Anselm's Ideas on “Coexistence”

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Introduction

This paper will discuss “coexistence” in the ideas of Anselm of Canterbury (1033/34AD – 1109AD). I will carry out this enquiry despite the fact that the term and concept of “coexistence” is not of course found in the writings of Anselm. The term “coexistence” that I discuss here means “to live together with” or “to exist together with.” It is natural to ask the question: “who or what lives together with who or what?” For Anselm, the things that exist are the Creator God, who “exists without qualification, perfectly and absolutely,” and those who He created, who “...almost do not, and hardly do, exist.” If there is only one who creates and whatever is created is from that one, it is clear that he who creates and what he has created is all there is. Thus, if Anselm’s ideas are indeed relevant to the aforementioned question, we might expect the answer to be firstly that “humans live together with God,” and secondly that “humans live together with humans.” The issue we face today of the “coexistence between humans and nature” was not a major concern for Anselm. Even so, this paper will address both this and the issue of coexistence between cultures. The ideas of this monk, who rigidly focused his thoughts on deep principles in a monastery in northern France, may provide some insights for the modern day topic of “coexistence.”

I will briefly describe Anselm’s career. Anselm was born in Aosta, northern Italy, in 1033/34AD. He left his hometown in 1056 at 23 years of age and, after wandering through Burgundy and France for three years, he knocked upon the doors of the Abbey of Bec in Normandy, northern France. Anselm was to lead a monastic life for the next thirty—three years serving as a monk, a prior, and then as an abbot. In 1093 he became the Archbishop of Canterbury, and his life ended in 1109.

I. “Coexistence” between God and Humans

In order to shed light on “coexistence” between God and humans, we must turn to Anselm’s first written work, Monologion, which he penned in 1076 aged 41. This can serve as an “example of meditation” (exemplum meditationis) concerning the nature of God.

At the beginning of this work, he writes: “Of all the things that exist, there is one nature that is supreme. ... Now, take someone who either has never heard of, or does not believe in, and so does not know, this – this, or indeed any of the numerous other things which we necessarily believe about God and his creation. I think that they can, even if of average ability, convince themselves, to a large extent, of truth of these beliefs, simply reason alone (sola ratione).” Anselm is saying that even those with no knowledge of Christianity, or with no belief in it, can understand in large part simply by reason alone without relying upon the authority of Scripture. But what led Anselm to make such a statement?

In this book, Anselm adopts a dialogue between reason and the self, in other words suggesting that one can have
an understanding of the God who is the basis of one’s own existence and knowledge through the medium of rational self-awareness. However, this will also have the effect of illuminating both the similarities and the differences between the existence and knowledge of God, and those of created beings, i.e., humans.

The things created by God that exist in this world are ranked differently according to how similar to God they are. Accordingly, there are things that simply exist, things that live, things that have sense, and things that have a rational nature. Anselm wrote that the beings in possession of a rational nature, i.e., human souls, can remember, understand and love. These abilities “mirror” the Trinity of God. The ability to remember reflects God the Father, the ability to understand reflects God the Son, and the ability to love reflects the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from both the Father and the Son. This is how Anselm described man as being in the “image of God” (imago Dei). In that it bears the image of God, rationality has the capacity to distinguish and judge right from wrong, truth from falsehood, good from evil, and also to distinguish between the different ranks of good. It is “the ruler and judge” among humans. Because it has an ontological and epistemological likeness with God, the rational nature is able to draw near to God. It is thus clear that Anselm’s method is constructed in such a way that it justifies itself through contemplation that is based on it.

We have clarified the way that Anselm ranked existence, and his view of humans bearing the image of God. With this knowledge in mind, let us consider what Anselm meant by “coexistence” with God. Anselm writes the following in Monologion.

To strive to give, therefore, expression to this impressed images; to strive to actualize, by an act of will, this, nature’s potential: such, above all, is, in consequence, the debt that rational creation owes its Creator. A debt above and beyond the very fact that it exists. To be able to be conscious of, understand and love the supreme good is its most momentous ability.

He then writes the following in Proslogion.

