The Future of a Transnational Cultural History of the Non-Place

BRADLEY Joff Peter Norman*

This paper examines the conceptual interrelationship between Marc Augé’s non-place and Gilles Deleuze’s use of the any-space-whatever to explore what ‘transnational cultural history’ might mean in the intellectual vacuum which has emerged in the torpid aftermath of Fukuyama’s end of history thesis (1992). It draws on concepts from continental philosophy to think the non-place as a desertification of human relations and to probe issues pertaining to the forecated mass mobilisation of humanity in the 21st century and the corresponding loss of autochthonic identity. It concludes by pointing to some ideas concerned with the reconstitution of community solidarity in such circumstances.

Keywords: Non-place, Deleuze, Augé, Virilio, Lévinas, cinema, any-space-whatever

In thinking through the dialectic of filmic representation and concrete moments of historical crisis, this paper aims to account for the apparent sense of atemporality in and of our time, that is to say, the time at the end of human time, at the end of history, a time which even Fukuyama, in his The Origins of Political Order (2011), has belatedly postponed the finale. One way to think this through is with cinematic representations of crisis which offer some indication of a more fundamental destabilisation of identity, subjectivity, and trajectory found in the generic, transnational, non-places (non-lieu) of the world.

In this paper, the concepts of Deleuze’s any-space-whatever (espace quelconque), Marc Augé’s non-place, and Giorgio Agamben’s whatever singularities are interwoven together in an emergent, funicular fashion to explore issues pertaining to the transnational. With both Kant’s notion of anticipation (1798/1978) and Deleuze’s Nietzschean-insipred philosophy of history and chance in mind (life as amor fati), a futurally-bound analysis of the transnational examines the crisis of the movement-image in post-WWII cinema. Alongside this, elements of a Baudrillardian critique of the spectacle and generic places of abundance and desperation are interpreted along-

* A lecturer in the Faculty of Literature, and a member of the Institute of Human Sciences at Toyo University
side the erasure of autochthonic presence. This is taken in the etymological sense of that which pertains to a fixed abode, to what springs from the land itself - to the earth or soil one inhabits (Ansell-Pearson, 1997, p.13). In conclusion, the paper will discuss how a phenomenological exposition and exegesis of the absolute proximity of the other might be read alongside a prescient concrete account of the forced movement and migration of foreign populations.

The any-space-whatever

Accounting for the geopolitical nature of the any-space-whatever is no easy task, not least because it is not an abstract universal signifying time immemorial as residing in situ. It pertains more to a particular space deprived of meaning and therefore rendered heterogenic and is akin to Dutch architect Koolhaas’ notion (2003) of ‘junk space’ or the unfinished, derelict, flotsam and jetsam of capital. Although there is some debate among academics as to the genealogy of the idea (Deleuze may have confused Marc Augé with Pascal Augé, a one-time student of his), the concept receives its fullest theoretical treatment in Deleuze’s Cinema 1 (1983/1986) and Cinema 2 (1985/1989), where it is construed in connection with the affection-image and deemed an integral element of the movement-image’s sensory-motor regime.

In urban settings, any-space-whatevers, deprived of connection to historical narrative or moment, operate outside the parade of history. They possess the power of being located not in this space, but in ‘a’ space. The affection-image is delinked from situation, with space deterritorialised from its usual milieu. Yet through action, ‘a’ space returns to this space. In Cinema 1, Deleuze argues that any-space-whatevers, are ‘capable of inducing non-human affects’ (p.110). This means there is an absence of any specific city, definite place, historical origin, or narrative exposition. The increased visibility of the any-space-whatever in post-war cinemas is accredited to the prevalence of ‘deconnected’ and ‘emptied’ space, which form part of an amorphous, paradoxical scenario in which what has happened has already been erased. According to Deleuze, ‘[i]t is an extinction or a disappearing’ (p.123). It is argued that, in post-war cinema, emptied, any-space-whatevers generate pure optical and sound images and this is found in ‘the post-war situation with its towns demolished or being reconstructed, its waste grounds, its shanty towns’ (Cinema 1, p.120).

