形成
  ④東アジアにおける国をこえた共生社会形成
  ⑤途上国での公民連携による共生社会形成手法研究
II. 研究会資料

Workshop Documents
東洋大学国際共生社会研究センター
Center for Sustainable Development Studies, Toyo University

研究会
Workshop

1. 開催日 2005年9月8日（木）
2. 場所 群馬県邑楽郡板倉町 東洋大学板倉キャンパス 第2会議室
3. 講師および議事
   (1) 開会(13:00)
       藤井敏信（国際地域学部長、司会）
   (2) センター長挨拶（松尾友麿学長・センター長）(13:05)
   (3) 講演「東ティモールの過去と現在」(13:10)
       Topic: East Timor: The Past and Present
       ラモス・ホルタ（東チモール民主共和国外務・協力上級大臣）
   (4) 質疑応答（13:50）
   (5) 閉会(14:30)
▲ 研究会開始前、国際地学部教授会メンバーとの記念撮影（前列右から２人目がホルタ大臣、同中央が長谷川国連事務総長特別代表）

▲ 松尾学長からホルタ大臣への記念品の贈呈
▲ 研究会のホルタ大臣による講演

▲ 研究会における質疑応答
▲ 研究会におけるホルタ大臣（右）と長谷川国連事務総長特別代表

▲ 板倉キャンパスでの記念撮影（左からホルタ大臣秘書官、長谷川国連事務総長特別代表、松尾学長、ホルタ大臣、北脇教授、金子教授、藤井教授）
III. 東洋大学国際共生社会研究センター概要
Outline of Center for Sustainable Development Studies
Toyo University

〒374-0193 群馬県邑楽郡板倉町泉野1-1-1
電話・Fax 0276-82-9140
1-1-1 Izumino, Itakura-machi, Ohra-gun, Gunma 374-0193, Japan
Tel/Fax +81-276-82-9140
URL: http://rdgs.itakura.toyo.ac.jp/ORC/
e-mail: orc@itakura.toyo.ac.jp
東洋大学国際共生社会研究センター
Center for Sustainable Development Studies, Toyo University

東洋大学大学院国際地域学研究科では、文部科学省の「私立大学学術研究高度化推進事業」を受けたオープン・リサーチ・センターとして、2001年11月に「国際共生社会研究センター」を設立した。「共生社会」の実現に向けての、多角的な研究・専門家育成の場となる。

研究センターは、3つの研究プロジェクトから構成される。

研究プロジェクト1 アジア大都市圏地域を対象とした定住環境の形成・整備

地域社会が急速に変容しているアジア大都市では、都市と農村の一体的開発、安定した自立的な地域社会の形成、その持続的な発展が求められる。この大都市圏を対象に、人的・物的・環境資源の活用による、定住環境の形成を日本の地域開発事例と比較しつつ追求する。特に「定住環境と混住」をキーワードにしつつ、現地コミュニティとの交流を通して研究を深める。

研究プロジェクト2 環境共生社会論の体系化

環境共生社会という概念を体系化すべく、都市機能、安全、エネルギー、教育という切り口から攻める。環境を汚染する物と浄化する物の両者の存在する都市機能、自然及び事故災害からの安全性、今後予想される発展途上国でのエネルギー大量消費による環境汚染、そしてこれらの情報を後世に伝える教育といった視点から考える。

研究プロジェクト3 地域開発データベースと計画作成・評価支援シミュレータの開発整備

発展途上国では、環境共生型地域開発が緊急課題であるが、そのための計画のあり方や、データについては、十分に整備されていない。そこで本研究では、現地の行政、専門家及びその他関係者が主体的に環境開発を行う際に必要とされる計画策定及び計画評価のためのツールとしての、計画・評価支援シミュレーションモデルの開発を行う。
Center for Sustainable Development Studies
Toyo University

“Center for Sustainable Development Studies” was established in Graduate School of Regional Development Studies, Toyo University in November 2001. The center is subsidized as an Open Research Center by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

The objective of the center is to find out schemes for actualizing the “Sustainable Development” in the developing countries. Our center consists of 3 different projects.

1) Strategic Studies on Sustainable Development of Human Settlements in Asian Mega-Cities

In Asian Mega-Cities, regional and interregional transformation is taking place in diversified ways in its process and its spatial relationship with the local communities. In order to contain such a situation to bearable levels, development of communities provided with sustainable environment should be encouraged, where urban and peripheral rural areas will be hopefully either integrated as united units of communities or organized through communication and other network systems.

To analyze the formation of those regional developments with use of human and material resources of these regions is one of the objectives. Our research also is to analyze comparatively with the cases of regional development in Japan.

2) Conceptual Formulation of Environmentally Coexistent Society

It will be required for the regional/urban development in the 21st century to pay more attention to environmental benignity both for human beings and natural resources. For the actual solution of environmental problems, we have to formulate common understandings of environmental elements and their relationships in our development policies.

Project No.2 is expected to examine and present the concept of “Conceptual Formulation of Environmentally Coexistent Society”. Four study fields such as urban function, safety, energy and education are prepared as a beginning part of this study.

3) Development of a Data-Base for a Planning and Simulation Model for Sustainable Regional Development

In the progress of information technology, very many databases for social, geological and infrastructure development projects have been developed in the planning sectors. It is true, however, that there are only limited data in developing countries and that the construction of the data base itself should be a big challenge in selection and collection of usable data. As for the usage of the data base, it is important to proceed with environmental impact assessment at the very early stage of the development project building and evaluation of the project.