I acknowledge, Lord, and I give thanks that You have created Your image in me, so that I may remember You, think of You, love You. ... I do not try, Lord, to attain Your lofty heights, because my understanding is in no way equal to it. But I do desire to understand Your truth a little, that truth that my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand.

For Anselm, “coexistence” with God is achieved through exerting memory, will, and rational ability to seek Him. Needless to say, it plays a decisive role in Anselm’s contemplations.

However, this gives rise to the following doubt. If God is the object of inquiry and is also beyond inquiry, how can one be said to “coexist” with Him? In Chapters XX through XXIV of Monologion, Anselm uses a detailed analysis of space and time to argue that God exists everywhere and throughout all of time without any spatial or temporal restrictions. This argument is also summarized in Chapters XVIII through XIX of Proslogion. Let us quote from the conclusion of Chapter XIX. “Though nothing can be without You, You are nevertheless not in place or in time, but all things are in You. For nothing contains You, but You contain all things.” God always exists. It is under the eternally existing God that contemplations aimed at understanding God can unfold.

Naturally, it is not the case that “coexistence” with God is something that is accomplished exclusively through Anselm’s contemplation. In other words, it is not only accomplished through theological reflections. In Anselm’s view, it is also accomplished in his life as a whole, that is to say, in his monastic life. Anselm’s monastic life is something that constantly takes place in the presence of God. The Rule of St. Benedict, which provided the model for Anselm’s monastic life, has the following to say regarding the divine office (officium divinum), which represents
the center of monastic life.

We believe that the divine presence is everywhere and that in every place the eyes of the Lord are watching the good and the wicked. But beyond the least doubt we should believe this to be especially true when we celebrate the divine office. ... Let us consider, then, how we ought to behave in the presence of God and his angels, and let us stand to sing the psalms in such a way that our minds are in harmony with our voices.16

“Coexistence” with God is accomplished in Anselm’s theological contemplation, in his daily liturgical exercises, and in all aspects of his life. Needless to say, this relationship is perfected when there is beatitude in Heaven.17

II. “Coexistence” between Humans and Nature

In a discussion of the ideas of Anselm, it is not easy to address the topic of “coexistence” between humans and nature. This is because the above-mentioned ontological hierarchy ranks nature lower than humans. Furthermore, the following quotation of the historian Yozo Horigome may help to give us some idea of the natural environment in which Anselm lived. “(Medieval) Europe was a darker and colder place than it is today and it was enveloped in a grave-like silence. This was not the fault of the climate. It was because Europe was covered with an unending expanse of great primeval forests.” “The forests were like a sea of green. A series of villages, farms, untilled land and towns were laid out like islands surrounded by the sea of forest. They were like island nations. The world of medieval Europe was formed of countless island nations dotted about and spread apart.”18 Bec, where Anselm carried out his activities, was also built in a clearing in the forests of Normandy. The eleventh Century was certainly a time when arable land gradually started increasing and exchanges in excess agricultural goods began to enliven urban commerce. These changes were brought about by the proliferation of iron farming tools, the more efficient use of horses through using horseshoes and carriages, and the introduction of the three-field system. Historians have labeled this the Agricultural Revolution. It must be said, however, that this was still on a very small scale. It was an age when nature had overwhelming power. Anselm never actually went into detail about the nature surrounding humans or the relationship between nature and humans. However, we can draw our attention to a passage of Monologion in which he talks about the order of the created world.

It is therefore utterly evident, beyond a shadow on a doubt, that the supreme essence alone and through itself produced so much and so many things of such beauty – things so varied, yet ordered, so different, yet concordant – and produced them out of nothing.19

The force that preserves the beautiful order is “the sustaining presence” (servatrix praesentia)20 that comes from the will of the Creator God. Anselm then explains the world’s natural phenomena as follows.