With the emergence of the time-image, there is thus a change in the expression of modern affects of ‘fear, detachment, freshness, extreme speed, and interminable waiting’ (Cinema 1, p.124). This point is echoed by Žižek (1995) in comments made about Japan: comparing cities in the East and West, Žižek finds in Japan an art of ignoring the other. In an interview ‘Japan through a Slovenian Looking Glass’, he argues: ‘In Japan, even when it is very crowded, you don’t feel the pressure, even if you are physically close. This art of ignoring. In the New York subway, even when it’s half full, you would have this horrifying experience of the absolute proximity of the Other.’ As such, the any-space-whatever is an important heuristic tool for noting the shift from movement - to time-image cinemas in the post-war era, as it captures the disruption and instability of the sensory-motor
whole. Importantly, for Deleuze, actions are no longer capable of altering situations. This has clear implications for the idea of atemporality as a destabilising effect of virtual time. The concept of atemporality is accredited to science fiction writer Bruce Sterling, who argues that the ‘West’ has entered into an era of decay and reordering of broken structures. In a 2010 lecture, he describes atemporality as a contingent explanation for ‘contingent times’ which experience the apparent absence of a Kantian anticipation of events to come. For Sterling, the time at the end of history is atemporal, a kind of ‘flattening sense of time’, a notion also detailed by Guattari, who speaks of the flattening (laminage) of capitalist subjectivity (Alliez, E. & Goffey, A., 2011, p.41).

In The Skin of the Film (2000), Marks examines a number of any-space-whatevers in post-war films, tracing the presence or absence of ‘inter-cultural’ characters. Diasporic or displaced characters inexist in such spaces, as any-space-whatevers are not the disjunctive spaces of postmodernism per se but more the ‘disruptive spaces of postcolonialism’ (Marks, 2000, p.27). Marks argues that in global cities, non-Western cultures increasingly come to the fore and repressed cultural memories return to ‘destabilise national histories’ (Marks, 2000, p.27). The argument goes that while not specifically national in character, the any-space-whatever is detached from specific historical coordinates and springs up across nations. It exists ahistorically, somehow transposed outside the purview of the narrative of the nation.

More precisely expressed, the any-space-whatever is a space of virtual conjunction, a pure locus of the possible (Cinema 1, p.109). And significantly, for Deleuze, it also acts as a condition for the emergence of the singularly new. It is the anonymity of space which engenders the infinite possibility of creation. The any-space-whatever is that which impregnates the affects in the background or environment. It can be seen in spaces that lie behind a character. It extracts the character from spatial coordinates, such as a sky, and allows the spectator to think beyond the conventional narration of the film. Therefore, we can take Deleuze as saying that the crisis of the movement image allows us to rethink time, space, and becoming in inaugural ways. The any-space-whatever uproots the viewer, provoking him or her to rethink the coordinates of time, history, and space afresh.

It was amidst the ruins of post-war-torn Europe that Deleuze saw a change in the cinematic image emerge. Deleuze contrasted any-space-whatevers with city spaces which had previously distinguished the realist cinema of the movement-image. Although Deleuze viewed any-space-whatevers as expressing the characteristics of European time-images, he considered Yasujiro Ozu as the first film director to develop pure optical and sound situations, to develop ‘a little time in the pure state’ (Deleuze, 1989, p. xi). Whether on a train journey, a taxi ride, a bus trip, or a bicycle ride, in Ozu’s films the object is the everyday banality of family life. Ozu’s spaces are empty, without characters or movement, interiors evacuated of occupants, deserted exteriors, or landscapes in nature. It is in these that the pure sense of time, of or time’s passing, is revealed.