The process and procedure of the assessment is changing now from a rather separate checking function of projects to building a comprehensive development plan that is to be
acceptable to both public and developers in the aspects of related environmental issues. It is reasonable to assume the recent change in the project-building scheme as illustrated in Figure 3, and a more comprehensive plan should be proposed, depending on requests from the public and developers. In this project-building step, the simulation model could be introduced to facilitate communication between people concerned about the project.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>名前</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>専門分野/Profession</th>
<th>e-mail-address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>藤井 敏信</td>
<td>Toshinobu FUJI</td>
<td>都市計画 Urban Planning</td>
<td><a href="mailto:t-fujii@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">t-fujii@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>北島 秀敏</td>
<td>Hitoshi KITAWAKI</td>
<td>途上国環境協力 Environmental Cooperation for Developing Countries</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kitawaki@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">kitawaki@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>坂元 晋一</td>
<td>Koichi SAKAMOTO</td>
<td>開発経済学 Development Economics</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ksaka@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">ksaka@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>高橋 一男</td>
<td>Kazuo TAKAHASHI</td>
<td>社会学 Sociology</td>
<td><a href="mailto:taka@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">taka@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>安相政</td>
<td>Sang Kyung AN</td>
<td>都市計画 Urban and Regional Planning</td>
<td><a href="mailto:an@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">an@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>伊藤徹哉</td>
<td>ITO Tetsuya</td>
<td>研究助手 Research Associate</td>
<td><a href="mailto:tetsu@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp">tetsu@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>七五三木 智子</td>
<td>Tomoko SHIMEGI</td>
<td>PRA Project Research Assistant</td>
<td><a href="mailto:dr0300056@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp">dr0300056@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>秋谷 公博</td>
<td>Kimihito AKIYA</td>
<td>PRA Project Research Assistant</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kimihiro@cj9.so-net.ne.jp">kimihiro@cj9.so-net.ne.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>隈 志勇</td>
<td>ZANG Zhiyong</td>
<td>PRA Project Research Assistant</td>
<td><a href="mailto:dr0500035@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp">dr0500035@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 王 博        | OU Haku    | PRA Project Research Assistant | }

環境共生社会論の体系化（プロジェクト2）

Conceptual Formulation of Environmentally Coexistent Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>名前</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>専門分野/Profession</th>
<th>e-mail-address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>太田 勝敏</td>
<td>Katsutoshi OHTA</td>
<td>都市交通計画 Urban Transportation Planning</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kohta@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">kohta@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>長瀧 元</td>
<td>Hajime NAGAHAMA</td>
<td>社会学 Sociology</td>
<td><a href="mailto:nagahama@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">nagahama@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>古田 猛彦</td>
<td>Tomihiko FURUTA</td>
<td>安全管理 Safe Management</td>
<td><a href="mailto:tfuruta@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">tfuruta@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>藤木 三生</td>
<td>Mitsuo USUKI</td>
<td>環境教育論・エコツーリズム Study of Environmental Sustainability</td>
<td><a href="mailto:usuki@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">usuki@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>久留島 守広</td>
<td>Morihiro KURUSHIMA</td>
<td>エネルギー・資源論 Study of Energy and Resource</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kurui@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">kurui@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>佐々木 宏茂</td>
<td>HiroshiGE SASAKI</td>
<td>リゾート開発論 Study of Resort Development</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sasaki@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">sasaki@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>竹園 健史</td>
<td>Shunshi MATSUZONO</td>
<td>旅行産業論 Study of Tourism Industry</td>
<td><a href="mailto:matsuz@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">matsuz@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>齋藤 伸</td>
<td>Shin SAITO</td>
<td>PRA Project Research Assistant</td>
<td><a href="mailto:dr0300025@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp">dr0300025@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

地域開発データベースと計画作成・評価支援シミュレータの開発・整備（プロジェクト3）

Development of a Data-Base for a Planning and Simulation Model for Sustainable Regional Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>名前</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>専門分野/Profession</th>
<th>e-mail-address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>橋本 蒼太郎</td>
<td>Zentaro HASHIMOTO</td>
<td>環境政策 Environmental Policy</td>
<td><a href="mailto:zenhashi@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">zenhashi@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>松尾 友枝</td>
<td>Tomonori MATSUO</td>
<td>環境計画 Environmental Planning</td>
<td><a href="mailto:matsuo@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">matsuo@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>金子 彰</td>
<td>Akira KANEKO</td>
<td>社会資本計画 Infrastructure Planning and Management</td>
<td><a href="mailto:akirak@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">akirak@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>池田 靖</td>
<td>Makoto IKEDA</td>
<td>政策科学 Policy Science</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ikeda@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp">ikeda@itakura.toyoto.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>矢光 喜志</td>
<td>Hiroshi YAKO</td>
<td>PRA Project Research Assistant</td>
<td><a href="mailto:dr0300014@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp">dr0300014@toyonet.toyou.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Outline of Center for Sustainable Development Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>天野 奉太郎  Kotaro AMANO</td>
<td>PRA Project Research Assistant</td>
<td><a href="mailto:dr0300018@toyonet.toyo.ac.jp">dr0300018@toyonet.toyo.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>朴 学進          PIAO Xue Jin</td>
<td>PRA Project Research Assistant</td>
<td><a href="mailto:piaoxuejin518@hotmail.com">piaoxuejin518@hotmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李 永青          LI Yongqing</td>
<td>PRA Project Research Assistant</td>
<td><a href="mailto:qingqing@cf7.so-net.ne.jp">qingqing@cf7.so-net.ne.jp</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

事務局/Secretariat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>来澤 伸子  Nobuko YONEZAWA</td>
<td>事務運営 Secretariat</td>
<td><a href="mailto:n-yonezawa@toyonet.toyo.ac.jp">n-yonezawa@toyonet.toyo.ac.jp</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注）○は各プロジェクトのリーダーを示す。