Everything that takes place, if carefully considered, comes about by the will of God alone, by nature according to the power accorded it by God, or by the will of a creature; and those things which neither created nature nor the will of a creature but only God does are always miraculous. It is therefore apparent that there are three ranks of events: the miraculous, the natural and the voluntary.21

To do harm to the workings of nature, which obeys the power given by God, or to do harm to the order of nature, is to contravene the will of God. Anselm writes the following. “I have no alternative but to admit that, for the sake even preserving the whole creation, there is nothing which I ought to do contrary to the will of God.”22 These words
are taken from a passage in Anselm's chief theological work *Why God Became Man*, in which he discusses the heaviness of the burden of human sin. This passage represents Anselm's fundamental understanding of sin, which forms the basis of his theory of redemption. The sin of Adam, the first man, destroyed the original order established in Creation. It destroyed the "coexistence" depicted in the Book of Genesis, both between humans and God and between humans and nature. Needless to say, this damage was rectified through the redemptive work of Christ, but at this point it is important to clarify the following. If one were to ask Anselm how "coexistence" between humans and nature is made possible, one would receive the sternest of replies: "God's created order must not be destroyed. In other words, one ought to do nothing that is contrary to the will of God."

III. "Coexistence" between Human and Human

It goes without saying that Anselm lived in an age in which society was divided according to a feudal order (ordo). Anselm's ontological hierarchy also reflected the real social hierarchy of the time. The three classes of clergy (oratores), warriors (bellatores), and workers (laboratores) made their first appearance in the ninth century and came to be spoken of once again from the eleventh century onwards. Although Anselm never discussed the three classes themselves, they evidently reflect his ideas and life. Moreover, each class had its own elaborate hierarchy. Churches, for example, had an ecclesiastical hierarchy headed by the Pope. Monasteries were headed by abbots and monks were required to show obedience (oboedientia) to the abbot. This is something that Anselm emphasized above all else. Accordingly, it would seem unreasonable to expect that Anselm's ideas can offer us much with regards to egalitarian or horizontal "coexistence" between human and human.

This does not mean, however, that there was no aspect of Anselm's ideas that broke through this vertical structure. This aspect is manifested through his ideas on "friendship" (amicitia). Speaking about this here in detail would clearly be gilding the lily, as there is already outstanding research into this by R. W. Southern and many others. I will therefore limit myself to making only a few points.

In the traditions of ancient philosophy and thought, "friendship" was of course a major theme. It is highly likely that Anselm would have been aware of this through Cicero and Seneca. However, Anselm's ideas on "friendship" would have been influenced less by this "profane" literature and much more by traditional monastic literature. His ideas would have been influenced in particular by the view on friendship laid out in *Collationes* (Cassianus around 360–430/35). There are three kinds of friendship. The first is based on the natural association; the second, on the relationship of groups with a common purpose; the third, on a union of souls in pursuit of a single noble and rational aim. Each of these friendships functions as a social and communal bond of intimacy. All three have significance for a monastic community, but the third kind of friendship, if it is too private or individualistic, may threaten the order of the community. Despite this, it is the most characteristic kind of friendship found in Anselm's ideas. This is made clear in Anselm's letters. More than 400 of Anselm's letters remain, and many of the letters that indicate Anselm's ideas of friendship were written when he was a prior and an abbot of Bec.

1. Expression of Passionate Friendship

Anselm's letters of friendship could not be more passionate. Take, for example, the following.

Whereas true love (amor) honorably bestowed demands to be loved blamelessly in return, I do not consider myself shameless if I display my love for you to some extent either to gain yours for me or, having gained it, to render it more perfect. But because of the very great distance separating us, you are not able to experience my love for you either by act of kindness on my part or even by conversations: may this letter of greeting be a sign to you that the memory of your love (delectio) thrives within me. For when your respected fraternity (fraternitas) first
made itself known to my lowliness by its presence, my soul so deeply marked it by drawing you close in the
embrace of charity (caritas) that, by loving you, it impressed a clear image of you on itself. By this, despite your
absence, you are always present to me. Yet however rare our meetings may be, my affection (affectio) is not
intermittent but continuous.26

This letter was written around 1075, when Anselm was prior of Bec. This means that it is from the earliest period
of his letters. In this letter, Anselm is inviting two young men named Odo and Lanzo to enter monastic life. The
above quotation is from the beginning of the letter. Here, Anselm passionately expresses his love using such
amorous language as amor/amare, dilectio/diligere, fraternitas, caritas and affectus. Such is the fervency in
Anselm’s language that the text could easily be mistaken for a love letter. By discovering in friendship the bonds of
intimacy that connect individuals, and by giving these bonds of intimacy expression in his fervent terminology and
writing style, Anselm offered something new that could not have been achieved in this way before his time.