In Cinema 1, Deleuze asserts that the movement-image can be identified through the unbroken sensory-motor continuity of chief protagonists in films. Deleuze uncovers an indirect image of time, a time in some way subordinate to movement. The protagonists act decisively in whatever situations they find themselves in, with
the sensory-motor continuity left unaffected. By contrast, in the time-image there is disruption as the protagonist is incapable of reacting physically to events. In the time-image, the protagonist lacks purpose or goal. In contrast with the ‘doers’ of the movement-image, the ‘seers’ in time-images move virtually within time. In the time-image, what emerges is a direct image of time, in a sense, time’s virtual movement. Without a protagonist to direct the viewer’s gaze, the direct image of time is identified in extended long takes over landscapes. Here, the passing of time occurs residually and the logical progression of events is affected. Disconnected spaces lack the agency of a character to negotiate the viewer’s reading of the linear narrative. In the time-image, time is often inextricably labyrinthine, with historical truth rendered malleable and based on memory and revision. The time-image reflects the anxiety of those waiting interminably for something to happen. This notion ties in with Agamben’s essay What is an Apparatus? (2009) which reflects upon the political proclivities of the contemporary socius and finds a similar sense of stasis and passivity. He argues that the present era has witnessed the presence of the ‘most docile and cowardly social body that has ever existed in human history’ (p.22). Deleuze also tries to account for the sense of docility and mutation as expressed in cinema. Deleuze writes,

In the West as in Japan, they are in the grip of a mutation, they are themselves mutants... Mutation of Europe after the war, mutation of an Americanised Japan, mutation of France in ‘68: it is not the cinema that turns away from politics, it becomes completely political, but in another way’ (Cinema 2, p.18).

In his thought-provoking book Deleuze, Cinema and National Identity (2006), David Martin-Jones discusses the intertwining of movement- and time-images as part of a kind of applied Deleuzianism which examines the manipulation of narrative time and identity in national film contexts. In terms of a transnational cultural history of the cinema, personal trauma symbolises and represents the collective national form, as there is a lingering sense of inaction. Contrasted with the linear, master, imperial, or grand narrative, the nonlinear is disruptive, producing different effects and different post-colonial histories. While acknowledging the reductionism of his schema and the idea that films do indeed encode myriad forms of both movement- and time-images, Martin-Jones’ argument, which relies on a labyrinthine concept of time, states that time-images effectively decode and recode national identity. Through reverse narrative structure (Chang-dong Lee’s Peppermint Candy, 1999), or manipulations of memory and explorations of a contingent past (Michel Gondry’s Eternal Sunshine of a Spotless Mind, 2004), the reconfiguration of narrative time and the subsequent use of non-linear time is read as a negotiation of national and transnational identity. It is through non-linear time that we see a contortion of orthodox schemas.

For Martin-Jones, the time-image reflects changing conceptions of time. After WWII, the relay of the deterritorialisation-reterritorialisation of narrative time has become increasingly dependent on moments of national crisis. Hybrid films, which weave together both movement- and time-images, contest postcolonial con-
structions of identity. Faced with the conception of labyrinthine time, questions of national identity and multiple and contested truths of the nation emerge in film, often exposing the imagined nature of regional identities. National identity is always elsewhere, in continual flux and becoming. For Deleuze, post-WWII has increased the situations in which we no longer know how to react, ‘in spaces which we no longer know how to describe’ (Cinema 1, p.32). Martin-Jones finds in Peter Howitt’s Sliding Doors (1998) the idea that British national identity is as always elsewhere. The film explores the transnational lifestyles of denizens living in London—the haves and have-nots and finds identity contingent, multiple, and permeable.