2. Conscience (conscientia)

Anselm’s view of friendship has a unique depth because he saw friendship as something that exists within
individuals: in the innermost parts of the soul. Let us consider his view from the perspective of “conscience”
(conscientia).27

Again and Again it presses upon me, aware as I am of another’s conscience, which is mine, that my letter should
fly across the sea to it and fly more often as if wanting to receive information about the state of my friendship. But
what will my letter tell you that you do not know, you, my second soul? Go into the inner chamber of your soul and
consider the affection of your true love and you will learn the love of your true friend. Although we may not be
equal by equality of conduct, still I dare not say that we are different; indeed, as regards the quality of our mutual
love, we are not dissimilar. For I confess, and I blush to do so, I admit, I say that my tepid charity is surpassed by
your fervent charity.28

This letter (Letter 16, 1070-77) was addressed to Anselm’s friend of friends Gundulf. Gundulf was a monk in Bec,
and would later become the Bishop of Rochester, England. Anselm writes in the letter that Gundulf’s “conscience” is
as his own and that he is therefore aware (concius) of it. The “conscience” that Anselm talks about here is different
from that used later on in scholasticism, where it refers to the capacity to make ethical judgments.29 For Anselm, it
is consciousness/awareness concerning the innermost parts of one’s soul, and also the mutual conscious-
ness/awareness of the soul between companions exchanging friendship.30

Anselm calls Gundulf “my second soul” and tells him to “go into the inner chamber of your soul” to learn of his
affection. This phrase appears in a passage from the Gospel According to Saint Matthew, in which believers are
instructed on the correct way to pray. The point that requires the most attention here is that Anselm quotes this
biblical phrase at the start of Proslogion.31 This is to say that in Proslogion, Anselm urges the reader to “go into the
inner chamber” of one’s soul to seek God and here he encourages the friend to “go into the inner chamber” of his
heart to learn of his friendship. The place where one seeks God is the very same place where a friend’s love emerges
– the “inner chamber of your soul” or “conscience.” In other words, friendship is established when fellow believers
who seek God in the innermost parts of the soul mutually come to be aware of it in innermost parts of the soul.

3. Friendship with the Dead

Anselm called Gundulf “my second soul,” but this phrase was also used to describe the deceased. Letter 4, quoted
below, was written before Letter 16, and addressed to the same Gundulf. The letter mentions a man named Osbern,
who was a monk of Bec. When Anselm became a prior, Osbern was initially jealous and defiant, but in the end he showed heartfelt reverence and obedience. However, he suddenly fell ill with a disease that would prove fatal, despite Anselm's desperate attempts to nurse him day and night. Anselm says to Gundulf that Osbern must never be forgotten. The passage here speaks of Anselm's acute affection (affectus) towards his late friend Osbern.

With as few words as possible and as much fervor as I am capable, I ask you and all my friends to pray for the late Osbern, my sweetest friend. Wherever Osbern is my soul is his soul. May I therefore receive on his behalf, while living, what I could hope for from my friends when I am dead, so that they will be free of obligation to me when I die. Farewell, farewell, my dearest friend; and that I may repay you in accord with your importunity, I pray and pray and pray; remember me and do not forget the soul of Osbern, my beloved. And if this seems to you to be too great a burden, forget me and remember him.

I would like to relate this passage to what was said by Anselm's biographer Eadmer in *Vita Anselmi*.

After Osbern's death, Anselm did not withhold from his dead friend the offices of that holy love which he had bestowed upon him while he was alive. Each day throughout an entire year he celebrated a mass for his soul. And if he was ever prevented from celebrating that sacrament, he procures one of those who had the duty of saying votive masses to say one for the soul of his brother, and repaid this service as opportunity arose, by saying another mass before the one for his dead friend. And so, every day for a whole year, he either said a mass for himself, or borrowed one said by another and repaid it. Besides this, he sent letters in all directions asking, and procuring, that prayers should be made for the soul of his Osbern.

The contents of the letter addressed to Gundulf that is quoted above also requested that a mass be celebrated for Osbern's soul. In this monastic liturgy, friendship with the departed is expressed and the memory of the departed lives on. In this setting, the fraternal relationships people previously had with those who are now dead are revived in the present. Liturgy is the setting where one coexists with the dead.

4. Friendship in Heaven

For Anselm, friendship was not limited to the bonds between individuals in past and present. Anselm believed that friendship is something that lives on in heaven; indeed it is in the life eternal that friendship is made complete. Anselm speaks about this in Chapter XXV of *Proslogion*. In this chapter, Anselm enumerates the virtues and joys of heaven and he counts friendship among them.

If it (the good) is friendship, they will love God more than themselves and one another as themselves, and God will love them more than they love themselves because it is through Him that they love Him and themselves and one another, and He loves Himself and them through Himself.

For Anselm, the friendship that is established between fellow believers who seek God in the soul's "inner chamber" represents the imitation of friendship in heaven. Once this friendship is made complete in heaven, a "coexistence" that stretches from past to present and into the future will be accomplished. This is "coexistence" between human and human and, at the same time, as mentioned above, the completion of "coexistence" between God and those who seek Him.

One may then ask whether, if the above represents Anselm’s view of friendship, the “coexistence” between human and human would not be limited to an extremely small sphere. Would it not be limited to relationships...
between monks and between nuns? This is indeed the case. When considering friendship within the theme of "coexistence," the sphere of this "coexistence" will become limited. This is also argued in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*: "it is well not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many as are enough for the purpose of living together (εὐζῆν)." Despite this, there is surely a need to consider friendship as an element that establishes "coexistence."

IV. "Coexistence" between Cultures

It is perhaps inappropriate to bring in the concept of culture to Anselm's ideas. The modern day word "culture" was not in Anselm's vocabulary. Let us consider the Latin word cultus. For Anselm, this meant above all "worship of God" or "liturgy" (Dei cultus), and it also meant attitudes, lifestyles, and habits that displayed reverence towards God, in particular relating to the monastic life. When we consider this view, we will be able to discover coexistence between cultures in Anselm's ideas and in his actual activities.

1. An Encounter with Monks in England

In 1079, Anselm visited England. For Anselm, England was a country of "barbarians (barbari)" who speak in an incomprehensible tongue." It was a world with a foreign culture. The purpose of Anselm’s visit was to go to Canterbury in order to inspect Bec’s property there and to meet his former teacher, Lanfranc. Once in Canterbury, Anselm gave an address to the monks of Christ Church. "It explained and proved that he who loves another possesses something greater than he who is the object of this love." In his biography of Anselm, *Vita Anselmi*, Eadmer introduces the content of the sermon and records that "Anselm talked to them daily in the chapterhouse or in the cloister about the life and habits of monks, setting forth wonderful things which had not been heard of before this time, with reason and eloquence. At other times also he talked privately with the more intelligent among them, raising deep questions concerning both sacred and secular books, and giving his answers to their problems." Whether in his words on love or his words on monastic life, habits and sacred books, what attracted and captured the hearts of Eadmer and other English monks was Anselm’s rational manner of speaking. Eadmer emphasizes that what Anselm was saying about monastic life and habits was entirely unheard of among English monks. This point requires some explanation.

In 1066, William, duke of Normandy (around 1027‒87) defeated King Harold II in the Battle of Hastings, and was enthroned as the King of England. The Anglo-Saxon dynasty was destroyed and the Norman dynasty began. William the Conqueror enforced continental standards in a range of areas, including politics, economics, culture, the church, and monasteries. He summoned Lanfranc, who had been the abbot of Caen in Normandy, to the position of Archbishop of Canterbury, and Lanfranc’s crossing into England, together with the monks of Bec and Caen, was a part of this policy. When Lanfranc arrived in Canterbury, he saw before him monks who clung fast to the ecclesiastical and monastic traditions of the Anglo-Saxon era, and who appeared to him to be backslidden wretches. Lanfranc then set about the task of reform. He rebuilt the church tower, enriched the library’s collection, and drew up new constitutions for monastic life, which were based on the continental Monastic Constitutions of Cluny. He then turned to the liturgy and removed Anglo-Saxon era saints' days from the church calendar. It goes without saying that this resulted in conflict, both openly and covertly, between Lanfranc and the Norman monks on the one side and the English monks on the other, also referred to as the conflict between Norman monasticism and Anglo-Saxon monasticism. Anselm knew about this of course, and the situation was no different upon his arrival. Through Anselm’s speech, the monks heard for the first time a well-reasoned and convincing explanation concerning the monastic life and the habits that the Norman occupation had forced upon them. It can be said that Eadmer’s account is an expression of his amazement at what was accomplished.
Anselm did not only introduce these ideas to the monks of Canterbury, but he also visited other monasteries and spoke to other monks, nuns, and clergymen. Eadmer writes “He conformed himself, so far as he could without sin, to their various habits.” He then goes on to say “He set forth each point with familiar examples in daily life, supporting them with the evidence of solid reason, and leaving them in the minds of his hearers, stripped of all ambiguity.”