Non-place

There are similarities between Augé’s notion of the non-place and the any-space-whatever. The non-place seemingly springs up overnight in airports, coffee shops, and shopping malls, or as the consequences of political collapse in the form of shanty towns and refugee camps. Non-places are without cultural context, which exist outside location or history. As spaces of temporariness and transience, they are devoid of social relation, shared history, or sign of collective identification. For Augé, a place is only historical and relational, and carries personal significance only for the people experiencing it. He writes, ‘A place has a history and its inhabitants know the past. Places focus on the static, whereas non-places focus on the temporary’ (1995, p.101). In contrast, the non-place is devoid of significance as people are disconnected, with empathy absent (Augé, 1995, pp.77-78). A schizoid mob traverses non-places, with communication conspicuously absent. Travellers simply pass through these locations oblivious, never residing in them for there is no going back. Nostalgia is a luxury few have little time to enjoy.

The archetype of the non-place is the voyager’s space (Augé, 1995, p.86). This idea shares some similarity with what Arjun Appadurai (1990) has designated the ethnoscapes, that is to say, the anonymous spaces of globalisation or planetary capitalism. Yet it is in the phenomenology of Emanuel Lévinas that a clearer description of both the non-place and any-space-whatever can be discerned. In thinking the otherness of the other, Lévinas finds the everyday café to be a site of horror and inhumanity. Lévinas writes,

The cafe holds open house, at street level. It is a place of casual social intercourse, without mutual responsibility. One goes in without needing to. One sits down without being tired. One drinks without being thirsty. All because one does not want to stay in one’s room. You know that all the evils in the world occur as a result of our incapacity to stay alone in our room. The cafe is not a place. It is a non-place for a non-society, for a society without solidarity, without tomorrow, without commitment, without common interests, a game society. (1990, p.111)

From these descriptions, it seems that phenomenology and the transcendental empiricism of Deleuze share
the same object. If this is indeed compelling, then it seems that any-space-whatevers and the non-places of Integrated World Capitalism are befitting and ‘proper’ objects of a transnational cultural history. To demonstrate this, let us look at Augé and fellow collaborator Virilio a little more closely.

Influenced by Virilio, Augé contends the world is spatially condensed through mass transport and technological developments. As Augé says, the world is in a state of ‘constant feverishness’ (2005). Both Virilio and Augé share the view that speed has affected the sense of dwelling-in-the-world. For Virilio, history is accelerating and driven by a technologico-military spirit. In *Speed and Politics* (1986, p.68), Virilio argues that history progresses at the speed of military technology or weapons systems. Travel is a projectile. Journeys are essentially ‘empty’ and ‘without destination’. Somewhat apocalyptically, Virilio directs his animus towards the atmospheric pollution and the contamination of ‘time distances’ and the compression of ‘depth of field’ (1997, p.40). For Virilio, speed is compressing the world, resulting in a humanity confronted by the pollution of shrinking distances.

Similar to the arguments regarding the loss of sensory-motor power in cinema, Augé argues in *A Sense for the Other* (1998) that the individual in transitory, soon-to-be-obsolete non-places is but a ‘witness’. The ‘I’ in the non-place is in continuous movement, with dislocation at once present and absent in anonymous and interchangeable spaces of communication and consumption. In other terms, the individual can be reread as the imperson, the dividual, or generic ‘whatever singularity’. The ‘I’ is the seer of history but not the maker. In these spaces, the imperson is detached from a local relation to the earth. And to return to any-space-whatevers, Deleuze finds in them a new race of mutant characters emerging: ‘They saw rather than acted, they were seers’ (*Cinema 1*, p.32).