Anselm did not only give a rational explanation of Norman monasticism and successfully convince the monks of England, but he also accommodated the habits of Anglo-Saxon monasteries, churches, and barons. In short, he accepted the traditions of Anglo-Saxon culture.

2. The Dialogue with Lanfranc about St. Ælfgeus/Ælfheah

Let us look at another example of Anselm’s acceptance of Anglo-Saxon culture that is reported by Eadmer. This example involves a dialogue that Lanfranc and Anselm had about the Anglo-Saxon era Archbishop of Canterbury, Ælfgeus/Ælfheah (died in 1012). Ælfheah was captured during a Dane invasion and he was later murdered because he would not allow the payment of ransom money that had been extorted from the poor. The people of England regarded him a saint and martyr and he was honored with a feast day in the church calendar (April 19th). Lanfranc was dubious about whether Ælfheah really qualified as a martyr. This was because Ælfheah was killed not for the sake of Christ as such, but because he would not allow his ransom to be paid. Anselm addressed Lanfranc’s doubts. According to Anselm, the direct cause of Ælfheah’s death was indeed not his refusal to deny Christ, but his refusal to accept the payment of ransom money that was stolen from his people. What was in Ælfheah’s heart at this time was the desire to defend justice, and it was for this righteous act that he was killed. Because Ælfheah died in the cause of justice, he qualifies as a martyr. The basis for this is as follows. The Church venerates John the Baptist as the first martyr. However, John the Baptist was killed, not because he refused to deny Christ, but because he desired to speak the truth. In other words, he died for the sake of truth. Incidentally, the Scripture says that Christ is both truth and justice. Therefore, to die for the sake of truth is to die for the sake of Christ, and likewise to die for the sake of justice is to die for the sake of Christ. Thus, Ælfheah is regarded as a martyr. Lanfranc accepted Anselm’s argument.

There is a reason why Lanfranc had no choice but to accept Anselm’s argument, which was based on the identification of justice and truth. He had previously written an annotation for a difficult passage in the Epistle to the Romans Chapter 3 Verses 4-10, in which he explained that justice and truth are one and the same. There is no doubt that Lanfranc’s Commentary provided essential material for Anselm’s reflections. One of the fruits of his reflections can be considered to have been his argument concerning Ælfheah. After returning from England, Anselm penned On Truth (around 1080–1086). In this work, he defined truth and justice via the concept of “rectitude” (rectitudo). When Anselm discusses truth of action in Chapter V, he quotes from Chapter 3 Verse 13 of The Gospel According to Saint John: “He who does evil hates the light,” and then states “He does not separate from this truth or light one who suffers persecution for justice’s sake.” The dialogue he had with Lanfranc concerning Ælfheah may well have been on Anselm’s mind when he wrote these words.

However, what must be emphasized here above all else is that Anselm’s rational argument rescued the cult (cultus) of Saint Ælfheah and his feast day, which were part of the liturgical traditions of churches and monasteries in England, from extinction. According to Eadmer’s account, “Lanfranc ordered a careful history of his life and passion to be written. This history was nobly written at his command by Osbern, a monk of Canterbury, of happy memory, who wrote it not only in plain prose for reading, but also put it music for singing.” This Osbern is not the same as the man discussed earlier on, but it should indeed be mentioned that he was a disciple of Anselm in Bec.