The perception that the ‘I’ is but a witness to the proliferation of non-places seems consistent with the postmodern, Baudrillardian- and Virilian-inflected observation that at present history is not made, with time and history petrified in some sense. Impersons exist atemporally and whatever singularities live life as frozen statues, as a death-in-life, a living-dead situated against a backdrop of any-space-whatevers. Resisting exposure to alterity, those who pass through non-places do so by erasing the face of the other, presenting instead a cool exterior and indifference to their plight. In the photography of Raymond Depardon (2008), the voyeur engages in a conspiracy of silence, with eyes askance, vigilant and watchful. To compound matters, terrorism heightens the paranoia, panoptic awareness of the other. Comparing the nature of transnational cities, and in observations made about Japan’s capital, Depardon (2009) says: ‘New York is a city you always go back to. Since 9-11, it has become less complacent to wandering foreigners like myself. The photogenic is still there. But perhaps it has moved to Tokyo, the new capital of indifference to foreigners’. According to Augé, the photography of Depardon allows the viewer to rethink the representation of alterity and the infinite demand whose beseechment one cannot evade. The faces that Depardon hones in on are looking at us, and they concern us. Our eyes meet theirs. Discerning a Klee-esque dialectic in Depardon’s work, Augé writes, ‘It is almost as if their silence drew us into
an impossible conversation on the order of the world and the meaning of life; almost as if, without saying anything, they were questioning us’ (Virilio & Depardon, 2010, p.287).

**Surmodernité**

Augé’s surmodernité or hypermodernity describes the explosion of non-places across the planet. Yet surmodernité should be differentiated from the postmodern turn to avoid association with decadence or rupture with a lost idealism. Surmodernité then is not only a question of disjunction but also of continuity. While there is no simple differentiation between the concepts of lieu and non-lieu, it can be said that they are both ideal types, and in a concrete sense, porous, neither existing independently of the other. It is possible for places and non-places to co-exist, as the non-lieu never fully obtains and the lieu never quite vanishes. At work in surmodernité is a logic of excess and absence, with non-places denuded of identity, history, and urban relationships. Along these lines, Derrida (2002) finds in the aporetical a conspicuous lack of a clear exit strategy or assured path. As he says, it is ‘without itinerary or point of arrival, without an exterior with a predictable map and a calculable programme’ (p.47).

As anthropo-pathological prisms of the *everyday*, non-places operate as apolitical spaces of hypermediated consumption and mobility. Non-places are non-descript. According to Jameson (1991), a definition of the non-descript might address homogeneous architecture and the dearth of local referents that orient the traveller. The modus operandi undergirding the fleetingness of non-places is their apolitical nature. They are sites of transaction with interaction kept to a bare minimum. Existence is *sad* for the marooned traveller, as the non-place is brutally unliveable. Schizoid subjectivity is at a loss to locate itself (pp.43-44) as these sites express a derealised sense of history. With the breakdown of temporality, Jameson explains: ‘the present of the world or material signifier comes before the subject with heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious charge of affect’ (p.73).

According to critics from differing philosophical traditions, who posit these spaces as essentially political such as Agamben (1998), contemporary non-places resemble a concentration camp. Found in hypermarché and refugee camp, Disneyland and Auschwitz, the logic of the camp operates. Camp and the spectacle function with the idea of ‘exterritoriality’ (Diken, 2004, p.96). The camp is a space of exception that produces *bare life*. Contrary to the spirit of the universal human rights doctrine, the *homo sacrine*, who lives and who may be killed without sacrifice, is subject to the whims of modern power operating in states of exception, such as refugee camps or war-time prisons like Abu Ghraib. Bare life is understood as existing on and in indeterminate margins and spaces, outside the normalising order of modern control societies but still nested within capillary networks of power relations. Such spaces include the non-place. While some travellers flow through non-places for leisure, or on business, others surreptitiously circumvent the rules, as in the sex trade or drug carrying. As Agamben argues, the camp is the hidden matrix of politics. He calls for a deeper understanding of these non-places to understand the metamorphoses at work in the *zones d’attentes* at airports and on the outskirts of cities (p.175).
is worth quoting Agamben at length here to show the contemporary relevance of these zones vis-à-vis the non-place and any-space-whatevers:

All of us can become potential hominess sacri for the very fact that we travel on the underground; for the fact that we enter into a vast and extraordinary space of exception, extraordinary precisely for its apparent normality. Within this space of exception the norm and its transgression are decided at the moment, they straddle a mobile confine that we, as citizens are not consented to know. (Agamben quoted in Minca 2006, p.387)