With regards to Anselm’s ideas on friendship, we learnt earlier that liturgy is the place for “coexistence” with the dead, but we should also see that the “coexistence” of liturgical tradition and liturgical culture, by which there is “coexistence” with the dead, is accomplished by a spirit of rationality and tolerance.
It is no exaggeration to say that Anselm’s chief responsibility as Archbishop of Canterbury was to work out how to achieve harmony between the Anglo-Saxon era traditions of churches and monasteries, the reform movement of Pope Gregory VII, and the traditions of Norman monasticism. However, there is no space to go into this in detail.

Concluding Remarks

We have considered Anselm’s ideas on “coexistence” between God and human, between nature and human, between human and human, and between cultures. It may seem strange to see liturgy as the setting for each type of “coexistence.” However, as the focus of Anselm’s life and thought was the search for God and coexistence with Him, the place where this was carried out in the most concrete way was liturgy: the place where one meets with God. What Anselm accomplished was an unprecedented synthesis of monastic spirituality and theology.


2 Monologion (=M) c. XXVIII, 46, 2–3: Si enim diligenter intendatur, ille solus videbitur simpliciter et perfecte et absolute esse, alia vero omnia fere non esse et vix esse.

3 De caso duaboli, c. I, 233, 10–11: Denique si non est aliquid nisi unus qui facit et quae facta sunt ab uno : clarum est quia nullatenus potest haberi aliquid nisi qui facit aut quod facit.

4 M. Prologus, 7, 1–3.

5 M. c. I, 13, 5–11: Si quis unam naturam, summam omnium quae sunt, ...aliaque perplura quae de deo sive de eius creatura necessarie credimus, aut non audiendo aut non credendo ignorant: puto quia ea ipsa ex magna parte, si vel mediocris ingenii est, potest ipse sibi saltem sola ratione persuadere.

6 M. Prologus, 7, 7–8.


8 M. c. XXXI, 49, 12–50, 10; c. LXVI, 77, 15–17.


10 M. c. LXVIII, 78, 21–23: Denique rationali naturae non est aliud esse rationalem, quam posse discernere iustum a non iusto, verum a non vero, bonum a non bono, magis bonum a minus bono.

11 Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, I, 10, 1.: In eorum quippe animabus ratio, quae et princeps et iudex debet omnium esse quae sunt in homine....

12 M. c. LXVI, 77, 4–24.

13 M. c. LXVIII, 78, 14–19: Consequi itaque videtur quia rationalis creatura nihil tantum debet studere, quam hanc imaginem sibi per naturalen potentiam impressam per voluntarium effectum exprimere. Etenim praeter hoc quia creanti se debet hoc ipsum quod est: hinc quoque quia nil tam praecipuum posse quam reminisci et intelligere et amare summum bonum cognoscitur, nimium nihil tam praecipue debere velle convincitur.

14 Proslogion (=P). c. I, 100, 12–18: Fateor, domine, et gratias ago, quia creasti in me hanc imaginem tuam, ut tui memor te cogitem, te amem. ... Non tenui, domine, penetrare altitudinem tuam, quia nullatenus comparo illi intellectum meum; sed desidero aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam, quam credit et amat cor meum. Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.

15 P. c. XIX, 115, 14–15: ... tu autem, licet nihil sit sine te, non est tamen in loco aut tempore, sed omnia sunt in te. Nihil enim te continet, sed tu contines omnia.

16 Benedictus, Regula, c. XIX, 1–2, 6–7: Ubique credimus divinam esse praesentiam et oculos Domini in omni loco speculator bonos et malos, maxime tamen hoc sine aliqua dubitatione credamus cum ad opus divinum adimitus. ... Ergo consideremus, quater oportet in conspectu divinitatis et angelorum eius esse, et sic stemus ad psallendum, ut mens nostra concordet voci nostrae. The source for the text is Benedictus, 1992, Die Benediktusregel, Lateinisch/Deutsch. Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Salzburger Abteikonferenz, Beuron.

17 Commentatio operis ad Urbanum Papatam II 40, 10–11: Denique quoniam inter fidem et speciem intellectum quem in hac vita
capimus esse medium intelligo.