Whatever singularities are in some sense immaterial and spectral bodies, merely ghosts, traces, or people without qualities or identity. Whatever singularities cannot form a society, as they do not possess identities to vindicate nor bonds or belonging of which to seek recognition. Agamben defines the nature of whatever singularities as those which reject all identity and every condition of belonging. In those terms then, they are enemies of the state. As such, and deriving a political vision from these descriptions, Agamben claims that wherever such singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common, the prospect is another Tiananmen, ‘and sooner or later, the tanks will appear’ (1993, p.87).

The non-place is distinct from anthropological place, as the latter is relational, historical, and determined by identity. The non-place creates smooth, frictionless spaces that aid the hypermobility of the fractured subject. Non-places are uninhabitable. Like postmodern, transnational cities, they are resistant to dwelling and residing. One enters, and then one leaves. The space is schizoid and decoded. Non-places are empty, often urban and interurban spaces associated with transit and communication and without history; they are between customers or travellers trapped and immobilised ‘in a time without events’ (Bosteels, 2003, p.119). The non-place is a hallucinogenic, infinite, and depthless space - a paragon of postmodern ennui and malaise premised on the loss of historicity.

For Augé, collective identities operate ‘through complications of language, local references and the unformulated rules of living know-how’ (1995, p.101). But in non-places, there is only a 'shared sense of identity among the passengers, customers, and Sunday drivers’ (Augé, p.101). Individuals are not singularities but generalisable customers, passengers, users, and listeners. Instrumental identity is registered at the point of entry and exit through name, occupation, place of birth, and address. Similarly, Mark Gottdiener (2001) sketches the social character of the archetypal air traveller, who is seen as an ‘uncaring, detached, self-contained individual armed with a laptop, walkman, credit cards, cellular phone, Palm Pilot and business agenda’ (p.34). Individuals intoxicated with portable mobile devices withdraw from public space. Moreover, for Graham and Marvin (2001), the desire for non-place is in part a response to the sense of fear of the postmodern city, as non-places are clean, and devoid of the homeless and crowds. In non-places, abstraction, acceleration, and continuous
movement negate democratic civic life. Non-places, gated communities, theme parks, and refugee camps all operate within a similarly coded logic of exclusion, a logic which condones the acceleration of historical events and the shrinking of spatial distances.

In his Les temps en ruines (2003), Augé claims that, despite widespread devastation, recent history is without ruin as the debris of war ‘no longer has the time to become ruins’ (p.9). Calling for a rediscovery of the sense of time upon which to found a consciousness of history, he argues, ‘At a time when everything conspires to make us believe that history is at an end and that the world is a spectacle in which this end is staged, we have to refind the time to believe in history’ (quoted in Burgin and Streitberger, 2009, p.325). What Augé appears to be criticising here is the way in which instantaneity and ubiquity negate and cancel both memory and history.

The fraught and petrified non-relation and non-identity pervading the non-place is perhaps made apparent in contemporary Hollywood film. According to Augé’s theory of solidarity, a person left alone, detached from his or her surroundings, derives only ephemeral meaning from non-places. People in these situations distrust permanent bonding. In Sofia Coppola’s film Lost in Translation (2003), the two main characters, Charlotte and Bob, both confront this distrust. Finding themselves in Tokyo, a node in what Alphonso Lingis has designated the archipelago of urban technopoles (Sparks, 1991, p.192), one site in the vast network of non-places, they are soon deterritorialised, bereft of ground and assurances. The characters indulge themselves in an empire of undecidable signs. What is made apparent is their uprootedness, the folly of their relationships, the tenuousness of their work, the insignificance of their life-decisions, and a deep, gnawing, and existential unhappiness. Non-places are therefore ideal loci for travellers imprisoned as solus ipse, that is, individuals living introspective, impersonal lives. In Lost in Translation, Charlotte takes a tour of the metropolis. An alien divorced from her surroundings, she soon becomes distressed by the nothingness of her feelings. Deeply troubled, she appears on the screen as a decentred, solitary, ghostly traveller. In Deleuzian terms, it is here that the time-image comes to the fore. She is moving through life without forming attachments to the places she encounters as she is subject to the whim of events or circumscribed by them. Solace and sanctuary are found in the hyperreal non-place of a luxury hotel in Shinjuku. The westerners take refuge in the skyscrapers, which shelter them from the deterritorialising effects of the city.

Identity and Virilio

From his heterodox phenomenological perspective, Virilio argues that identity is bereft of territory; it is a becoming, a trajectory, a gaze intimately bound to landscape. According to Virilio, mankind is on the cusp of a huge historical transformation, as the planet is on the brink of confronting ‘unprecedented migratory phenomena’ (2010 b, p.2) that will displace and uproot an estimated one billion people by 2050, according to UN projections. This ‘great hurricane’ of migration and movement will call into question the notion of sedentarity or autochthonic identity, and the flows of migration will raise new problems related to borders and walls. Explor-
ing the ramifications of one of the ‘most formidable events in the history of mankind’ (2010a), a planetary re-
population and urban exodus of unparalleled dimensions, he argues that, hitherto, identity pertained to the local,
to place of birth, to native land or first appearance. While indispensable for citizenship and nationality, identity
risks being replaced by traceability—a radical shift and delocalisation (Virilio, 2008). If this occurs, a person be-
comes a trajectory, no longer the subject of a birth in a place, but a trajectory pure and simple, subjected to non-
stop telesurveillance via coded systems, waves, passwords, order-words, and so on. He describes a mutation al-
ready underway that calls localisation into question. The mobility of constant supervision is undermining seden-
tary life. Those on the move are those most at home.

For Virilio, the peak of speed is the extermination of space, and the end of time is absolute or outlandish.
He perceives the world as hyper-mediated and subject to laws of accelerating capital development. As he puts it,
‘With acceleration there is no more here and there, only the mental confusion of near and far, present and future,
real and unreal—a mix of history, stories, and the hallucinatory utopia of communication technologies’ (Virilio,
1995, p.35). In his City of Panic (2005), Virilio contends that deterritorialisation is effectively eroding and eras-
ing people’s sense of place. Transhumant humanity, caught in perpetual motion, suffers the loss of a sense of be-
longing to any particular locality. As a consequence, it is the city itself which is unliveable. Virilio discerns the
process of ‘miniaturisation of our terrestrial habitat’s proportions’ (2005, p.113), and forewarns of a ‘twilight of
place’ and collapse of the body. Seemingly at odds with Augé, who claims people are never at home in the
world of surmodernité, Virilio contends that the sedentary type—equipped with devices such as the mobile
phone and laptop—can find a home in the non-place precisely because one is nomadic and never still. This idea
follows Marx in the middle of the 19th century who discerned inherent contradictions in capitalism and fore-
casted the ‘annihilation of space by time’ (Marx, 1973/1859, p.538). Marx claims that capital strives, on the one
hand, to tear down every barrier, to conquer all markets, and, on the other, to annihilate this space with time
(p.539).

Conclusion

Writing a transnational cultural history of the non-place is premised on the extent to which people travers-
ing cultural spaces at speed can be tracked. Reworking Deleuze, who argues that the people for his writing has
yet to arrive, we can take this another way and say that the public are missing in the present, in the non-places,
the favelas, the balieues, and the British sink council estates. If many remain unaccounted for, how does one
write an historical account for people who have come and gone without trace or registration, or for those itiner-
ants who have and will traverse the planet, moving from places of terror to places of temporary sanctuary? This
perhaps is the purview of a transnational history as it seems untimely to question the notion of migration and ad-
dress how transhumants evacuate a place from which they cannot return as a result of forced exodus and uproot-
ing. Thinking the futurity of a transnational cultural history necessitates an examination of migration in the 21st
century. It means considering identity in non-places, the trajectory of identity, the nature of becoming transhumant and nomadic, and resistance to the proliferation of *non-lieu de memoire* (memory-less non-places).