19 M. c. VII, 22, 5–10: Quoniam ergo certissime patet quia essentia omnium, quae praeter summam essentiam sunt, ab eadem summa essentia facta est, et quia ex nulla materia est: procul dubio nihil apertius quam illa summa essentia tantam rerum molem, tam numerosam multitudinem, tam formosam formatam, tam ordinate variatam, tam convenienter diversam sola per seipsam produxit ex nihilo.

20 M. c. XIII, 27, 15.

21 De conceptu virginiali et de originali peccato, c. XI, 154, 4–8 : Cum igitur omnia quae sunt, si diligenter considerentur, sint aut sola voluntate dei, aut natura secundum vim illi a deo inditam, aut voluntate creaturae ; et ea quae nec natura creatae nec volutas creaturae sed solus deus facit, semper miranda sint : apparebat quia quae sunt cursus rerum, scilicet mirabilis, naturalis, voluntarius.

22 Cur Deus homo, l. I, c. XXI, 89, 12–13 : Fateri me necesse est quia pro conservanda tota creatura nihil deberebamus facere contra voluntatem dei.

23 For more on ʻordo,’ see cf. Constable, G., 1995, “The Order of Society,” in Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social Thought, Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press, 249–360.11. For more on the eleventh century and the origins of these three classes, see pages 279–288 and pages 279–288, respectively, of the same book.


27 According to Evans, G. R., ed., 1984, A Concordance to the Works of St Anselm. 4vols. New York. Anselm uses the word conscientia 87 times. It appears in 70 places in Epistola and 14 places in Oratio and Meditatio. The word conscio (awareness) is used 20 times.

28 Ep. 16, 121, 3-7: Instat et instat mihi conscius alterius suae conscientiae, id est meae, ut ad se trans mare voliit et voliit saepius litterae meae, quasi volens discere statum amicitiae meae. Sed quid te docebit epistola mea quod ignores, o tu altera anima mea ? »Intra in cubiculum « cordis tui et considera affectum veri amoris tui, et cognosces amorem veri amici tui. Quamquam enim pares non simus morum aequalitate, tamen non audeo dicere impares ; sed certe dissimiles non sumus mutui amoris qualitate. Namque fatero – quamvis erubescentes ~, fatero, inquam, quia tepida mea caritas a tua fervida caritate superatur. ...

34 P. c. XXV, 119, 4–7: Si amicitia: diligent deum plus quam seipsos, et invicem tamquam seipsos, et deus illos plus quam illi seipsos; quia illum et se et se invicem per illum, et ille se et illos per seipsum.

35 Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomacheia, IX, c. 11, 117a.


37 Ep. 35, 143, 22–24: Domum MAURITIUM, quem esse meum dilectum et dilectorem non ignoras, sic tibi commedo, ut et ipse gaudeat se inter barbaros fratrem invenisse.... ; Ep. 80, 203, 9–10: Quamvis enim barbaris vestra praelata sit sanctitas, quos verbis docere propter linguarum diversitatem non potestis,....

38 Vita Anselmi l. I, c. xxix : ...rationalitatem ostendens eum qui caritatem erga alterum habet majus aliquid habere, quam illum ad quem caritas ipsa habetur.

39 Ibid. l. I, c. xxix : ...et cotta aut in capitulo, aut in clausuro mira quaedam et illis adhuc temporibus insolita de vita et moribus monachorum coram eis rationabiliter ostendens eum qui caritatem erga alterum habet majus aliquid habere, quam illum ad quem caritas ipsa habetur.


43 Vita Anselmi, l. I, c. xxxi: Vadens autem et ad diversa monasteria monachorum, canonicerum, sanctimonialium, necnon ad curias quorumque nobilium prout eum ratio ducebat perveniens; laetissime suscipiebatur, et suscepto quaeque caritatis obsequia gratissime ministrabantur. Quid ille ? Solito more cunctis se jocundum et affabilem exhibeat, moresque singulorum in quantum sine peccato poterat in suscipiebat. ...non eo ut aliis mos est docendi modo exercebat, sed longe aliter, singula quaeque sub vulgaribus et notis exemplis proponens, solidaque rationis testimonio fulciens, ac remota omni ambiguitate in mentibus auditorum deponens.