A transnational culture analysis of the non-place ought to account for the vast number of excluded workers and people, those renditioned to *ad hoc* intersticial spaces, awaiting conferment of status, such as those who have lost their place, lost their right to live, or have been forced to flee one world to survive another. As such, these people are sentenced to not one but two non-places. It can be argued that our world and our time is one in which walls, camps, and barriers exist on one level to protect the rich and wealthy and, on the other, to exile and jettison those excluded by globalisation, those fleeing terror or dispossessed of identity or place. Against a plethora of grand narratives insinuating *jouissance* and celebration of the end of history *ad nauseam*, the worrying sense of atemporal time is worth reflecting upon. Whence connected with ideas of any-space-whatever (Deleuze), the imperson, and whatever singularities (Agamben), we begin to see what a transnational cultural history might look like.

Lingis (1994) asks how community can be constituted with those who have nothing in common. Such a community would be populated by those stripped of subjectivity. Lingis, following Jean-Luc Nancy, asks if the truly ethical community is the one in which inhabitants have nothing in common, except a base level of certain genericness. In non-places and any-space-whatevers, how can there be ethical relations to the other? The answer to the question of how one conceives of a community, which is both fluid and nomadic in which members are not of the same soil or land, is complex. Nancy (1991) takes community as a transcendent notion. It is argued that a community consists of subjects or citizens sharing a common language, laws, customs, or imaginations. Yet singular or generic beings are not subjects. They are without community in the conventional sense. They are whatever and without a grand transcendent project. Non-places are thus a form of inoperable or unavowable community (Blanchot, 2008), which is laden with *déseoeuvrement*, beyond work and oeuvre. We ought to ask, then, what happens to national identity in the any-space-whatever. What forms of transnational identity emerge in such transitory places? To what extent can a theory of the non-place and the crisis of the movement-image work within a generalised state of exemption?

The first positive task of a transnational cultural history is to ask how one archives and records those future generations in perpetual transit and how one thinks of identity as marginal, transhumant, and without a fixed abode. The goal of a transnational cultural history ought to be to analyse the changing demographics of people marooned by Integrated World Capitalism. It is to analyse, on the one hand, the super-rich in the archipelago of urban metropolises and, on the other, to map the vast underclass which nurtures the former but whose existence is precarious. Such a critique would contest the reality of the council sink estates, favelas, the banlieues, and the hyperghettos, as well the UN refugee camps or crowded no-go-zones whose members appear lawless and therefore subject to the sometimes whimsical and inhuman decisions of those who abuse their station.
References


Film bibliography


無場所のトランスナショナルカルチュラルヒストリーについての研究

ブラッドリー・ジョフ・ピーター・ノーマン*

本論文は、マルク・オジェの“非場所”（non-lieu）という概念とジル・ドゥルーズの“真空にされた空間”（espace quelconque）という概念の相互関係を検討した。問題の分析にあたって重視されているのは、歴史の終わりという観点である。また大陸哲学の概念を使用して、“人間関係の砂漠化”の観点から無場所という意味を検証した。本論文で重点的に考察されているのは以下の諸点である。1）人々の移動が“非場所”、“真空にされた空間”を21世紀にはどのように拡大していくのか。2）個別化されたアイデンシティの喪失の効果は何か。3）何も共有していない者たちの無場所という意味は何か。4）こうした共同体を再構成することができるのか。

キーワード：無場所、ドゥルーズ哲学、マルク・オジェ、ポール・ヴィリリオ、ポスト構造主義

* 人間科学総合研究所研究員・東洋大学文学部